Sunday, December 21, 2008

Moving Over to Friar Forecast

I am very happy to announce that I will now be a part of Friar Forecast, and would like to thank Myron for the opportunity to join him, Mike, and Ben in contributing to the site. Because many of you already frequent Friar Forecast on a regular basis, this move should be an added convenience, allowing you to get more of your Padres content with less hassle. For those who are unfamiliar with Myron's site, I heartily recommend you check it out, as a lot of interesting insight is published there on a frequent basis. Thank you to those who have been reading this blog, and I hope to hear from you over at Friar Forecast.

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Trade will be Judged on Greene's Ability to Bounce Back

Initial reports state the Padres will receive relief pitcher Mark Worrell, as well as a "player to be named later" from the Cardinals in return for Khalil Greene.

Supposedly Worrell is a submariner who can get his fastball up into the low-90s and has an average slider. He followed up a nice 2007 season with an even better 2008 minor league season, striking out 80 batters, compared to 30 walks in 58.2 innings. His ERA of 2.15 reflected his ability to miss bats, and prevent the long-ball (only 2 HR allowed). These numbers are even more impressive in the context of his league (the PCL).

Baseball Prospectus's translated minor league statistics suggest Worrell would have put up a 3.65 DERA in the major leagues. Worrell should earn a spot in the Padre's 2009 bullpen, and based on his minor league profile, looks to be a decent bet to have a pretty good season. At 25 years old, and with minimal big league experience Worrell will be under team control through his prime years.

While I am pleased about adding Worrell, and am optimistic he will be another K.T. "bullpen gem," the fact Worrell is a reliever puts a damper on his value. Not only do relievers not pitch many innings, but their performance is notoriously volatile across seasons. Likewise, there is some risk that Worrell's odd delivery will not fool big league hitters like it did minor leaguers.

We can analyze the Padre's return all we want, but the bottom line is this trade will not be evaluated in the context of who the Padres received, but rather whether Khalil Greene is able to bounce back from a disastrous 2008 season, and put up reasonable numbers while playing a decent shortstop. Greeney has never been good at getting on base, but if he can somehow replicate, or even approach his 2005-2007 line (once park effects are adjusted for), the Cardinals are likely to come out on top in this deal.

Personally, and this is pure speculation, I see Greene rebounding and having solid seasons going forward. He will probably never be an allstar, but capable every day shortstops are not easy to find cheaply (they are certainly more difficult than finding cheap, capable relievers). It might have been in the Padres best long-term interests to try and sign Khalil to a steeply discounted multi-year deal now rather than trading him away. Of course, the Padres know more about Greene than I do, and we should probably give them the benefit of the doubt on this one. If they planned on letting Greene walk after the season, because the Padres are unlikely to contend in 2009, it makes sense to get as much as possible for him now. Likewise, Greene might have had no interest in signing a dirt cheap contract extension following his worst season as a pro.

Assuming the Padres made this trade for baseball reasons, rather than as a reaction to a short-term cash flow problem, I have no problem with it since I trust the team's ability to evaluate players. But my feelings are reversed if management had reason to believe Greene's 2008 performance was bit of an outlier, and would have otherwise liked to hold onto him, possibly signing him to a contract extension. Since there is no way to know what the Padres true motives for dealing Greene were, I guess we'll just have to wait and see. Hopefully things work out in the Friar's favor.

Greene Traded to Cardinals

ESPN is reporting Khalil Greene has been traded to the Saint Louis Cardinals. I plan on commenting once we know who the Padres will receive in return. Honestly, I am not holding out much hope that the Padres received significantly more than salary relief. If that is the case, you can rest assured I will not be a fan of the deal.

Update: It appears Tom Krasovic of the U.T. had the story first.

Update 2: Here is a more detailed analysis (though certainly not complete analysis) of the trade.

Monday, November 10, 2008

The Final Out

I attend a handful of Padres games per season. Most of these games, taken by themselves, have little impact on the overall success of the team that season. Whether the Padres win or lose is somewhat irrelevant.

