The Padres were unable to make any deadline beating deals following the Randy Wolf trade. This should come as no real surprise to anyone. It is easy to suggest trading veterans for prospects, but getting anything back of value is an entirely different proposition.
Greg Maddux was the Padre who frequented the rumor mills the most often. Greg is, even at this point in his career, a decent pitcher who could possibly step in and be the fifth starter for a few contending teams. Maddux has been a few runs worse than the average pitcher this season, and was intriguing to teams like the Phillies who have had problems with consistency of their rotations. Had Maddux not possessed a no-trade clause, the Padres may have been able to snag a prospect similar, or even slightly better in quality to what they received in the Randy Wolf trade-nothing special, but certainly a potentially useful player.
Unfortunately (or fortunately if you really like seeing Maddux pitch in San Diego), Maddux has a no-trade clause, and he had no interest in going anywhere except for a contender on the West Coast. Maddux’s wishes basically limited the potential market to only the Dodgers. The Dodgers, recognizing the Padres had little leverage over them, probably offered the Padres nothing but the assumption of the remainder of Maddux’s contract.
If this were any other business, I would imagine the Padres would have made that trade. With no shot at the playoffs, there is really little financial logic to continuing to pay Maddux’s not so cheap salary. Better to let the Dodgers do so, and pocket the savings as profit. However, baseball is unlike most other businesses in that the customers are able to analyze the company’s every move. Had the Padres merely given Maddux away, to a division rival no less, a good majority of the fans would have been incensed. For whatever reason, fans tend to not like seeing an owner put profit into his own pocket. Trading Maddux for what would appear to be nothing, would be sure to cause such a P.R. backlash that it was just not worth doing.
Other Padres rumored to possibly be dealt included Brian Giles, Cla Meredith, and Josh Bard, Khalil Greene, and Kevin Kouzmanoff. Below is a very brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding each of them…
Giles, has a relatively affordable option for next year, and is likely to be the team’s best option for RF in 2009. Trading him now would have created another hole to be filled in the off-season.
Meredith is not great, and would not have generated much of a return. With that said, he is a serviceable bullpen arm under team control for the next few years. I would guess he actually has more value to the Padres than what they could have received in a trade.
Trading Greene now would probably have amounted to selling at a low. He has been awful so far this season, but his past performance suggests he will play better going forward. Also, much like the problem of trading Giles, getting rid of Greene would open a huge hole at SS, and because there are so few good shortstops, both internally, and externally, it may take a while to find a good replacement.
Kouzmanoff is a league average third baseman who comes cheap. Headley can play 3B, but, unless a team were to offer a quality player who could fill a position of need (i.e. CF or 2B) in 2009, there was little reason to trade Kouz.
The only guy who I thought might have been traded was Bard. He, like many players on the Padres roster is between a replacement level and average level talent. At one point, I had read that the Marlins were interested in him. My initial thought was that trading him would not hurt the team too much, as a guy like Hundley could replace him without too big of a drop in overall production. At the same time, Bard is not a good enough player to fetch much in return, so keeping him around is not the worst thing that could have happened.
Easy as it is to argue the front office was complacent, and should have traded some veterans for prospects, when each of the possible trade candidates is examined individually, it becomes clear that the Padres would not have received much in return, or were actually better off from a baseball perspective keeping the player. Had any team actually made an enticing offer for any of the players mentioned above, I am sure the Padres would have jumped all over it.
Perhaps the best news the Padres received all day, was that the Dodgers acquired Manny Ramirez. In return for 2 months of Manny, they gave up two quality prospects, including a guy (LaRoche) who should have been starting at 3B for them all year. Since the Padres are not contending this year, it really does not matter how well the Dodgers finish the season. Removing players from the Dodger’s system who could have been useful to the team in the future can only benefit the Padres.
Finally, lets not forget, although the Padres were unable to pull off a deal today, Kevin Towers once said: “There are Better Deals in August...”
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Words of Wisdom from Manny Ramirez
"I should go to Green Bay straight up and they should send Brett Favre to Boston. That will end two soap operas at the same time."
-Manny Ramirez
-Manny Ramirez
Sunday, July 27, 2008
The Misutilization of Bullpen Resources
It is pretty clear that Heath Bell has been the Padres best reliever over the past two seasons. Still, Trevor Hoffman continues to be the team’s designated closer. I am okay with this. Others are not.
It seems like every time Trevor blows a save, or even makes one interesting, there are murmurings about making Heath Bell the closer-if not this year, then next year. My response is always the same: the worry should be less about who the closer is, but rather who gets to pitch in the highest leverage situations.
Protecting a ninth inning lead is certainly important, but how important it is depends on the magnitude of the lead, as well as the skill of the batters scheduled to bat in the inning. As Tom Tango writes: “The record books don't make distinctions between the one-run save and the three-run save, but it's rather clear that it's much easier to save a three-run game than a one-run game.”
With this in mind, Tango set out to quantify the relative importance of various situations within a game. To do so, he established a table of win expectancies. The table shows the probability of winning the game at any point in the game. For example, a home team winning by one run with two outs in the top of the eighth inning with no runners on base will win 84.7% of the time. Using the win expectancy data, leverage index, which measures the importance of any situation relative to the start of the game, was born. Baseball Prospectus explains that: “a leverage of 1.00 is the same importance as the start of a game. Leverage values below one represent situations less important than the start of a game (such as mopup innings in a blowout). Leverage values above one represent situations with more importance (such as a closer protecting a one-run lead with bases loaded in the 9th inning).”
To demonstrate the importance of a team getting its best reliever into the game in high leverage situations, I ran a quick regression analysis, which hopefully illustrates the intuition behind the leverage theory. The theory is that if teams are better off pitching their best reliever in high leverage situations regardless of whether it is classified as a “save situation,” there should exist a positive relationship between the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by the team’s best reliever and wins (once other factors such as a team’s total runs scored and runs allowed have been controlled for).
To test this theory, I first needed to define a way to measure the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by a team’s best reliever. Leverage does not account for innings pitched. Rather, it signifies the average importance of a team/player’s relief appearances. A minor league pitcher can get called up and throw one inning of high leverage ball. His leverage score will be high, but his impact on wins over the course of a 162 game season is negligible. For this reason, I have created what may be a new statistic called effective leveraged innings (note: there is a good chance someone has done something like this before; I am just unaware of it). Effective leveraged innings is the product of innings pitched and leverage index. Effective leveraged innings accounts for both the quantity and importance of innings pitched. A pitcher with 100 innings pitched and a leverage index of 1.20 would have pitched 120 effective leveraged innings. A team whose relievers pitched 500 combined innings with a leverage index of 1.1 would have pitched 550 effective leveraged innings.
Measuring the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever requires identifying each team’s best reliever. A team’s closer is not necessarily the best reliever. The closer may have the role based on the reputation of his past performance rather than his current skills. Also, managers may already recognize save situations are not always the most important, and purposely name a pitcher who is not the team’s best reliever “the closer.”
Traditional statistics such as earned run average (ERA) do an equally poor job of identifying a team’s best reliever. ERA often overstates the skills of bad pitchers who may have had some lucky success over a small sample of innings. Another shortcoming of ERA is it is dependent on factors outside of the pitcher’s control. Differences in the skill of the surrounding defense and ballpark configurations make ERA a poor choice for evaluating the skill of pitchers. Other frequently cited statistics such as WHIP (base runners allowed per inning) offer many of the same shortcomings as ERA.
The best measure of a reliever’s skill is WXL, the “expected wins added over an average pitcher, adjusted for level of opposing hitters faced.” WXRL could be used if you prefer to use replacement level as a comparison rather than average level. WXL factors in the MLV [marginal lineup value] of the actual batters faced by the pitchers. Then, WXL uses win expectancy calculations to assess how relievers have changed the outcome of games” (baseballprospectus.com). In this study, the player on each team with the highest WXL is considered the team’s best reliever.
My data comes from the 2006 and 2007 seasons. A larger sample size would be more telling, but data collection takes time, and I did not feel like spending hours collecting data to better prove such a widely accepted concept. I have removed data from the 2006 Atlanta Braves and 2006 Cleveland Indians because the Cleveland Indians traded their best reliever, Bob Wickman to the Braves in the middle of the season. Wickman’s proportion of effective leveraged innings pitched was not representative of his use while with either team.
Regression Results:
I first ran a regression using only runs scored and runs allowed to explain wins. These two variables explained approximately 83% of the variance in wins. Next, I ran the regression with a third independent variable-the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever. Not only was this variable significant at the 0.01 level, but the new equation did an even better job than the first at explaining wins. It had a higher adjusted R^2, lower Akaike, and lower Schwartz. I played around with different functional forms of the variables, and even added a variable that measured the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s second best reliever (as measured by WXL), but these equations had trouble passing the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification, or contained combinations of variables that turned out to be insignificant. Below, I am posting two images of the results. The first captures the pertinent information of my final equation. The second image compares the final equation to the control. Click on the images to enlarge and view more clearly.
