Sunday, December 21, 2008
Moving Over to Friar Forecast
I am very happy to announce that I will now be a part of Friar Forecast, and would like to thank Myron for the opportunity to join him, Mike, and Ben in contributing to the site. Because many of you already frequent Friar Forecast on a regular basis, this move should be an added convenience, allowing you to get more of your Padres content with less hassle. For those who are unfamiliar with Myron's site, I heartily recommend you check it out, as a lot of interesting insight is published there on a frequent basis. Thank you to those who have been reading this blog, and I hope to hear from you over at Friar Forecast.
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Trade will be Judged on Greene's Ability to Bounce Back
Initial reports state the Padres will receive relief pitcher Mark Worrell, as well as a "player to be named later" from the Cardinals in return for Khalil Greene.
Supposedly Worrell is a submariner who can get his fastball up into the low-90s and has an average slider. He followed up a nice 2007 season with an even better 2008 minor league season, striking out 80 batters, compared to 30 walks in 58.2 innings. His ERA of 2.15 reflected his ability to miss bats, and prevent the long-ball (only 2 HR allowed). These numbers are even more impressive in the context of his league (the PCL).
Baseball Prospectus's translated minor league statistics suggest Worrell would have put up a 3.65 DERA in the major leagues. Worrell should earn a spot in the Padre's 2009 bullpen, and based on his minor league profile, looks to be a decent bet to have a pretty good season. At 25 years old, and with minimal big league experience Worrell will be under team control through his prime years.
While I am pleased about adding Worrell, and am optimistic he will be another K.T. "bullpen gem," the fact Worrell is a reliever puts a damper on his value. Not only do relievers not pitch many innings, but their performance is notoriously volatile across seasons. Likewise, there is some risk that Worrell's odd delivery will not fool big league hitters like it did minor leaguers.
We can analyze the Padre's return all we want, but the bottom line is this trade will not be evaluated in the context of who the Padres received, but rather whether Khalil Greene is able to bounce back from a disastrous 2008 season, and put up reasonable numbers while playing a decent shortstop. Greeney has never been good at getting on base, but if he can somehow replicate, or even approach his 2005-2007 line (once park effects are adjusted for), the Cardinals are likely to come out on top in this deal.
Personally, and this is pure speculation, I see Greene rebounding and having solid seasons going forward. He will probably never be an allstar, but capable every day shortstops are not easy to find cheaply (they are certainly more difficult than finding cheap, capable relievers). It might have been in the Padres best long-term interests to try and sign Khalil to a steeply discounted multi-year deal now rather than trading him away. Of course, the Padres know more about Greene than I do, and we should probably give them the benefit of the doubt on this one. If they planned on letting Greene walk after the season, because the Padres are unlikely to contend in 2009, it makes sense to get as much as possible for him now. Likewise, Greene might have had no interest in signing a dirt cheap contract extension following his worst season as a pro.
Assuming the Padres made this trade for baseball reasons, rather than as a reaction to a short-term cash flow problem, I have no problem with it since I trust the team's ability to evaluate players. But my feelings are reversed if management had reason to believe Greene's 2008 performance was bit of an outlier, and would have otherwise liked to hold onto him, possibly signing him to a contract extension. Since there is no way to know what the Padres true motives for dealing Greene were, I guess we'll just have to wait and see. Hopefully things work out in the Friar's favor.
Supposedly Worrell is a submariner who can get his fastball up into the low-90s and has an average slider. He followed up a nice 2007 season with an even better 2008 minor league season, striking out 80 batters, compared to 30 walks in 58.2 innings. His ERA of 2.15 reflected his ability to miss bats, and prevent the long-ball (only 2 HR allowed). These numbers are even more impressive in the context of his league (the PCL).