What keeps me in my seat for the entire game is not the uncertainty of the outcome, the thrill of watching a big league ball game, or even my passion for the sport. Rather, it is the possibility that Trevor Hoffman might get called upon to close out a game, and jog in from center field to "Hells Bells." I love the anticipation of Hoffman's departure from the bullpen, the blaring music, the blackened scoreboard, and most of all the energy of the crowd.

If Buster Olney is correct, I may have witnessed my last "Hells Bells" in Petco Park. While I realize Hoffman's skills have diminished, he is not only still an effective closer, but a fixture in the San Diego community, and the reason I never leave my seat until the final out has been recorded. From a pure baseball/profit-making perspective Trevor Hoffman might not be worth keeping around for more than $4-5 million, but from my perspective (as a guy who merely watches the games rather than signs the paychecks), Hoffman is worth, assuming he is willing to agree to a 1-year deal, whatever it takes to sign him.

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

No More Matt and Mud

http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2008/nov/03/padres-s4padtv/?padres

Oddly, I am more dissapointed about this news than the fact Peavy might be traded. Previously, I shared my feelings about the quality of Matty V's. work, so it isn't really neccesary for me to elaborate. While I will certainly miss hearing Matt call Padres games, he had long ago outgrown the market, and this day was going to come sooner than later. I wish Matt the best in his new job, and hope the Padres bring in someone with the same combination of personality and baseball knowledge as Matty V.

By the way, did anybody hear Vasgersian's football two weeks ago. He invented a truly brilliant phrase for icing the kicker: "clock blocking."

Thursday, October 23, 2008

No-Trade Clauses

In the comments of my previous post, one reader asked me to explain why a team would ever give a player a no-trade clause. While a player with a no-trade clause is certainly more difficult to trade than a player without a no-trade clause, there are plenty of valid reasons to "give" them to some players...

1) A no-trade clause does not mean that player cannot be traded. Often, players will consent to be traded even if they have a no-trade clause. In 2008 alone, Scott Rolen, Johan Santana, Manny Ramirez, Ken Griffey Jr., and Greg Maddux were all traded in spite of their no-trade powers. Some of these players threatened to veto deals to particular clubs, or specified a few "acceptable" teams, but the fact remains they were traded. The definition of a trade means the acquiring team values a certain player more than the team currently with a player. It seems that players like to be where they are most wanted, and will often change their mind and agree to a trade they previously said they would veto. Additionally, teams are often able to provide incentives to a player to waive his no-trade clause. An extra option year may be picked up, or an extension to the player's contract offered. No-trade clauses make it marginally more difficult to move players, but does not make it impossible.

2) The no-trade clause may be important to a player, and he will insist on having one included in his contract. Many baseball players have families. They have friends. They have a life outside of baseball. No-trade clauses protect players against disruptions in their lives outside of baseball. They ensure that they cannot be arbitrarily assigned to some club on the other side of the country without their consent. In the specific case of the Padres, some players may (I am not sure if this actually exists) have taken a "San Diego discount." The insertion of a no-trade clause, or other contract mechanism such as an escalation in salary in the case of a trade, guarantees their "discount" is only applicable to San Diego.

Obviously players value no-trade clauses, but they are also costly (albeit in a non-monetary fashion) for teams. Theoretically, the full cost of the no-trade clause is recognized by teams, and some sort of acceptable concession is made on the part of the player. Say a player is worth $10 million per year, and values a no-trade clause at $1 million per year. The team believes their true cost of a no-trade clause is only $0.5 million per year because there is a high probability they will be able to trade the player anyway. Because the no-trade clause is valued asymetrically, the player can be paid anywhere between $9 million and $9.5 million and both parties will be better off because of it. The club will pay, including the cost of the no-trade clause, less than the $10 million the player is worth, and the player will get more than the $10 million he is worth.

3) The "10 and 5 rule" lessens the impact of contractually guaranteed no-trade clauses. The collective bargaining agreement gives any player who has been in MLB for 10 years, including 5 years on his current team full no-trade powers. In many cases, players who ink a contract with a no-trade clause are really only getting 1 or 2 additional years of no-trade protection above what they would already have received.