Conclusions:
The data shows that for each additional percentage of effective leveraged innings pitched by a team’s best reliever, a team can expect to add 0.33 wins to its record. The implication is a team could increase its win total by pitching its best reliever in an additional 3% of its effective leveraged innings. There are two ways to do this. A team could increase the innings pitched of its best reliever or increase its proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by its best reliever. Increasing a pitcher’s innings thrown is unlikely to be successful because it could cause extra wear on the pitcher’s arm and lead to injury. The more practical method is to increase the leverage score of its best pitcher, while maintaining the same amount of innings thrown. Increasing the leverage score would entail that teams not reserve its best reliever for save situations, but instead employ their ace reliever in the highest high leverage situations possible.
I understand the argument that closing games in the 9th inning may take a special mind-set. This may or may not be true, but I am willing to cede the point for now. Luckily, that theory is not inconsistent with using a team’s best reliever in the highest leverage situations. Many save situations are in fact high leverage. What I encourage the Padres to do with Heath Bell (once Hoffy retires), or whoever their best reliever may be in the future, is to have him close out tight games in the 9th inning, but not necessarily games with a 3 run lead. Rather than wasting innings picking up easy saves with a huge lead, the Padres should allow their best reliever to pitch in other high leverage situations.
Of course, it is easy to pinpoint the highest leverage situation in a particular game after the fact, but not so easy to do mid-game. My solution to this is for the Padres to employ its statisticians to make up a chart outlining the probability of any given situation being the highest leverage moment in that game. Armed with this information, the manager will be able to make an informed decision about when best to bring in his best reliever. Using the “save situation” as a rule-of-thumb will no longer be necessary.
It seems like every time Trevor blows a save, or even makes one interesting, there are murmurings about making Heath Bell the closer-if not this year, then next year. My response is always the same: the worry should be less about who the closer is, but rather who gets to pitch in the highest leverage situations.
Protecting a ninth inning lead is certainly important, but how important it is depends on the magnitude of the lead, as well as the skill of the batters scheduled to bat in the inning. As Tom Tango writes: “The record books don't make distinctions between the one-run save and the three-run save, but it's rather clear that it's much easier to save a three-run game than a one-run game.”
With this in mind, Tango set out to quantify the relative importance of various situations within a game. To do so, he established a table of win expectancies. The table shows the probability of winning the game at any point in the game. For example, a home team winning by one run with two outs in the top of the eighth inning with no runners on base will win 84.7% of the time. Using the win expectancy data, leverage index, which measures the importance of any situation relative to the start of the game, was born. Baseball Prospectus explains that: “a leverage of 1.00 is the same importance as the start of a game. Leverage values below one represent situations less important than the start of a game (such as mopup innings in a blowout). Leverage values above one represent situations with more importance (such as a closer protecting a one-run lead with bases loaded in the 9th inning).”
To demonstrate the importance of a team getting its best reliever into the game in high leverage situations, I ran a quick regression analysis, which hopefully illustrates the intuition behind the leverage theory. The theory is that if teams are better off pitching their best reliever in high leverage situations regardless of whether it is classified as a “save situation,” there should exist a positive relationship between the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by the team’s best reliever and wins (once other factors such as a team’s total runs scored and runs allowed have been controlled for).
To test this theory, I first needed to define a way to measure the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by a team’s best reliever. Leverage does not account for innings pitched. Rather, it signifies the average importance of a team/player’s relief appearances. A minor league pitcher can get called up and throw one inning of high leverage ball. His leverage score will be high, but his impact on wins over the course of a 162 game season is negligible. For this reason, I have created what may be a new statistic called effective leveraged innings (note: there is a good chance someone has done something like this before; I am just unaware of it). Effective leveraged innings is the product of innings pitched and leverage index. Effective leveraged innings accounts for both the quantity and importance of innings pitched. A pitcher with 100 innings pitched and a leverage index of 1.20 would have pitched 120 effective leveraged innings. A team whose relievers pitched 500 combined innings with a leverage index of 1.1 would have pitched 550 effective leveraged innings.
Measuring the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever requires identifying each team’s best reliever. A team’s closer is not necessarily the best reliever. The closer may have the role based on the reputation of his past performance rather than his current skills. Also, managers may already recognize save situations are not always the most important, and purposely name a pitcher who is not the team’s best reliever “the closer.”
Traditional statistics such as earned run average (ERA) do an equally poor job of identifying a team’s best reliever. ERA often overstates the skills of bad pitchers who may have had some lucky success over a small sample of innings. Another shortcoming of ERA is it is dependent on factors outside of the pitcher’s control. Differences in the skill of the surrounding defense and ballpark configurations make ERA a poor choice for evaluating the skill of pitchers. Other frequently cited statistics such as WHIP (base runners allowed per inning) offer many of the same shortcomings as ERA.
The best measure of a reliever’s skill is WXL, the “expected wins added over an average pitcher, adjusted for level of opposing hitters faced.” WXRL could be used if you prefer to use replacement level as a comparison rather than average level. WXL factors in the MLV [marginal lineup value] of the actual batters faced by the pitchers. Then, WXL uses win expectancy calculations to assess how relievers have changed the outcome of games” (baseballprospectus.com). In this study, the player on each team with the highest WXL is considered the team’s best reliever.
My data comes from the 2006 and 2007 seasons. A larger sample size would be more telling, but data collection takes time, and I did not feel like spending hours collecting data to better prove such a widely accepted concept. I have removed data from the 2006 Atlanta Braves and 2006 Cleveland Indians because the Cleveland Indians traded their best reliever, Bob Wickman to the Braves in the middle of the season. Wickman’s proportion of effective leveraged innings pitched was not representative of his use while with either team.
Regression Results:
I first ran a regression using only runs scored and runs allowed to explain wins. These two variables explained approximately 83% of the variance in wins. Next, I ran the regression with a third independent variable-the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever. Not only was this variable significant at the 0.01 level, but the new equation did an even better job than the first at explaining wins. It had a higher adjusted R^2, lower Akaike, and lower Schwartz. I played around with different functional forms of the variables, and even added a variable that measured the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s second best reliever (as measured by WXL), but these equations had trouble passing the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification, or contained combinations of variables that turned out to be insignificant. Below, I am posting two images of the results. The first captures the pertinent information of my final equation. The second image compares the final equation to the control. Click on the images to enlarge and view more clearly.
Conclusions:The data shows that for each additional percentage of effective leveraged innings pitched by a team’s best reliever, a team can expect to add 0.33 wins to its record. The implication is a team could increase its win total by pitching its best reliever in an additional 3% of its effective leveraged innings. There are two ways to do this. A team could increase the innings pitched of its best reliever or increase its proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by its best reliever. Increasing a pitcher’s innings thrown is unlikely to be successful because it could cause extra wear on the pitcher’s arm and lead to injury. The more practical method is to increase the leverage score of its best pitcher, while maintaining the same amount of innings thrown. Increasing the leverage score would entail that teams not reserve its best reliever for save situations, but instead employ their ace reliever in the highest high leverage situations possible.
I understand the argument that closing games in the 9th inning may take a special mind-set. This may or may not be true, but I am willing to cede the point for now. Luckily, that theory is not inconsistent with using a team’s best reliever in the highest leverage situations. Many save situations are in fact high leverage. What I encourage the Padres to do with Heath Bell (once Hoffy retires), or whoever their best reliever may be in the future, is to have him close out tight games in the 9th inning, but not necessarily games with a 3 run lead. Rather than wasting innings picking up easy saves with a huge lead, the Padres should allow their best reliever to pitch in other high leverage situations.
Of course, it is easy to pinpoint the highest leverage situation in a particular game after the fact, but not so easy to do mid-game. My solution to this is for the Padres to employ its statisticians to make up a chart outlining the probability of any given situation being the highest leverage moment in that game. Armed with this information, the manager will be able to make an informed decision about when best to bring in his best reliever. Using the “save situation” as a rule-of-thumb will no longer be necessary.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Jason Szuminski
The Padres selected Jason Szuminski in the 2004 Rule 5 draft. He made the club out of spring training, and after appearing in his first game, he became the first MIT graduate to play in the major leagues. His story gained national attention, and resulted in an abundance of personal interest pieces that played off the novelty of having a “rocket scientist” pitching in the major leagues.
Sadly, Szuminski’s performance left much to be desired, and he was returned to his original team, the Cubs. Szuminski was never able to make it back to the big leagues, but hey, with an MIT diploma, at least he had something to fall back on. Thanks for the Memories Jason!
Sadly, Szuminski’s performance left much to be desired, and he was returned to his original team, the Cubs. Szuminski was never able to make it back to the big leagues, but hey, with an MIT diploma, at least he had something to fall back on. Thanks for the Memories Jason!