Baseball Prospectus's translated minor league statistics suggest Worrell would have put up a 3.65 DERA in the major leagues. Worrell should earn a spot in the Padre's 2009 bullpen, and based on his minor league profile, looks to be a decent bet to have a pretty good season. At 25 years old, and with minimal big league experience Worrell will be under team control through his prime years.
While I am pleased about adding Worrell, and am optimistic he will be another K.T. "bullpen gem," the fact Worrell is a reliever puts a damper on his value. Not only do relievers not pitch many innings, but their performance is notoriously volatile across seasons. Likewise, there is some risk that Worrell's odd delivery will not fool big league hitters like it did minor leaguers.
We can analyze the Padre's return all we want, but the bottom line is this trade will not be evaluated in the context of who the Padres received, but rather whether Khalil Greene is able to bounce back from a disastrous 2008 season, and put up reasonable numbers while playing a decent shortstop. Greeney has never been good at getting on base, but if he can somehow replicate, or even approach his 2005-2007 line (once park effects are adjusted for), the Cardinals are likely to come out on top in this deal.
Personally, and this is pure speculation, I see Greene rebounding and having solid seasons going forward. He will probably never be an allstar, but capable every day shortstops are not easy to find cheaply (they are certainly more difficult than finding cheap, capable relievers). It might have been in the Padres best long-term interests to try and sign Khalil to a steeply discounted multi-year deal now rather than trading him away. Of course, the Padres know more about Greene than I do, and we should probably give them the benefit of the doubt on this one. If they planned on letting Greene walk after the season, because the Padres are unlikely to contend in 2009, it makes sense to get as much as possible for him now. Likewise, Greene might have had no interest in signing a dirt cheap contract extension following his worst season as a pro.
Assuming the Padres made this trade for baseball reasons, rather than as a reaction to a short-term cash flow problem, I have no problem with it since I trust the team's ability to evaluate players. But my feelings are reversed if management had reason to believe Greene's 2008 performance was bit of an outlier, and would have otherwise liked to hold onto him, possibly signing him to a contract extension. Since there is no way to know what the Padres true motives for dealing Greene were, I guess we'll just have to wait and see. Hopefully things work out in the Friar's favor.
Greene Traded to Cardinals
ESPN is reporting Khalil Greene has been traded to the Saint Louis Cardinals. I plan on commenting once we know who the Padres will receive in return. Honestly, I am not holding out much hope that the Padres received significantly more than salary relief. If that is the case, you can rest assured I will not be a fan of the deal.
Update: It appears Tom Krasovic of the U.T. had the story first.
Update 2: Here is a more detailed analysis (though certainly not complete analysis) of the trade.
Update: It appears Tom Krasovic of the U.T. had the story first.
Update 2: Here is a more detailed analysis (though certainly not complete analysis) of the trade.
Monday, November 10, 2008
The Final Out
I attend a handful of Padres games per season. Most of these games, taken by themselves, have little impact on the overall success of the team that season. Whether the Padres win or lose is somewhat irrelevant.
What keeps me in my seat for the entire game is not the uncertainty of the outcome, the thrill of watching a big league ball game, or even my passion for the sport. Rather, it is the possibility that Trevor Hoffman might get called upon to close out a game, and jog in from center field to "Hells Bells." I love the anticipation of Hoffman's departure from the bullpen, the blaring music, the blackened scoreboard, and most of all the energy of the crowd.
If Buster Olney is correct, I may have witnessed my last "Hells Bells" in Petco Park. While I realize Hoffman's skills have diminished, he is not only still an effective closer, but a fixture in the San Diego community, and the reason I never leave my seat until the final out has been recorded. From a pure baseball/profit-making perspective Trevor Hoffman might not be worth keeping around for more than $4-5 million, but from my perspective (as a guy who merely watches the games rather than signs the paychecks), Hoffman is worth, assuming he is willing to agree to a 1-year deal, whatever it takes to sign him.