I am sure I am omitting some of the reasons teams may give no-trade clauses, but the overiding reason they exist is "reason number 2." No-trade clauses can be a win-win, making both the team and the player better off due to the asymetry of their valuations of the no-trade clause. Sometimes no-trade clauses come back to bite a team in the rear-end, but so do many contracts without no-trade clauses. The no-trade clause is not what "kills" the team, but rather a mistake in the initial player evaluation.

Friday, October 17, 2008

Trading Peavy: It's all About Excess Value

Today I received an email from a Padre fan upset about the possibility Jake Peavy may be traded. The letter began:

As you may have heard the Padres are actively, yes actively, shopping Jake Peavy and hope to find a suitor before free agency begins. I want to start off by saying that moving him would be stupid...period. There is no excuse, no way to justify it. Not "potential" injuries, not cost, not anything. A pitcher of his caliber is going for 20 mil/a year now (Santana and what Sabathia will get)...

This letter epitomizes a widespread misunderstanding about player value. Jake Peavy may very well be worth $20 million on the free agent market, but that does not mean he has more value than a player (or set of players) who would be worth $10 million as a free agent.

Peavy's true value to the team is the difference between his marginal revenue product and his salary. If we assume Jake Peavy is a $20 million pitcher, then (all else equal) he will generate an average of $5.25 million in surplus value for the Padres over the next 4 years. Just because this (highly limited) model predicts Peavy generates positive value for the Padres over a 4 year period does not mean the Padres should not explore a trade. Another team could offer a package of young players expected to generate $10 million dollars per season with a collective cost of $2 million per season. If the Padres were to accept this trade they would be better off. Instead of earning $5.25 million per year of profit, the Padres would be making profits of $8 million.

Of course, as fans, we are not interested in how much profit the team makes, but rather how well the team does. My example seems to suggest the Padres would neccesarily get worse, as they are losing $10 million per year in production. What I failed to mention was assuming the team maintains an even payroll, making this trade could be the first step toward improving the team.

Over the next 4 seasons, the Padres will pay Jake Peavy a non-discounted average of approximately $15 million. In my theoretical trade, the Padres take back $2 million per year in salary obligations. This leaves $13 million per season to spend on additional players. Assuming the Padres maintain an even payroll, the team will have replaced $20 million of production with $23 million of production (Note: there are enough replacement level players on the current roster such that their contributions can essentially be ignored). In addition to getting $3 million dollars better, the Padres will have also reduced their risk. This includes both the risk of injury, and the risk of poor performance.

Now, what if the Padres do reduce payroll. Should we as fans still support a trade of Jake Peavy? In short, yes. Lets assume the Padres are planning to reduce their current projected 2009 payroll by $15 million and do not want to trade Jake Peavy. Instead, the team decides to forego resigning Brian Giles ($6 million in savings), and Trevor Hoffman (estimated $5.5 million in savings), and trades Khalil Greene ($6.5 million). These players are replaced by cheap talent that costs (and is expected to produce) $3 million. It is likely Giles, Hoffman, and Greene will collectively be worth in 2009 at least the $21 million I project they will be paid. If so, by reducing costs in this manner, the Padres will have gotten at least $18 million worse.

By trading Peavy, the Padres will be able to reduce costs while also aquiring valuable assets. In my example, the Padres only get $10 million worse by trading Peavy, which is certainly better than $18 million worse. (Disclosure: I am going to go ahead and use the $15 million per year average, rather than the actual 2009 salary number. But, if you want, you can trade Greene as well, and the team still does better than in the previous example). I recognize there are other ways to reduce payroll than getting rid of Giles, Hoffman, and Greene, but the concept is the same: the Padres will be unlikely to get much back in return. Instead, the full effects of payroll reduction are likely to be felt on the field. If the Padres are able to acquire surplus value for Peavy, not only is ownership better off, but the fans are better off as well. This is the case regardless of whether the team cuts payroll.