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Randy Wolf May Have More Value for the 'Stros than People Think
Yesterday, the Padres traded Randy Wolf to the Astros. The reviews are in, and while few analysts are overly excited about Chad Reineke, the 26 year old AAA pitcher the Padres received, the general consensus is that the move made no sense for the Astros. Prior to the trade being completed, Rob Neyer (subscription required) of ESPN wrote: "If the Astros trade even one promising young player for Randy Wolf, it'll rank among the worst deals of the year." Today, he replied: “Well, they've done it. And it may wind up looking like one of the worst deals of the year.”
I too was initially shocked that the Astros wanted to acquire Randy Wolf, and deemed it another bone-headed move by Astros GM Ed Wade. Like the Padres, the Astros are in last place in their division. They trail the Cubs by 12 games, and recently placed Roy Oswalt-their best pitcher-on the DL. Additionally, Randy Wolf is not very good. Besides the fact that he has historically had trouble staying healthy, he currently has a SNLVAR of 2.2, meaning he has essentially been a replacement level pitcher this season. The only reason his ERA does not look worse, is he has been fortunate enough to pitch half his games at Petco Park. For the privilege of acquiring a player who fall somewhere between replacement level and average level (probably closer to replacement level), the Astros surrendered one of their top 5 pitching prospects.
As bad as the trade is for the Astros, I can at least understand it. First, Reineke is nowhere close to a top prospect. He is neither particularly young, nor particularly good. From what I have read, most scouts project him as a long-reliever with the upside to be a serviceable middle reliever. That type of player has some value, but is nothing to get too worked up about losing. Next, Randy Wolf actually improves the Astros rotation this season. With Oswalt injured, Wolf is probably the best starter on their team. Even though they will not contend for a playoff spot, as MB over at Friar Forecast notes: “it’s not like regular season games are meaningless, if you aren’t in contention. A win (or some fraction of a win) is still worth something, in revenue, to a ball club.” I have no idea what the Astros specific win curve (the amount of revenue they receive for each marginal win) looks like, but it is conceivable that acquiring Wolf is close to a break-even proposition for Houston this season.
Finally, trading for Wolf presents the Astros with the opportunity to exclusively negotiate a contract with him for a few weeks after the season. If they are able to resign Wolf, the deal suddenly makes a lot of sense. Even if they do not resign Wolf, there is the chance that they could receive a compensatory draft pick for losing him to free agency. When all factors are considered, the Astros suddenly do not look too dumb. At the same time, they took on more payroll and further depleted their farm system in a year without much hope at contending. From the Padres perspective-the trade makes complete sense. They acquire another cheap arm they can control for the next half-decade, and no longer need to pay a mediocre pitcher a decent salary.
I too was initially shocked that the Astros wanted to acquire Randy Wolf, and deemed it another bone-headed move by Astros GM Ed Wade. Like the Padres, the Astros are in last place in their division. They trail the Cubs by 12 games, and recently placed Roy Oswalt-their best pitcher-on the DL. Additionally, Randy Wolf is not very good. Besides the fact that he has historically had trouble staying healthy, he currently has a SNLVAR of 2.2, meaning he has essentially been a replacement level pitcher this season. The only reason his ERA does not look worse, is he has been fortunate enough to pitch half his games at Petco Park. For the privilege of acquiring a player who fall somewhere between replacement level and average level (probably closer to replacement level), the Astros surrendered one of their top 5 pitching prospects.
As bad as the trade is for the Astros, I can at least understand it. First, Reineke is nowhere close to a top prospect. He is neither particularly young, nor particularly good. From what I have read, most scouts project him as a long-reliever with the upside to be a serviceable middle reliever. That type of player has some value, but is nothing to get too worked up about losing. Next, Randy Wolf actually improves the Astros rotation this season. With Oswalt injured, Wolf is probably the best starter on their team. Even though they will not contend for a playoff spot, as MB over at Friar Forecast notes: “it’s not like regular season games are meaningless, if you aren’t in contention. A win (or some fraction of a win) is still worth something, in revenue, to a ball club.” I have no idea what the Astros specific win curve (the amount of revenue they receive for each marginal win) looks like, but it is conceivable that acquiring Wolf is close to a break-even proposition for Houston this season.
Finally, trading for Wolf presents the Astros with the opportunity to exclusively negotiate a contract with him for a few weeks after the season. If they are able to resign Wolf, the deal suddenly makes a lot of sense. Even if they do not resign Wolf, there is the chance that they could receive a compensatory draft pick for losing him to free agency. When all factors are considered, the Astros suddenly do not look too dumb. At the same time, they took on more payroll and further depleted their farm system in a year without much hope at contending. From the Padres perspective-the trade makes complete sense. They acquire another cheap arm they can control for the next half-decade, and no longer need to pay a mediocre pitcher a decent salary.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Do the Brightest Stars Dim Slower?
It is well documented that baseball players tend to peak at around 26 or 27 years of age. Last year, I was talking a little baseball with a person who knows the game well. At some point in the conversation, the aging process of position players became central to the discussion. I suggested that the Padres should be wary of signing or trading for any star player already in his 30s-even early 30s, because an expected decrease in skill may leave the club paying for past performance rather than future performance. The person I was talking to suggested that star players actually experience a much longer peak than the average ball player. Therefore, acquiring a star player in his early 30s could actually be a good bet for the Padres, as the star will be likely to maintain his production, or at the very least experience an extremely gradual decline.
At the time, I did not pursue the argument any further, but continued to silently contemplate the concept that the best players may age better than the average player. I have no doubt that hall of famers continue to be extremely productive well into their 30s. There is no way that they would be able to accumulate the longevity statistics necessary to be voted into the hall without sustained excellence. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that just because they played great baseball at 33, they were not even better at 27.
The biggest problem I had with the argument was that it is very difficult to project the players that will age well, and who will completely fall off the map. Sure players with greater athleticism have been shown to age better than huge, clumsy first baseman/DH types such as Cecil Fielder, but it is very difficult to make predictions for an individual player. Most of the players fans remember as stars were able to sustain their excellence, but for every Paul Molitor who seemed to grow better with age, there is a Ruben Sierra who looked like a star early in his career, but struggled after experiencing early success.
Since the conversation began with the question of whether the Padres can safely sign or trade for “stars,” in their 30s, I decided to construct a test that examines the careers of players who at any given point may have been considered a “star.”
The first step was to define the parameters. I chose to define a “star” as a person selected to at least 2 allstar games-at least one of which occurred in the 90s. I examined stars from the 90s because these players were able to take advantage of relatively modern training and medical technologies. In addition, most of these players are now retired or at the very end of their careers, which allows for a longitudinal view. I included only players elected to at least 2 allstar games because this removes fluky players who may have only had one good half season, or were only elected because their team needed a representative (sorry guys, but Jon Jaha was removed from the data set).
Skill was defined by WARP (Wins Against Replacement Player). WARP has the advantage of measuring both offensive and defensive production. About 1/3 of the way through my data collection, I realized I probably should have used WARP 3, but I did not really feel like starting over at that point, and I am certain that the results were not affected by the subtle differences between WARP 1 and WARP 3.
I recorded the age of each player when he achieved his career high WARP, the lower and upper bounds of each player’s best three year WARP, and each player’s cumulative WARP from their age 26-28, 29-31, and 32-34 seasons. I calculated the mean, median, mode, and standard deviations for each category where applicable. I present the results in the table below. In addition, feel free to download the excel spreadsheet that contains the raw data and calculations.
Results (I can't seem to get the formatting right, so please scroll down):
It is pretty clear that even the stars experience their best play between 26 and 28. From 29-31, there is a gradual decline (12.48%), and then an even more dramatic decline from 32-34 (an additional 25.69% or 34.97% from the age 26-28 seasons). These results are extremely consistent with the numbers seen in the general baseball population.
My conclusion is that although some players maintain an extremely high level of play well into their 30s, that in general, even the stars demonstrate severe slippage from their peak level of play, and that slippage tends to begin between ages 29 and 31. This fact suggests that making a large investment in a 30 year old star is a very risky proposition. Although it is likely that the star will continue to be a serviceable regular worthy of consistent playing time, the team cannot expect the player to duplicate the production from earlier in his career, and should plan accordingly.
At the time, I did not pursue the argument any further, but continued to silently contemplate the concept that the best players may age better than the average player. I have no doubt that hall of famers continue to be extremely productive well into their 30s. There is no way that they would be able to accumulate the longevity statistics necessary to be voted into the hall without sustained excellence. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that just because they played great baseball at 33, they were not even better at 27.
The biggest problem I had with the argument was that it is very difficult to project the players that will age well, and who will completely fall off the map. Sure players with greater athleticism have been shown to age better than huge, clumsy first baseman/DH types such as Cecil Fielder, but it is very difficult to make predictions for an individual player. Most of the players fans remember as stars were able to sustain their excellence, but for every Paul Molitor who seemed to grow better with age, there is a Ruben Sierra who looked like a star early in his career, but struggled after experiencing early success.