What keeps me in my seat for the entire game is not the uncertainty of the outcome, the thrill of watching a big league ball game, or even my passion for the sport. Rather, it is the possibility that Trevor Hoffman might get called upon to close out a game, and jog in from center field to "Hells Bells." I love the anticipation of Hoffman's departure from the bullpen, the blaring music, the blackened scoreboard, and most of all the energy of the crowd.
If Buster Olney is correct, I may have witnessed my last "Hells Bells" in Petco Park. While I realize Hoffman's skills have diminished, he is not only still an effective closer, but a fixture in the San Diego community, and the reason I never leave my seat until the final out has been recorded. From a pure baseball/profit-making perspective Trevor Hoffman might not be worth keeping around for more than $4-5 million, but from my perspective (as a guy who merely watches the games rather than signs the paychecks), Hoffman is worth, assuming he is willing to agree to a 1-year deal, whatever it takes to sign him.
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
No More Matt and Mud
http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2008/nov/03/padres-s4padtv/?padres
Oddly, I am more dissapointed about this news than the fact Peavy might be traded. Previously, I shared my feelings about the quality of Matty V's. work, so it isn't really neccesary for me to elaborate. While I will certainly miss hearing Matt call Padres games, he had long ago outgrown the market, and this day was going to come sooner than later. I wish Matt the best in his new job, and hope the Padres bring in someone with the same combination of personality and baseball knowledge as Matty V.
By the way, did anybody hear Vasgersian's football two weeks ago. He invented a truly brilliant phrase for icing the kicker: "clock blocking."
Oddly, I am more dissapointed about this news than the fact Peavy might be traded. Previously, I shared my feelings about the quality of Matty V's. work, so it isn't really neccesary for me to elaborate. While I will certainly miss hearing Matt call Padres games, he had long ago outgrown the market, and this day was going to come sooner than later. I wish Matt the best in his new job, and hope the Padres bring in someone with the same combination of personality and baseball knowledge as Matty V.
By the way, did anybody hear Vasgersian's football two weeks ago. He invented a truly brilliant phrase for icing the kicker: "clock blocking."
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Thursday, October 23, 2008
No-Trade Clauses
In the comments of my previous post, one reader asked me to explain why a team would ever give a player a no-trade clause. While a player with a no-trade clause is certainly more difficult to trade than a player without a no-trade clause, there are plenty of valid reasons to "give" them to some players...
1) A no-trade clause does not mean that player cannot be traded. Often, players will consent to be traded even if they have a no-trade clause. In 2008 alone, Scott Rolen, Johan Santana, Manny Ramirez, Ken Griffey Jr., and Greg Maddux were all traded in spite of their no-trade powers. Some of these players threatened to veto deals to particular clubs, or specified a few "acceptable" teams, but the fact remains they were traded. The definition of a trade means the acquiring team values a certain player more than the team currently with a player. It seems that players like to be where they are most wanted, and will often change their mind and agree to a trade they previously said they would veto. Additionally, teams are often able to provide incentives to a player to waive his no-trade clause. An extra option year may be picked up, or an extension to the player's contract offered. No-trade clauses make it marginally more difficult to move players, but does not make it impossible.
2) The no-trade clause may be important to a player, and he will insist on having one included in his contract. Many baseball players have families. They have friends. They have a life outside of baseball. No-trade clauses protect players against disruptions in their lives outside of baseball. They ensure that they cannot be arbitrarily assigned to some club on the other side of the country without their consent. In the specific case of the Padres, some players may (I am not sure if this actually exists) have taken a "San Diego discount." The insertion of a no-trade clause, or other contract mechanism such as an escalation in salary in the case of a trade, guarantees their "discount" is only applicable to San Diego.