In this post I have used somewhat arbitrary examples. The reason for this was not to somehow prove the Padres should trade Jake Peavy. That type of analysis must include concepts such as the variability of Peavy's value depending on the projected success of the team. Rather, I merely wanted to demonstrate (and I know I am in some cases preaching to the choir) that if the Padres are able to deal Peavy to a team that more highly values his services, they should do it. The team, and the fans will be better off because of it.

Friday, September 26, 2008

There's Always Next Year

I leave for London tomorrow, where I will be for the next 9 or so months. So, while the season has yet to completely wind down, it is doubtful I will be able to crank out any more posts this season. I expect to be able to offer some sporadic thoughts throughout the off-season (particularly in response to notable events), but recognize these posts will probably be few in number.

In response to the disappointing season all Padres fans experienced in 2008:
There's Always Next Year.

Sunday, September 21, 2008

Math Demonstrates Just How Unlikely it is that the Padres Will Pick #1

In my previous post, I concluded: "theoretically it is possible the Padres will end up with the worst record, but the odds are not that great." Well, my curiosity got the best of me, and I decided to calculate just how small those odds actually are...

Using Bill James log5 method of estimating one-game winning percentages, I calculated the odds of both Washington and San Diego beating their opponents in any given game. I included an adjustment for home-field advantage, but did not account for pitching match ups. Although there is an extremely good chance Seattle actually winds up with the worst record in MLB, for the sake of simplicity, I am excluding them in this analysis.

The Padres are expected to beat the Dodgers 37% of the time, and Pittsburgh 51% of the time. Washington is expected to beat Florida 39% of the time, and Philly in 31% of their games. In short, over their next 6 games, ignoring pitching matchups, the Padres are expected to win 2.664 games, and Washington is expected to win 2.121 games.

In order to end up with a worse record than Washington, the Padres must lose 4 games more than Washington. Three situations exist which satisfy this requirement. The Nats can lose 0, and the Padres lose 4 or more games, the Nats can lose 1 game, and the Pads lose 5 or more games, or the Nats can lose 2 games, and the Padres lose 6 games.

The first situation has a probability of 0.00112214. The probability of the Padres losing 4 or more games is nearly 60%, but the probability of the Nationals losing 0 games is under 1%. Situation 2 has a probability of 0.0054376. Situation 3 has a likelihood of 0.002737. Taken as a whole, the probability of San Diego finishing with a worse record than Washington is under 1%. Combined with the fact that the Padres must also overtake Seattle for the worst record, it is extremely unlikely the Padres will select first in the 2009 draft.

The Padres Are Not Even Good at Losing

An absolutely heartbreaking weekend. I admit it, I am rooting for the Padres to lose games. I don't care if this team finishes with 100 losses or 99 losses. The season has long been over, and it almost certainly behooves the team to have the first pick in the draft. This is not to say the Padres themselves are purposely tanking games, but only that I am now actively rooting for the opposing teams.

By sweeping the Nationals this weekend, the Padres put themselves in a terrible position in the "Strasburg Sweepstakes." Not only did they win 3 games, but by definition, the Nats also lost 3 games. With 6 games to play, the Padres are 3 games "ahead" of Washington in the standings. Realistically, the Pads need Washington to win at least 5 of their final 6 games against Florida and Philly-both quality teams. Theoretically it is possible the Padres will end up with the worst record, but the odds are not that great.

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Thanks for the Memories-Chris Gwynn

My original plan was to just post the video of his 1996 11th inning pinch hit double against the Dodgers that catapulted the Padres into the playoffs, and say nothing more.  Unfortunately, I was unable to find the video online. Instead, I offer you the post-game celebration made possible by the other Gwynn's memorable hit...



Monday, September 15, 2008

Preserving Hoffman's Legacy

Not exactly new news, but Trevor Hoffman wants to return to the Padres in 2009.  Contrary to popular belief, Hoffman has not been that bad this season.  His 4.04 ERA is a little high for a closer, but he has 45 strike outs to only 8 walks in 42 innings.  The only problem has been a propensity to give up the long-ball, as his HR/9 is at 1.70, well above his career average of 1.38.  

Hoffman is still a quality reliever, and with the dearth of good bullpen arms on the team,  will almost certainly be welcomed back assuming his contract demands are not ridiculous.  