Since the conversation began with the question of whether the Padres can safely sign or trade for “stars,” in their 30s, I decided to construct a test that examines the careers of players who at any given point may have been considered a “star.”
The first step was to define the parameters. I chose to define a “star” as a person selected to at least 2 allstar games-at least one of which occurred in the 90s. I examined stars from the 90s because these players were able to take advantage of relatively modern training and medical technologies. In addition, most of these players are now retired or at the very end of their careers, which allows for a longitudinal view. I included only players elected to at least 2 allstar games because this removes fluky players who may have only had one good half season, or were only elected because their team needed a representative (sorry guys, but Jon Jaha was removed from the data set).
Skill was defined by WARP (Wins Against Replacement Player). WARP has the advantage of measuring both offensive and defensive production. About 1/3 of the way through my data collection, I realized I probably should have used WARP 3, but I did not really feel like starting over at that point, and I am certain that the results were not affected by the subtle differences between WARP 1 and WARP 3.
I recorded the age of each player when he achieved his career high WARP, the lower and upper bounds of each player’s best three year WARP, and each player’s cumulative WARP from their age 26-28, 29-31, and 32-34 seasons. I calculated the mean, median, mode, and standard deviations for each category where applicable. I present the results in the table below. In addition, feel free to download the excel spreadsheet that contains the raw data and calculations.
Results (I can't seem to get the formatting right, so please scroll down):
| Age: Best WARP | Age: Best 3 yr. WARP Low | Age: Best 3 yr. WARP High | WARP 26-28 | WARP 29-31 | WARP 32-34 | |
| Mean | 27.867 | 26.965 | 28.965 | 18.366 | 16.073 | 11.944 |
| Median | 27 | 26 | 28 | 18.3 | 16.3 | 11.1 |
| Mode | 27 | 26 | 28 | |||
| Std. Dev. | 2.987 | 2.982 | 2.982 |
It is pretty clear that even the stars experience their best play between 26 and 28. From 29-31, there is a gradual decline (12.48%), and then an even more dramatic decline from 32-34 (an additional 25.69% or 34.97% from the age 26-28 seasons). These results are extremely consistent with the numbers seen in the general baseball population.
My conclusion is that although some players maintain an extremely high level of play well into their 30s, that in general, even the stars demonstrate severe slippage from their peak level of play, and that slippage tends to begin between ages 29 and 31. This fact suggests that making a large investment in a 30 year old star is a very risky proposition. Although it is likely that the star will continue to be a serviceable regular worthy of consistent playing time, the team cannot expect the player to duplicate the production from earlier in his career, and should plan accordingly.
Monday, July 14, 2008
How to Correctly Guess the Attendance
The Padres are big fans of the game: “guess the attendance.” They have a few variations of the game, but regardless of the exact rules, one lucky fan is asked to choose between a couple of attendance options. Prior to the fan choosing, the crowd is always asked for its input.
I find these games fascinating. There are three primary strategies the “lucky fan” is likely to follow. The three strategies are: going with one’s gut, choosing the highest number(s), and following the advice of the crowd.
I do not like strategy one-following one’s gut. Often, the difference between the various attendance options is only a couple of thousand people. I find it difficult to believe that a fan is able to recognize the difference between 35,000 people in a stadium and 33,000 people in a stadium. I can barely recognize the difference when 5 people enter a room where 15 previously stood. That is a 33% increase. Going from 33,000 to 35,000 is a mere 6% increase. Going with one’s gut is no likely to be more successful than a simple flip of the coin. Note: I always choose tails.
Strategy two-choosing the highest number(s)-is better. Although I do not keep an exact recording, it does seem that the highest number available for the fan to choose is the actual attendance more often than not. In addition, I have found that a general level of excitement fills the stadium when it is announced that the highest number available was in fact the actual attendance. I am not sure why fans care how many people are in the stadium with them. I suppose many fans feel that a larger crowd is associated with a better ballpark atmosphere. I am even more perplexed as to why fans care whether the actual attendance number was larger than a handful of other completely arbitrary numbers. Regardless of why fans get excited when the largest option turns out to be the actual attendance, the fact is that they do get excited about it. The Padres have surely recognized this phenomenon, and have decided to cater to the crowd by assigning the actual attendance to be the highest number on a very regular basis. At the same time, the Padres, for fear of making the game too predictable do not always select the highest number. While it does not guarantee victory, selecting the highest number seems to increase the odds of the fan guessing correctly compared to a random guess or “going with one’s gut.”
My favorite strategy is actually to go with the crowd. Going with the crowd takes advantage of the “wisdom of the crowds” phenomenon written about by James Surowiecki. In the opening anecdote of his book, Surowiecki discusses
“Francis Galton's surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when their individual guesses were averaged (the average was closer to the ox's true butchered weight than the estimates of most crowd members, and also closer than any of the separate estimates made by cattle experts” (Wikipedia.org).
Basically, even though the crowd had no particular expertise in raising oxen, they were able to better approximate the weight of the ox than an individual cattle expert. Likewise, the crowd at the ballgame is often correct in it’s prediction. It is likely that the crowd takes into account all relevant information including the fact that the highest number is correct quite often. To demonstrate the benefit of going with the crowd, one need look no further than Saturday night’s game against the Braves. Rather than choosing highest possible number combination, the crowd went with the second highest number combination. The reason for this deviation from the proven strategy of choosing the highest number, was that the highest number would have suggested an attendance that exceeded the capacity of Petco Park. The crowd recognized this fact, and was correct in it’s prediction. The (un)lucky contestant picked against the crowd, and lost.
In reality, if you are ever chosen to participate in the “guess the attendance” game at Petco Park, it probably does not matter what strategy you choose. Even the losers are often given the grand prize anyway. However, if you have some pride in your predictions, I recommend just going with crowd and rightfully staking claim to your ever so valuable Khalil Greene autographed baseball given away to each night's winner.
I find these games fascinating. There are three primary strategies the “lucky fan” is likely to follow. The three strategies are: going with one’s gut, choosing the highest number(s), and following the advice of the crowd.
I do not like strategy one-following one’s gut. Often, the difference between the various attendance options is only a couple of thousand people. I find it difficult to believe that a fan is able to recognize the difference between 35,000 people in a stadium and 33,000 people in a stadium. I can barely recognize the difference when 5 people enter a room where 15 previously stood. That is a 33% increase. Going from 33,000 to 35,000 is a mere 6% increase. Going with one’s gut is no likely to be more successful than a simple flip of the coin. Note: I always choose tails.
Strategy two-choosing the highest number(s)-is better. Although I do not keep an exact recording, it does seem that the highest number available for the fan to choose is the actual attendance more often than not. In addition, I have found that a general level of excitement fills the stadium when it is announced that the highest number available was in fact the actual attendance. I am not sure why fans care how many people are in the stadium with them. I suppose many fans feel that a larger crowd is associated with a better ballpark atmosphere. I am even more perplexed as to why fans care whether the actual attendance number was larger than a handful of other completely arbitrary numbers. Regardless of why fans get excited when the largest option turns out to be the actual attendance, the fact is that they do get excited about it. The Padres have surely recognized this phenomenon, and have decided to cater to the crowd by assigning the actual attendance to be the highest number on a very regular basis. At the same time, the Padres, for fear of making the game too predictable do not always select the highest number. While it does not guarantee victory, selecting the highest number seems to increase the odds of the fan guessing correctly compared to a random guess or “going with one’s gut.”
My favorite strategy is actually to go with the crowd. Going with the crowd takes advantage of the “wisdom of the crowds” phenomenon written about by James Surowiecki. In the opening anecdote of his book, Surowiecki discusses
“Francis Galton's surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when their individual guesses were averaged (the average was closer to the ox's true butchered weight than the estimates of most crowd members, and also closer than any of the separate estimates made by cattle experts” (Wikipedia.org).
Basically, even though the crowd had no particular expertise in raising oxen, they were able to better approximate the weight of the ox than an individual cattle expert. Likewise, the crowd at the ballgame is often correct in it’s prediction. It is likely that the crowd takes into account all relevant information including the fact that the highest number is correct quite often. To demonstrate the benefit of going with the crowd, one need look no further than Saturday night’s game against the Braves. Rather than choosing highest possible number combination, the crowd went with the second highest number combination. The reason for this deviation from the proven strategy of choosing the highest number, was that the highest number would have suggested an attendance that exceeded the capacity of Petco Park. The crowd recognized this fact, and was correct in it’s prediction. The (un)lucky contestant picked against the crowd, and lost.