Obviously players value no-trade clauses, but they are also costly (albeit in a non-monetary fashion) for teams. Theoretically, the full cost of the no-trade clause is recognized by teams, and some sort of acceptable concession is made on the part of the player. Say a player is worth $10 million per year, and values a no-trade clause at $1 million per year. The team believes their true cost of a no-trade clause is only $0.5 million per year because there is a high probability they will be able to trade the player anyway. Because the no-trade clause is valued asymetrically, the player can be paid anywhere between $9 million and $9.5 million and both parties will be better off because of it. The club will pay, including the cost of the no-trade clause, less than the $10 million the player is worth, and the player will get more than the $10 million he is worth.
3) The "10 and 5 rule" lessens the impact of contractually guaranteed no-trade clauses. The collective bargaining agreement gives any player who has been in MLB for 10 years, including 5 years on his current team full no-trade powers. In many cases, players who ink a contract with a no-trade clause are really only getting 1 or 2 additional years of no-trade protection above what they would already have received.
I am sure I am omitting some of the reasons teams may give no-trade clauses, but the overiding reason they exist is "reason number 2." No-trade clauses can be a win-win, making both the team and the player better off due to the asymetry of their valuations of the no-trade clause. Sometimes no-trade clauses come back to bite a team in the rear-end, but so do many contracts without no-trade clauses. The no-trade clause is not what "kills" the team, but rather a mistake in the initial player evaluation.
1) A no-trade clause does not mean that player cannot be traded. Often, players will consent to be traded even if they have a no-trade clause. In 2008 alone, Scott Rolen, Johan Santana, Manny Ramirez, Ken Griffey Jr., and Greg Maddux were all traded in spite of their no-trade powers. Some of these players threatened to veto deals to particular clubs, or specified a few "acceptable" teams, but the fact remains they were traded. The definition of a trade means the acquiring team values a certain player more than the team currently with a player. It seems that players like to be where they are most wanted, and will often change their mind and agree to a trade they previously said they would veto. Additionally, teams are often able to provide incentives to a player to waive his no-trade clause. An extra option year may be picked up, or an extension to the player's contract offered. No-trade clauses make it marginally more difficult to move players, but does not make it impossible.
2) The no-trade clause may be important to a player, and he will insist on having one included in his contract. Many baseball players have families. They have friends. They have a life outside of baseball. No-trade clauses protect players against disruptions in their lives outside of baseball. They ensure that they cannot be arbitrarily assigned to some club on the other side of the country without their consent. In the specific case of the Padres, some players may (I am not sure if this actually exists) have taken a "San Diego discount." The insertion of a no-trade clause, or other contract mechanism such as an escalation in salary in the case of a trade, guarantees their "discount" is only applicable to San Diego.
Obviously players value no-trade clauses, but they are also costly (albeit in a non-monetary fashion) for teams. Theoretically, the full cost of the no-trade clause is recognized by teams, and some sort of acceptable concession is made on the part of the player. Say a player is worth $10 million per year, and values a no-trade clause at $1 million per year. The team believes their true cost of a no-trade clause is only $0.5 million per year because there is a high probability they will be able to trade the player anyway. Because the no-trade clause is valued asymetrically, the player can be paid anywhere between $9 million and $9.5 million and both parties will be better off because of it. The club will pay, including the cost of the no-trade clause, less than the $10 million the player is worth, and the player will get more than the $10 million he is worth.
3) The "10 and 5 rule" lessens the impact of contractually guaranteed no-trade clauses. The collective bargaining agreement gives any player who has been in MLB for 10 years, including 5 years on his current team full no-trade powers. In many cases, players who ink a contract with a no-trade clause are really only getting 1 or 2 additional years of no-trade protection above what they would already have received.
I am sure I am omitting some of the reasons teams may give no-trade clauses, but the overiding reason they exist is "reason number 2." No-trade clauses can be a win-win, making both the team and the player better off due to the asymetry of their valuations of the no-trade clause. Sometimes no-trade clauses come back to bite a team in the rear-end, but so do many contracts without no-trade clauses. The no-trade clause is not what "kills" the team, but rather a mistake in the initial player evaluation.
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