What I find interesting about the situation is many fans seem to wish Hoffman would just retire after the season.  They believe that he is ruining is legacy by continuing to pitch well past his prime, that he will somehow be remembered not as one of the best relievers in major league history, but as a middle of the road closer who made every save appearance an adventure toward the end of his career.

Personally, I have no problem with players continuing to play until no team will offer them a job, even if they are not still at their peak.  An athlete has a limited time frame in which to earn a living.  The money earned playing baseball basically has to last them a lifetime (yes, I realize they could transition to a different job, but most baseball players best, and most lucrative skill is playing baseball-not doing something else).

I have heard the argument that star players are better off protecting their legacy, that they have accumulated enough money in their careers already, and don't need another contract.  I find this line of reasoning silly.  

First, there is no reason to think that continuing to play past one's prime results in a reduced legacy.  Jordan came back and played for the Wizards, he is still considered the best basketball player of all time.  Willie Mays played one forgettable season for the Mets at age 42, but most remember his fantastic years with the Giants.  It seems to me that once removed from the short-term, people tend not to remember the last years of most athlete's careers (unless you are talking about Barry Bonds of course).  Hoffman is really at no risk of wrecking his legacy by continuing to play.  In fact, he may be enhancing it.  Hoffman will continue to accumulate saves, innings, and strikeouts, all of which will be positively referenced in hall of fame debates.  Note: His career ERA is not really at risk of a significant increase if he continues to play.

Second, even if you assume that a player's legacy is reduced by playing past his prime, I am not sure the magnitude of that reduction is enough to bypass the millions of dollars a contract will pay.  It seems ridiculous that a player would be so worried about what others think, that he would turn down such a large amount of money.

Hoffman is not a bad pitcher, and his presence on the Padres makes the team better than they would otherwise be.  So long as the team agrees with my assessment of his value, and Hoffman does in fact wish to continue playing, there is no reason he should not be welcomed back. Whether the fans think Hoffman should retire is irrelevant.  Whether Hoffman should continue to close out games is an entirely different debate.

Sunday, September 7, 2008

Gone for a Week

Not that many of you care, but I will probably be unable to post this upcoming week, as I will be out of town. I do however have a few taco shop bracket posts already lined up, so if you are following along at sdtacoshops.wordpress.com , you will continue to see updates throughout the week.

Saturday, September 6, 2008

SD Taco Shops

Besides, a love for baseball, I also enjoy frequenting the local taco shops. This month, I have a lot of extra time on my hands, so taking inspiration from Nate Silver's burrito bracket , I have decided to hold a similar contest to establish the best taco shop in San Diego County. If you are into this type of thing, feel free to follow along at: sdtacoshops.blogspot.com . There you can find the rules, the bracket, a map detailing the location of all the eateries, and the results of the first two match ups.

Thursday, September 4, 2008

Are the Padres Tanking Games?

Stephen Strasburg, is, at this time, widely recognized as the most promising talent eligible for the 2009 MLB draft. He is a SP who combines a fastball that reaches the mid to upper 90s with quality secondary pitches. He is seen as being close to major league ready, perhaps ready to assume a rotation spot within 2 years of being drafted. While there are certainly other intriguing prospects, the number one prize in the '09 draft is clearly Strasburg.

With the Padres well out of contention, it would seemingly behoove them to finish with the worst overall record, allowing the team to draft Strasburg. Recent moves such as starting Will Venable in CF, Matt Antonelli at 2B, and employing a 6 man rotation do not seem to have been made with the goal of winning ballgames.

With that said, many of those moves may have other explanations. Jody Gerut is probably not the long-term answer in CF. Venable may be. Giving him a chance to experience life in the big leagues, and face major league pitching could help him progress as a player. Same with Antonelli, who although he had a miserable overall batting line in AAA, has been hitting better of late, and could very well be the Padres opening day second baseman in '09.