In reality, if you are ever chosen to participate in the “guess the attendance” game at Petco Park, it probably does not matter what strategy you choose. Even the losers are often given the grand prize anyway. However, if you have some pride in your predictions, I recommend just going with crowd and rightfully staking claim to your ever so valuable Khalil Greene autographed baseball given away to each night's winner.
Thanks for the Memories-Carlos Hernandez
On Saturday night the Padres honored the 10th anniversary of the 1998 World Series team. I attended the game on Saturday. So did Carlos Hernandez.
Carlos Hernandez came to the Padres from the Dodgers in 1997. He was the starting catcher for much of 1998. For some reason, my memory deceived me as I have always remembered him as an above average backstop. In fact, he only had an OPS+ of 83 that season. Nonetheless, I will always have fond memories of Carlos, and for that reason, I proudly gave him a standing ovation when his name was announced on Saturday night. Thanks for the memories Carlos!
Carlos Hernandez came to the Padres from the Dodgers in 1997. He was the starting catcher for much of 1998. For some reason, my memory deceived me as I have always remembered him as an above average backstop. In fact, he only had an OPS+ of 83 that season. Nonetheless, I will always have fond memories of Carlos, and for that reason, I proudly gave him a standing ovation when his name was announced on Saturday night. Thanks for the memories Carlos!
Thursday, July 10, 2008
VORP SHMORP?
JC Bradbury is an economist that writes about baseball. He really likes the Braves. And really hates VORP.
VORP which stands for Value Over Replacement Player, is defined by Baseball Prospectus as “the number of [offensive] runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances.” So, a player with a VORP of 10 has contributed 10 more runs than a freely available player who could be called up from the minors would have produced. VORP is adjusted for many variables such as year, park, and league effects.
In his blog, Bradbury writes that VORP is nothing more than “insider language,” and compares using the statistic to “speaking Klingon at a Star Trek convention.” He argues that VORP does not provide any advantages over other statistics such as ERA+ and OPS+ which also include adjustments for park and league effects. Additionally, Bradbury believes that the replacement level is arbitrary and no more useful than using the average level. Bradbury also notes that VORP is misused in evaluating player salaries because “player value is determined by opportunity cost as determined by marginal revenue product (MRP),” not VORP.
In many respects, Bradbury is correct. Park, league, and year adjustments can be made to almost any statistic, the replacement level is somewhat arbitrary, and player value is more closely aligned with MRP than VORP (although VORP can be used as a quick and dirty way to get an idea of a player's marginal value). None of these points lead to the logical conclusion that VORP does not have a place in baseball discussions. Batting average does not explain run production as well as OPS, but it is still a somewhat interesting stat to examine. Likewise, RBI is partly a function of opportunity, but it is still neat to note the number of runs a batter has actually driven in, regardless of whether that batter is likely to repeat that effort. Like many other statistics, VORP is interesting to examine, and leads to some pretty funny observations like the fact that as of June 15, “if you exclude the resurgent Cristian Guzmán (VORP: 21.5), the Washington Nationals' offense has a negative VORP -- which, in essence, means if you released every last one of their position players (except Guzmán) and replaced them with cheap, waiver-wire scrubs, the team would be better off” (David Sheinin-Washington Post). Now, would it be smart to actually release every member of the National’s lineup and replace them with replacement level talent? Of course not. Many of those players true ability is above replacement level, but the stat provided a nice laugh and starting point for further discussion.
Bradbury himself seems to hedge, by stating: “My point isn’t that VORP is an awful or useless stat. To the contrary, there is clearly useful information contained in it.” If there is useful information contained in VORP, and it is not an “awful or useless stat,” why does Bradbury get so worked up over its use? My guess is that he is deliberately trying to ruffle some feathers, and potentially drive up publicity for himself, his blog, and his book. Or maybe, he just really hates VORP.
VORP which stands for Value Over Replacement Player, is defined by Baseball Prospectus as “the number of [offensive] runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances.” So, a player with a VORP of 10 has contributed 10 more runs than a freely available player who could be called up from the minors would have produced. VORP is adjusted for many variables such as year, park, and league effects.
In his blog, Bradbury writes that VORP is nothing more than “insider language,” and compares using the statistic to “speaking Klingon at a Star Trek convention.” He argues that VORP does not provide any advantages over other statistics such as ERA+ and OPS+ which also include adjustments for park and league effects. Additionally, Bradbury believes that the replacement level is arbitrary and no more useful than using the average level. Bradbury also notes that VORP is misused in evaluating player salaries because “player value is determined by opportunity cost as determined by marginal revenue product (MRP),” not VORP.
In many respects, Bradbury is correct. Park, league, and year adjustments can be made to almost any statistic, the replacement level is somewhat arbitrary, and player value is more closely aligned with MRP than VORP (although VORP can be used as a quick and dirty way to get an idea of a player's marginal value). None of these points lead to the logical conclusion that VORP does not have a place in baseball discussions. Batting average does not explain run production as well as OPS, but it is still a somewhat interesting stat to examine. Likewise, RBI is partly a function of opportunity, but it is still neat to note the number of runs a batter has actually driven in, regardless of whether that batter is likely to repeat that effort. Like many other statistics, VORP is interesting to examine, and leads to some pretty funny observations like the fact that as of June 15, “if you exclude the resurgent Cristian Guzmán (VORP: 21.5), the Washington Nationals' offense has a negative VORP -- which, in essence, means if you released every last one of their position players (except Guzmán) and replaced them with cheap, waiver-wire scrubs, the team would be better off” (David Sheinin-Washington Post). Now, would it be smart to actually release every member of the National’s lineup and replace them with replacement level talent? Of course not. Many of those players true ability is above replacement level, but the stat provided a nice laugh and starting point for further discussion.
Bradbury himself seems to hedge, by stating: “My point isn’t that VORP is an awful or useless stat. To the contrary, there is clearly useful information contained in it.” If there is useful information contained in VORP, and it is not an “awful or useless stat,” why does Bradbury get so worked up over its use? My guess is that he is deliberately trying to ruffle some feathers, and potentially drive up publicity for himself, his blog, and his book. Or maybe, he just really hates VORP.
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Matty V.
Last week I wrote about the idiocy of a particular Ted Leitner statement. Today I write to commend the quality work put out by Matt Vasgersian on each of his telecasts. Prior to joining the Padres in 2002, Matt was perhaps best known to Padres fans as the play-by-play voice of the now defunct XFL. I guess not even true talent could save the league that was famous for outlawing the fair-catch. Upon joining the Padres, he was paired with Mark “Mud” Grant, who while not quite up to the caliber of Matty V., is one of the few announcers able to pull off the “silly shtick” persona.
What’s great about Vasgersian is he keeps the game fun, while still calling a fundamentally good game. When away from San Diego, mlb.tv forces me to watch Padres road games called by the home-team’s announcers. Nationally renowned play-by-play men do not even approach Vasgersian’s ability to combine entertainment with detailed description. Vin Scully, the longtime voice of the Dodgers is famous for his “great voice” and never-ending stock of adjectives. But, he’s boring. By the sixth inning of a low scoring affair between the Duds and Pads, I was able to take no more, and had to shut off my computer. The Giants famed play-by-play man, Jon Miller is nearly as horrendous. I had always given him the benefit of the doubt when I watched his work on ESPN’s nationally televised broadcasts; after all, to be able to work with Joe Morgan for so many years is a testament to Miller’s professionalism. Professionalism aside, Miller is dull. Sure he calls a good game, but he comes nowhere near matching Vasgersian’s quick wit and abundance of clever Seinfeld references. Lesser known announcers from other teams provide for an equally abysmal viewing experience.
As a Padres fan, I recognize that I may be biased in proclaiming Vasgersian’s supremacy over all other announcers. When watching telecasts called by others, I try to reduce this bias, and derive an impartial opinion. In fact, prior to watching Scully for the first time, I really wanted to enjoy his work. It just didn’t happen. I guess I have become so accustomed to the quality produced by Matty V., that when watching games called by lesser-skilled announcers, I quickly pick up on their reduced ability.
I leave you with one of Matt’s all-time best calls from the 2008 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl (That’s right, he does more than just baseball):
What’s great about Vasgersian is he keeps the game fun, while still calling a fundamentally good game. When away from San Diego, mlb.tv forces me to watch Padres road games called by the home-team’s announcers. Nationally renowned play-by-play men do not even approach Vasgersian’s ability to combine entertainment with detailed description. Vin Scully, the longtime voice of the Dodgers is famous for his “great voice” and never-ending stock of adjectives. But, he’s boring. By the sixth inning of a low scoring affair between the Duds and Pads, I was able to take no more, and had to shut off my computer. The Giants famed play-by-play man, Jon Miller is nearly as horrendous. I had always given him the benefit of the doubt when I watched his work on ESPN’s nationally televised broadcasts; after all, to be able to work with Joe Morgan for so many years is a testament to Miller’s professionalism. Professionalism aside, Miller is dull. Sure he calls a good game, but he comes nowhere near matching Vasgersian’s quick wit and abundance of clever Seinfeld references. Lesser known announcers from other teams provide for an equally abysmal viewing experience.