The six-man rotation is a little trickier to explain. The Padres have had trouble fielding 5 good starters, let alone 6. Adding Wade LeBlanc and Josh Geer to the rotation makes some sense, with the logic being similar to that of playing Venable and Antonelli every day. On the other hand, adding Sean Estes to the rotation makes little sense. Estes had his last reasonably solid year in 2001 with the Giants. Since then, his performance, when healthy has been miserable. Of course, he has rarely been healthy. Estes has pitched 30 innings since 2005-not exactly a guy a team can count on to be healthy in the future. It is unlikely Estes will provide much value to the Padres in '09, so the only reason I can think of for him to be pitching every 6 days is to give Peavy extra rest.

Jake Peavy pitching every 6 days, rather than every 5 days does two things: it helps avoid unnecesarily overtaxing Peavy, and it also transfers some innings Peavy would have otherwise pitched to a (probably worse than) replacement level pitcher. One explanation implies the Padres are tanking games, the other merely suggests the Padres are being cautious with one of their most valuable assets.

Personally, I don't think the Padres would risk the hit to their reputation that would result from overtly tanking games. Rather, I believe the Padres primary motive is introducing some of their prospects to the majors in a relatively stress-free atmosphere, and protecting Peavy's arm. The fact that losing more games may actually benefit the team is just an added bonus which has allowed the Padres to be more aggressive in making September lineup and rotation adjustments at little cost.

I liken the situation to playing poker without money on the line. Going all-in on every hand, or otherwise disrespecting the game, is no fun for anybody involved. This type of behavior will draw the ire of others at the table. At the same time, with little to lose, it is likely everybody will play more aggressively, and even try out a new strategy or two (or in the Padres case-3 or 4).

Thursday, August 28, 2008

Thanks for the Memories-Bret Boone

In 2000, Bret Boone replaced the traded Quilvio Veras as the team’s second baseman. In Boone’s only season with the Friars, he provided almost exactly league average production-both offensively and defensively. If it were not for what happened next, Boone would not have been all that memorable.

The next season, Boone played for the Seattle Mariners. There, he was anything but average. He hit 37 homeruns, and had an OPS+ of 153. Perhaps Boone’s most remarkable feat in 2001 was his ability to match Barry Bonds in the race to see whose cranium could grow at the fastest rate.

During that 2001 season, Boone became the first player I suspected of using illegal performance enhancers. While my suspicions have never been confirmed (he was not named in the Mitchell Report), I still chuckle when I think about his remarkable mid-30s surge in both power and cap size. Thanks for the memories Bret!

Monday, August 25, 2008

Clarifying my Comments on Preseason Predictions

Geoff, at Ducksnorts seems to take issue with my statement that "I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins." He suggests that the answer to whether the Padres explicitly mislead the fans regarding the season outlook lies in how one "perceive[s] the front office." Geoff writes:

If you are inclined to mistrust them, then you will conclude that they were lying because this is consistent with your beliefs. It’s easy to find (or concoct) justifications for a particular point of view. What’s difficult is taking an honest look at a situation, with all its incumbent variables, and trying to figure out what’s actually happening.


I disagree. The answer is not necessarily a function of perception. In previous posts, I have vehemently defended the front office, going so far as to write: "The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward." I have supported the controversial goal of being "consistently competitive," have urged others to resist placing the blame on management, and have written glowingly of the decisions made in keeping or trading personnel and protecting our prospects.

With that said, it is not inconceivable that the Padres, who clearly have an interest in maintaining high expectations, would release the most optimistic results of their preseason projections. Prior to the season, PECOTA predicted 79 wins. An average of the opinions of 17 Baseball Prospectus writers felt the Padres would finish 4th in the NL West, ahead of only the Giants. Other quantitative systems predicted the Padres were a low to mid 80 win team. In fact, the only 2 projections I saw that forecasted close to a 90 win season belonged to The Hardball Times and the San Diego Padres (who obviously did not disclose their methodology).

Clearly there is no definitive proof that the Padres had internal models that were not as optimistic as their public prediction of 90 wins. I am choosing to believe that in the excitement of the off-season, the Padres released their most optimistic projections, and in the process may have mislead the fans. My belief is not biased from a lack of faith in the Padres. Rather, bias may exist because I have too much faith in the Padres and their ability to get things right.

Regardless of whether you believe that in this specific situation the Padres purposely mislead the fans, the underlying question remains: when is okay for the front office to lie?

An Unabashed Advertisement

Many of you are reading this site for the first time, having been directed from Ducksnorts. There, Geoff further developed the discussion I began in my previous post. Because comments have been temporarily disabled at Ducksnorts, I encourage all who wish to engage in the discussion to post their comments here. Even if you care not to comment, please feel free to check out some of my previous posts. Welcome.

Thursday, August 21, 2008

Is it Okay for the Front Office to Lie?

Asymmetric information makes baseball interesting. If all teams valued players the same way, then baseball would be little more than a game of luck (reasonable variation from expectations). Instead, teams with innovative management are able to gain an edge over their competitors by developing better models of player valuation.

Gains teams exhibit by possessing more precise knowledge tend to be short term. Recognizing the importance of OBP may have provided the Oakland Athletics with opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for a few years, but for a number of reasons including: other teams copying their successful tactics, the release of Moneyball (I am not sure how big of an effect this really had. If OBP was actually still undervalued, the As probably would not have allowed Michael Lewis to chronicle their secrets), and their top assistants leaving for other jobs around baseball, the competitive advantage the As received by more accurately valuing OBP quickly evaporated.

Because asymmetric information does not stay asymmetric forever, it is crucial for teams to actively protect their valuation models. This suggests the front office must keep some information from the fans, and at some level even mislead the public. It is likely that at any given time, the front office knows certain players are not very good. However, it may be in the best interest of the team to extol the virtues of those players, even if it misleads the fans as well.

Derek Carty, writing for The Hardball Times, references Paul DePodesta’s blog as a possible source of front office propaganda. In outlining the Padres who might have been traded at the deadline, DePodesta cherry picks stats that, in the absence of other information, make players like Randy Wolf look like they have all-star potential. Carty writes: “Perhaps my favorite quote comes in his discussion of Randy Wolf.
His collective line of 109 innings, 109 hits, 42 walks, and 100 k's is one of the better lines you'll find during this deadline, but his line of 101 innings, 95 hits, 33 walks, and 94 k's (3.48 ERA) without those two starts is even more indicative of the pitcher he has been. In fact, his 12 quality starts ranks 7th in the NL behind Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez (DePodesta).
Carty recognizes that smart GMs such as Theo Epstein or Billy Bean are unlikely to be swayed by the writings of DePodesta; however, a few GMs such as Ed Wade may actually believe some of what DePodesta writes. To favorably compare Wolf with Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez, is a useful sales tool to peddle Wolf, but at the same time is misleading.

In this situation, I doubt many Padre fans have a problem with DePodesta attempting to convince others that Wolf is actually a good pitcher. The club was already out of contention at the time of the post, and if a team overvalues Wolf, the Padres, and by extension the fans, can only benefit.

A messier version of a team misleading the public occurs when the team knows they will not be very good, but tries to convince the fans that the team will contend. In this situation, the team stands to benefit from the higher ticket sales that result from positive expectations. Some point to the Padres preseason prediction of 90 wins as unethical manipulation of their customers. Personally, I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins for this team. Perhaps a few simulations out of thousands resulted in a 90 win season, but there is no way that was the average result. At the same time, I don’t really have a problem with teams raising the level of expectations. Ticket buyers were never guaranteed a 90 win season. Additionally, the ballpark experience, while better when the team is winning, can still be fun when the team is losing.

Teams, including the Padres, clearly need to protect their player valuation secrets from other teams. To do this, the team is unable to let the fans in on much of the behind the scenes work that goes into constructing the ball club. It is when teams reveal only selective information in order to entice the fans to buy more tickets that an ethical debate can be had. To me, things like trying to convince the fans that the team is going to be good, or to accept higher beer prices for phony reasons, may be justified from a business perspective, and I have a hard time getting too worked up, but others may be more offended.

I know I've been rambling, and don't really have an answer as to when it is okay for a team to mislead its fans, but I am curious what others have to say on the topic...