As a Padres fan, I recognize that I may be biased in proclaiming Vasgersian’s supremacy over all other announcers. When watching telecasts called by others, I try to reduce this bias, and derive an impartial opinion. In fact, prior to watching Scully for the first time, I really wanted to enjoy his work. It just didn’t happen. I guess I have become so accustomed to the quality produced by Matty V., that when watching games called by lesser-skilled announcers, I quickly pick up on their reduced ability.
I leave you with one of Matt’s all-time best calls from the 2008 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl (That’s right, he does more than just baseball):
Monday, July 7, 2008
Playing the Blame Game
The Padres currently have the second worst record in the major leagues. They have a few good players, a few average players, and a bunch of replacement level players. Although June has ended, the gloom hovering over the Padres has not. Someone must be to blame.
It is easy to point to manager Buddy Black. His team nearly made the playoffs last year, but this season the team has “underperformed.” Easy as it is to make Buddy the scapegoat for the team’s struggles, I do not see how the losing is his fault. He is the same manager that won 89 games last year. It is unlikely that at some point between October and April he forgot how to manage teams to victories. All Buddy can do is put the best players on the field and manage the bullpen effectively. Just because his best players cannot get on base, and his bullpen, aside from Heath Bell, is horrendous, does not mean he is doing a poor job managing.
If the managing is not sub par, then it must be the general manager’s fault; right? Most fans, including myself, would like to believe that the job of the general manager is to acquire the best players possible every season. The reality is that the general manager’s job is to follow the instructions of the owner. John Moores may have tasked Kevin Towers to maximize profits over the long-run, or at the very least, to keep the team at break-even once the appreciation of the franchise’s value is accounted for. Regardless of Towers’ specific job description, he must work within the confines of budget constraints, and take more than a one-period outlook. Towers must balance the success of the team this year, with the success of the team in future seasons.
Towers’ moves this off-season did just that; balance the current season with future seasons. The Padres lost only two significant contributors: Milton Bradley and Mike Cameron. They probably could have afforded to sign at least one of them. Bradley was offered $4 million, but took $5 million with Texas instead. With Chase Headley nearly ready to assume LF duties, it did not make a lot of sense to fork over big bucks for a guy who has never been able to stay healthy and is always a threat to blowup mentally. I am a big Milton Bradley fan, but at a certain point the risk outweighs the reward. Yes he is having a great season in Texas, but that does not necessarily suggest he would be having the same great season in San Diego. San Diego presents a less hitter-friendly ballpark, and an entirely different set of environmental circumstances. We also don’t know if he will lose a significant amount of time to injury, suspension, or something else later in the season.
The bigger loss was Mike Cameron. I don’t think any of us know exactly what transpired in the negotiations. The Padres offered Cameron a deal that they thought reflected his true value, but instead Cameron took a one-year deal that paid him slightly more than what the Padres ended up paying Jim Edmonds. Perhaps the Padres mishandled the negotiations, or maybe Cameron just wanted to move on. Whatever the reason, Cameron did not accept the deal the Padres offered. Once Cameron declined the Padres best offer, the club was forced to make its next best move. They decided to bring in Jim Edmonds. Edmonds did not pan out, but there were not many better options available. It’s not like the Indians were offering to stick a ribbon on Grady Sizemore and drop him off at Petco Park. Again, the club made the proper decision at the time. Just because the results have not been great does not mean the GM is to blame.
As long as the process is right, and decisions are made that incorporate all relevant information, winning seasons will be more common than losing seasons. Sometimes though, even good decisions do not result in good outcomes. Paul Depodesta, Padres Special Assistant for Baseball Operations, compared this “paradox” to gambling and the operation of a casino in his blog:
Many years ago I was playing blackjack in Las Vegas on a Saturday night in a packed casino. I was sitting at third base, and the player who was at first base was playing horribly. He was definitely taking advantage of the free drinks, and it seemed as though every twenty minutes he was dipping into his pocket for more cash.
On one particular hand the player was dealt 17 with his first two cards. The dealer was set to deal the next set of cards and passed right over the player until he stopped her, saying: "Dealer, I want a hit!" She paused, almost feeling sorry for him, and said, "Sir, are you sure?" He said yes, and the dealer dealt the card. Sure enough, it was a four.
The place went crazy, high fives all around, everybody hootin' and hollerin', and you know what the dealer said? The dealer looked at the player, and with total sincerity, said: "Nice hit."
I thought, "Nice hit? Maybe it was a nice hit for the casino, but it was a terrible hit for the player! The decision isn't justified just because it worked."
Well, I spent the rest of that weekend wandering around the casino, largely because I had lost all of my money playing blackjack, thinking about all of these different games and how they work. The fact of the matter is that all casino games have a winning process - the odds are stacked in the favor of the house. That doesn't mean they win every single hand or every roll of the dice, but they do win more often than not. Don't misunderstand me - the casino is absolutely concerned about outcomes. However, their approach to securing a good outcome is a laser like focus on process...right down to the ruthless pit boss.
Much like the process of a casino ensures a high likelihood of profitability, the process of the Padres’ front office ensures a high likelihood of being consistently competitive. The decision making process is the right one. Firing the key decision makers should not be done because the team is losing, but only if there are different people who can do a better job in the future. The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward.
It is easy to point to manager Buddy Black. His team nearly made the playoffs last year, but this season the team has “underperformed.” Easy as it is to make Buddy the scapegoat for the team’s struggles, I do not see how the losing is his fault. He is the same manager that won 89 games last year. It is unlikely that at some point between October and April he forgot how to manage teams to victories. All Buddy can do is put the best players on the field and manage the bullpen effectively. Just because his best players cannot get on base, and his bullpen, aside from Heath Bell, is horrendous, does not mean he is doing a poor job managing.
If the managing is not sub par, then it must be the general manager’s fault; right? Most fans, including myself, would like to believe that the job of the general manager is to acquire the best players possible every season. The reality is that the general manager’s job is to follow the instructions of the owner. John Moores may have tasked Kevin Towers to maximize profits over the long-run, or at the very least, to keep the team at break-even once the appreciation of the franchise’s value is accounted for. Regardless of Towers’ specific job description, he must work within the confines of budget constraints, and take more than a one-period outlook. Towers must balance the success of the team this year, with the success of the team in future seasons.
Towers’ moves this off-season did just that; balance the current season with future seasons. The Padres lost only two significant contributors: Milton Bradley and Mike Cameron. They probably could have afforded to sign at least one of them. Bradley was offered $4 million, but took $5 million with Texas instead. With Chase Headley nearly ready to assume LF duties, it did not make a lot of sense to fork over big bucks for a guy who has never been able to stay healthy and is always a threat to blowup mentally. I am a big Milton Bradley fan, but at a certain point the risk outweighs the reward. Yes he is having a great season in Texas, but that does not necessarily suggest he would be having the same great season in San Diego. San Diego presents a less hitter-friendly ballpark, and an entirely different set of environmental circumstances. We also don’t know if he will lose a significant amount of time to injury, suspension, or something else later in the season.
The bigger loss was Mike Cameron. I don’t think any of us know exactly what transpired in the negotiations. The Padres offered Cameron a deal that they thought reflected his true value, but instead Cameron took a one-year deal that paid him slightly more than what the Padres ended up paying Jim Edmonds. Perhaps the Padres mishandled the negotiations, or maybe Cameron just wanted to move on. Whatever the reason, Cameron did not accept the deal the Padres offered. Once Cameron declined the Padres best offer, the club was forced to make its next best move. They decided to bring in Jim Edmonds. Edmonds did not pan out, but there were not many better options available. It’s not like the Indians were offering to stick a ribbon on Grady Sizemore and drop him off at Petco Park. Again, the club made the proper decision at the time. Just because the results have not been great does not mean the GM is to blame.
As long as the process is right, and decisions are made that incorporate all relevant information, winning seasons will be more common than losing seasons. Sometimes though, even good decisions do not result in good outcomes. Paul Depodesta, Padres Special Assistant for Baseball Operations, compared this “paradox” to gambling and the operation of a casino in his blog:
Many years ago I was playing blackjack in Las Vegas on a Saturday night in a packed casino. I was sitting at third base, and the player who was at first base was playing horribly. He was definitely taking advantage of the free drinks, and it seemed as though every twenty minutes he was dipping into his pocket for more cash.
On one particular hand the player was dealt 17 with his first two cards. The dealer was set to deal the next set of cards and passed right over the player until he stopped her, saying: "Dealer, I want a hit!" She paused, almost feeling sorry for him, and said, "Sir, are you sure?" He said yes, and the dealer dealt the card. Sure enough, it was a four.
The place went crazy, high fives all around, everybody hootin' and hollerin', and you know what the dealer said? The dealer looked at the player, and with total sincerity, said: "Nice hit."
I thought, "Nice hit? Maybe it was a nice hit for the casino, but it was a terrible hit for the player! The decision isn't justified just because it worked."
Well, I spent the rest of that weekend wandering around the casino, largely because I had lost all of my money playing blackjack, thinking about all of these different games and how they work. The fact of the matter is that all casino games have a winning process - the odds are stacked in the favor of the house. That doesn't mean they win every single hand or every roll of the dice, but they do win more often than not. Don't misunderstand me - the casino is absolutely concerned about outcomes. However, their approach to securing a good outcome is a laser like focus on process...right down to the ruthless pit boss.
Much like the process of a casino ensures a high likelihood of profitability, the process of the Padres’ front office ensures a high likelihood of being consistently competitive. The decision making process is the right one. Firing the key decision makers should not be done because the team is losing, but only if there are different people who can do a better job in the future. The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward.
Saturday, July 5, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Deivi Cruz
Friday, July 4, 2008
Why I am Content with Being “Consistently Competitive"
The Padres have never won a World Series. They have won two pennants, and five Western Division titles-all since 1984; but no championships. I often hear fans lament the fact that the Padres have never won a title. The most frequent complaint is not that the Padres have not won the Series, but rather that the team, and ownership in particular does not care about winning it all.
John Moores, the Padres owner, has done little to extinguish the fan’s anger. In March, when asked whether his goal was to win a World Series this year, he responded that: “The goal is to play meaningful games in September” (San Diego Union Tribune). Based on similar statements issued in years past by Moores and high ranking club officials such as Sandy Alderson, I believe it is safe to assume that the goal of the Padres is to be consistently competitive.
One mistake many fans make is that they assume there is a fundamental difference between striving to be competitive, and attempting to win a world series. Due to the random nature of the baseball playoffs, I am not so sure that this difference exists. Once a team qualifies for the playoffs, anything can happen (and as the 2006 St. Louis Cardinals can attest-it is often good things that do happen). Admittedly, although randomness is a huge factor due to the small sample of the post-season, the best teams in the playoffs still have a higher probability of winning the World Series, than the worst teams in the playoffs.
My biggest issue with striving to win the World Series in any given year is that sacrifices must be made in future years. To acquire that big-bat at the trading deadline, top prospects must be surrendered, or a terrible contract must be assumed. Basically, the team is forced to swap future success for an increased probability of winning a World Series in the current year. The marginal increase in the probability of winning the title is often not large enough to overcome the costs.
Unlike many fans, I do not think the mission of the Padres should be to maximize the number of World Series they can win. Instead, I actually agree with John Moores and would prefer that the team attempt to maximize the number of meaningful September games it plays for two reasons. First, for a smaller market team like the Padres, it does not make sense to trade top young talent to try and make a huge splash in a given year. The team’s best strategy is to remain consistently competitive and qualify for as many playoff births as possible. In doing so, the team will probably win more championships in the long-run, than if it went “all-in” one year, leaving itself with “no chips” to play for the next five years. Second, I personally do not care too much about winning the World Series. What I actually care about is that the possibility of winning the World Series exists throughout the season. As all Padres fans have been reminded of this year, it is much more fun to root for a team that is eliminated on game 163 rather than game 63. Would I rather see the Padres win a World Series than not? Of course. But in general, I am content with the team being “consistently competitive.”
John Moores, the Padres owner, has done little to extinguish the fan’s anger. In March, when asked whether his goal was to win a World Series this year, he responded that: “The goal is to play meaningful games in September” (San Diego Union Tribune). Based on similar statements issued in years past by Moores and high ranking club officials such as Sandy Alderson, I believe it is safe to assume that the goal of the Padres is to be consistently competitive.
One mistake many fans make is that they assume there is a fundamental difference between striving to be competitive, and attempting to win a world series. Due to the random nature of the baseball playoffs, I am not so sure that this difference exists. Once a team qualifies for the playoffs, anything can happen (and as the 2006 St. Louis Cardinals can attest-it is often good things that do happen). Admittedly, although randomness is a huge factor due to the small sample of the post-season, the best teams in the playoffs still have a higher probability of winning the World Series, than the worst teams in the playoffs.
My biggest issue with striving to win the World Series in any given year is that sacrifices must be made in future years. To acquire that big-bat at the trading deadline, top prospects must be surrendered, or a terrible contract must be assumed. Basically, the team is forced to swap future success for an increased probability of winning a World Series in the current year. The marginal increase in the probability of winning the title is often not large enough to overcome the costs.
Unlike many fans, I do not think the mission of the Padres should be to maximize the number of World Series they can win. Instead, I actually agree with John Moores and would prefer that the team attempt to maximize the number of meaningful September games it plays for two reasons. First, for a smaller market team like the Padres, it does not make sense to trade top young talent to try and make a huge splash in a given year. The team’s best strategy is to remain consistently competitive and qualify for as many playoff births as possible. In doing so, the team will probably win more championships in the long-run, than if it went “all-in” one year, leaving itself with “no chips” to play for the next five years. Second, I personally do not care too much about winning the World Series. What I actually care about is that the possibility of winning the World Series exists throughout the season. As all Padres fans have been reminded of this year, it is much more fun to root for a team that is eliminated on game 163 rather than game 63. Would I rather see the Padres win a World Series than not? Of course. But in general, I am content with the team being “consistently competitive.”
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
The High Price of Beer at the Ballpark
I applaud profit maximizing behavior. After all, everyone deserves the opportunity to make a buck. What irritates me are people/firms that pretend to have altruistic motives, when in fact they are merely profit maximizing.
In late March, the San Diego Union Tribune reported that for the fourth consecutive season, the Padres would be raising the price of beer sold at Petco Park. The price of “A 16 ounce domestic draft”-the cheapest beer sold at the park-rose 75 cents to $6.50. Clearly the Padres determined that they were still in the inelastic portion of the demand curve for beer at Petco Park, and that a price increase would in fact cause profits to rise.
As a fan that does not drink beer at the ballpark, I could not have been happier upon hearing about the price increase. The price increase would presumably allow the Padres to generate more profits. While it is naïve to believe that 100% of the marginal profits would be invested in baseball operations (ie. Players, scouts, training staff, etc…), so long as a positive percentage of the marginal profits went to baseball operations, I, as a fan who cares mostly about seeing the Padres win ballgames, would be better off.
Oddly, the Padres elected to present their price increase not as a way to generate additional revenue, and hence allow them to improve the on-field product, but instead as a paternalistic policy intended to promote a “family atmosphere” at the game. Said Richard Anderson, Padres Executive VP of Ballpark Management: “We don't want to do anything to encourage excessive alcohol consumption…We want people to have a beer or two if they like. We're not interested in attracting people who want six or eight beers.”
This rationale for the price increase actually does make some theoretical sense IF it is true that beers that cost 75 cents more make a noticeable impact on the atmosphere. After all, the potential revenue generated by the typical family-even if none of the four drinks beer-is probably greater than that of the typical beer drinker and his buddy or date. Of course, the Padres only care about this because they know that if they appeal to families they will make more money than if they do not. I doubt they believe that families have some intrinsic qualities that make them better customers than consumers of alcoholic beverages-aside from any increased expense, or decreased revenue.
Unfortunately for the Padres, their argument for higher beer prices is conditional upon the marginal price increase actually decreasing rowdy and disruptive behavior. The same Union Tribune article states the price of beer at Angel Stadium in Anaheim has not increased for 5 years. Beer at Angel Stadium still sells for $4.50 per 14 ounce receptacle. Chances are the Angels have not experienced any problems with a rowdier crowd. If they had, then family attendance at games would surely decrease, but there is no indication that has been the result. Now, if Beer were priced at 10 cents like the Cleveland Indians tried for one disastrous promotion in the summer of 1974, then the probability of bedlam breaking out would be high (and bedlam did in fact break out). In that case, it is likely that an increase to at least a market-level price would make the atmosphere better for families. However, beer at Petco Park already sells for well above prices found at liquor stores, or even bars. We are not talking about a price increase from $0.10 to $6.50, we are talking about a price increase from $5.75 to $6.50. Most fans do not go to the game with the intention of getting drunk. In fact, purchasing enough ballpark beer to get drunk is probably unaffordable for most fans already. Increasing the price by 75 cents does nothing to change this.
I have no problem with the Padres squeezing every possible dime out of their customer’s pockets. The team is a business, and businesses are designed to make money. As a fan who minimizes his consumption of concessions and souvenirs, I actually smile when I hear of such price increases, as it indicates that the Padres may be able to supply a better on-field product. My only complaint about the price increase for beer is the Padres try to convince the public that they care about maintaining a family atmosphere solely because they value families. That is clearly not the case. Next year, I hope to hear no explanations by the Padres for any price increases. No excuses are needed.
In late March, the San Diego Union Tribune reported that for the fourth consecutive season, the Padres would be raising the price of beer sold at Petco Park. The price of “A 16 ounce domestic draft”-the cheapest beer sold at the park-rose 75 cents to $6.50. Clearly the Padres determined that they were still in the inelastic portion of the demand curve for beer at Petco Park, and that a price increase would in fact cause profits to rise.
As a fan that does not drink beer at the ballpark, I could not have been happier upon hearing about the price increase. The price increase would presumably allow the Padres to generate more profits. While it is naïve to believe that 100% of the marginal profits would be invested in baseball operations (ie. Players, scouts, training staff, etc…), so long as a positive percentage of the marginal profits went to baseball operations, I, as a fan who cares mostly about seeing the Padres win ballgames, would be better off.
Oddly, the Padres elected to present their price increase not as a way to generate additional revenue, and hence allow them to improve the on-field product, but instead as a paternalistic policy intended to promote a “family atmosphere” at the game. Said Richard Anderson, Padres Executive VP of Ballpark Management: “We don't want to do anything to encourage excessive alcohol consumption…We want people to have a beer or two if they like. We're not interested in attracting people who want six or eight beers.”
This rationale for the price increase actually does make some theoretical sense IF it is true that beers that cost 75 cents more make a noticeable impact on the atmosphere. After all, the potential revenue generated by the typical family-even if none of the four drinks beer-is probably greater than that of the typical beer drinker and his buddy or date. Of course, the Padres only care about this because they know that if they appeal to families they will make more money than if they do not. I doubt they believe that families have some intrinsic qualities that make them better customers than consumers of alcoholic beverages-aside from any increased expense, or decreased revenue.
Unfortunately for the Padres, their argument for higher beer prices is conditional upon the marginal price increase actually decreasing rowdy and disruptive behavior. The same Union Tribune article states the price of beer at Angel Stadium in Anaheim has not increased for 5 years. Beer at Angel Stadium still sells for $4.50 per 14 ounce receptacle. Chances are the Angels have not experienced any problems with a rowdier crowd. If they had, then family attendance at games would surely decrease, but there is no indication that has been the result. Now, if Beer were priced at 10 cents like the Cleveland Indians tried for one disastrous promotion in the summer of 1974, then the probability of bedlam breaking out would be high (and bedlam did in fact break out). In that case, it is likely that an increase to at least a market-level price would make the atmosphere better for families. However, beer at Petco Park already sells for well above prices found at liquor stores, or even bars. We are not talking about a price increase from $0.10 to $6.50, we are talking about a price increase from $5.75 to $6.50. Most fans do not go to the game with the intention of getting drunk. In fact, purchasing enough ballpark beer to get drunk is probably unaffordable for most fans already. Increasing the price by 75 cents does nothing to change this.
I have no problem with the Padres squeezing every possible dime out of their customer’s pockets. The team is a business, and businesses are designed to make money. As a fan who minimizes his consumption of concessions and souvenirs, I actually smile when I hear of such price increases, as it indicates that the Padres may be able to supply a better on-field product. My only complaint about the price increase for beer is the Padres try to convince the public that they care about maintaining a family atmosphere solely because they value families. That is clearly not the case. Next year, I hope to hear no explanations by the Padres for any price increases. No excuses are needed.
Thanks for the Memories-Archi Cianfrocco
Archi Cianfrocco came to the Padres from the Montreal Expos in a trade for pitcher Tim Scott. His tenure as a Padre lasted from 1993 until 1998. In 1995, Cianfrocco played at every position except for catcher. He followed up that impressive performance with a '96 campaign in which he logged 1 inning behind the plate in addition to once again leaving his mark on every inch of soil at the Murph. Thanks for the Memories Archi!
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
"Uncle Teddy's" Dubious Claim
Media personalities say dumb things all the time. Joe Morgan-perhaps the king of dumb baseball statements-is notorious for arguing that: “A good manager with a good team over 162 games…can make the difference in 10-15 games. A bad manager can make the difference in 20-30 games” (firejoemorgan.com). The implication of Joe’s argument is that the difference between a good manager and a bad manager can be as large as 45 games. I don’t think I need to explain why there is no possible way that managers can contribute to a 45 game swing in a team’s record.
San Diego is not immune to similarly idiotic statements from its local sports media. While I am thoroughly impressed by the work of Matt Vasgersian, Scott Kaplan, and Billy Ray Smith among others, Ted Leitner fascinates me for reasons other than the quality of his work. I am amazed that the guy both still has a job, and is as popular as he continues to be.
A few weeks ago in the car, I was listening to a little sports talk radio on 1090 AM, when “Uncle” Teddy Leitner made a guest appearance on the show. Following the customary exchange of pleasantries with the hosts of the show, Leitner proceeded to discuss Padres Baseball, eventually touching on the club’s trouble putting the ball in play. Anyway, Leitner had this little nugget to share with the audience: He argued that strikeouts have increased throughout major league baseball due to an overall rising level of salaries.
Leitner’s most egregious mistake was confusing correlation with causation. It may very well be the case that in recent years, as salaries have risen exponentially, so too have strikeouts. What I cannot conclude is that rising salaries have caused an increase in strikeouts.
Ballplayers get paid (at least in free agency) just like anybody else-based on the amount of dollars they are capable of generating for their team. (Note: Part of this may be the appreciation of the team's overall value). This is the case because if a team were to offer a player a contract substantially below the amount of revenue that player could generate, then a different team would likely swoop in and offer a contract that pays the player more, but still allows the team to profit. Next, another team would intervene and offer a slightly larger contract. Theoretically, this process continues until there is no gap between the amount of money a player is paid, and the amount of revenue he is generating for his team.
Therefore, it is likely that players are being paid exactly what they are worth to the team that signed them. Over the past decade, acceptance of statistical analysis has led many teams to conclude that for hitters, the two skill sets that most contribute to runs scored are getting on base, and hitting for power. Thus, teams are willing to pay hitters who can do both of these things well a lot of money. Few teams like large strikeout totals, but so long as players are getting on base and hitting for power, it is of negligible concern.
A better explanation for the increasing number of strikeouts is that teams understand strikeouts are not the end of the world, and are developing players who get on base and hit for power-even if that means striking out more than in the past. Teams have shifted from valuing players who hit dinky singles and rarely strikeout to players who walk frequently, but swing hard at pitches in the strike zone. I acknowledge I have completely ignored the pitching side of the equation (every strikeout includes both a pitcher and a batter), but even so, I am comfortable concluding that higher salaries do not cause more strikeouts.
San Diego is not immune to similarly idiotic statements from its local sports media. While I am thoroughly impressed by the work of Matt Vasgersian, Scott Kaplan, and Billy Ray Smith among others, Ted Leitner fascinates me for reasons other than the quality of his work. I am amazed that the guy both still has a job, and is as popular as he continues to be.
A few weeks ago in the car, I was listening to a little sports talk radio on 1090 AM, when “Uncle” Teddy Leitner made a guest appearance on the show. Following the customary exchange of pleasantries with the hosts of the show, Leitner proceeded to discuss Padres Baseball, eventually touching on the club’s trouble putting the ball in play. Anyway, Leitner had this little nugget to share with the audience: He argued that strikeouts have increased throughout major league baseball due to an overall rising level of salaries.
Leitner’s most egregious mistake was confusing correlation with causation. It may very well be the case that in recent years, as salaries have risen exponentially, so too have strikeouts. What I cannot conclude is that rising salaries have caused an increase in strikeouts.
Ballplayers get paid (at least in free agency) just like anybody else-based on the amount of dollars they are capable of generating for their team. (Note: Part of this may be the appreciation of the team's overall value). This is the case because if a team were to offer a player a contract substantially below the amount of revenue that player could generate, then a different team would likely swoop in and offer a contract that pays the player more, but still allows the team to profit. Next, another team would intervene and offer a slightly larger contract. Theoretically, this process continues until there is no gap between the amount of money a player is paid, and the amount of revenue he is generating for his team.
Therefore, it is likely that players are being paid exactly what they are worth to the team that signed them. Over the past decade, acceptance of statistical analysis has led many teams to conclude that for hitters, the two skill sets that most contribute to runs scored are getting on base, and hitting for power. Thus, teams are willing to pay hitters who can do both of these things well a lot of money. Few teams like large strikeout totals, but so long as players are getting on base and hitting for power, it is of negligible concern.
A better explanation for the increasing number of strikeouts is that teams understand strikeouts are not the end of the world, and are developing players who get on base and hit for power-even if that means striking out more than in the past. Teams have shifted from valuing players who hit dinky singles and rarely strikeout to players who walk frequently, but swing hard at pitches in the strike zone. I acknowledge I have completely ignored the pitching side of the equation (every strikeout includes both a pitcher and a batter), but even so, I am comfortable concluding that higher salaries do not cause more strikeouts.
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