In 2000, Bret Boone replaced the traded Quilvio Veras as the team’s second baseman. In Boone’s only season with the Friars, he provided almost exactly league average production-both offensively and defensively. If it were not for what happened next, Boone would not have been all that memorable.
The next season, Boone played for the Seattle Mariners. There, he was anything but average. He hit 37 homeruns, and had an OPS+ of 153. Perhaps Boone’s most remarkable feat in 2001 was his ability to match Barry Bonds in the race to see whose cranium could grow at the fastest rate.
During that 2001 season, Boone became the first player I suspected of using illegal performance enhancers. While my suspicions have never been confirmed (he was not named in the Mitchell Report), I still chuckle when I think about his remarkable mid-30s surge in both power and cap size. Thanks for the memories Bret!
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Monday, August 25, 2008
Clarifying my Comments on Preseason Predictions
Geoff, at Ducksnorts seems to take issue with my statement that "I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins." He suggests that the answer to whether the Padres explicitly mislead the fans regarding the season outlook lies in how one "perceive[s] the front office." Geoff writes:
If you are inclined to mistrust them, then you will conclude that they were lying because this is consistent with your beliefs. It’s easy to find (or concoct) justifications for a particular point of view. What’s difficult is taking an honest look at a situation, with all its incumbent variables, and trying to figure out what’s actually happening.
I disagree. The answer is not necessarily a function of perception. In previous posts, I have vehemently defended the front office, going so far as to write: "The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward." I have supported the controversial goal of being "consistently competitive," have urged others to resist placing the blame on management, and have written glowingly of the decisions made in keeping or trading personnel and protecting our prospects.
With that said, it is not inconceivable that the Padres, who clearly have an interest in maintaining high expectations, would release the most optimistic results of their preseason projections. Prior to the season, PECOTA predicted 79 wins. An average of the opinions of 17 Baseball Prospectus writers felt the Padres would finish 4th in the NL West, ahead of only the Giants. Other quantitative systems predicted the Padres were a low to mid 80 win team. In fact, the only 2 projections I saw that forecasted close to a 90 win season belonged to The Hardball Times and the San Diego Padres (who obviously did not disclose their methodology).
Clearly there is no definitive proof that the Padres had internal models that were not as optimistic as their public prediction of 90 wins. I am choosing to believe that in the excitement of the off-season, the Padres released their most optimistic projections, and in the process may have mislead the fans. My belief is not biased from a lack of faith in the Padres. Rather, bias may exist because I have too much faith in the Padres and their ability to get things right.
Regardless of whether you believe that in this specific situation the Padres purposely mislead the fans, the underlying question remains: when is okay for the front office to lie?
If you are inclined to mistrust them, then you will conclude that they were lying because this is consistent with your beliefs. It’s easy to find (or concoct) justifications for a particular point of view. What’s difficult is taking an honest look at a situation, with all its incumbent variables, and trying to figure out what’s actually happening.
I disagree. The answer is not necessarily a function of perception. In previous posts, I have vehemently defended the front office, going so far as to write: "The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward." I have supported the controversial goal of being "consistently competitive," have urged others to resist placing the blame on management, and have written glowingly of the decisions made in keeping or trading personnel and protecting our prospects.
With that said, it is not inconceivable that the Padres, who clearly have an interest in maintaining high expectations, would release the most optimistic results of their preseason projections. Prior to the season, PECOTA predicted 79 wins. An average of the opinions of 17 Baseball Prospectus writers felt the Padres would finish 4th in the NL West, ahead of only the Giants. Other quantitative systems predicted the Padres were a low to mid 80 win team. In fact, the only 2 projections I saw that forecasted close to a 90 win season belonged to The Hardball Times and the San Diego Padres (who obviously did not disclose their methodology).
Clearly there is no definitive proof that the Padres had internal models that were not as optimistic as their public prediction of 90 wins. I am choosing to believe that in the excitement of the off-season, the Padres released their most optimistic projections, and in the process may have mislead the fans. My belief is not biased from a lack of faith in the Padres. Rather, bias may exist because I have too much faith in the Padres and their ability to get things right.
Regardless of whether you believe that in this specific situation the Padres purposely mislead the fans, the underlying question remains: when is okay for the front office to lie?
An Unabashed Advertisement
Many of you are reading this site for the first time, having been directed from Ducksnorts. There, Geoff further developed the discussion I began in my previous post. Because comments have been temporarily disabled at Ducksnorts, I encourage all who wish to engage in the discussion to post their comments here. Even if you care not to comment, please feel free to check out some of my previous posts. Welcome.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Is it Okay for the Front Office to Lie?
Asymmetric information makes baseball interesting. If all teams valued players the same way, then baseball would be little more than a game of luck (reasonable variation from expectations). Instead, teams with innovative management are able to gain an edge over their competitors by developing better models of player valuation.
Gains teams exhibit by possessing more precise knowledge tend to be short term. Recognizing the importance of OBP may have provided the Oakland Athletics with opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for a few years, but for a number of reasons including: other teams copying their successful tactics, the release of Moneyball (I am not sure how big of an effect this really had. If OBP was actually still undervalued, the As probably would not have allowed Michael Lewis to chronicle their secrets), and their top assistants leaving for other jobs around baseball, the competitive advantage the As received by more accurately valuing OBP quickly evaporated.
Because asymmetric information does not stay asymmetric forever, it is crucial for teams to actively protect their valuation models. This suggests the front office must keep some information from the fans, and at some level even mislead the public. It is likely that at any given time, the front office knows certain players are not very good. However, it may be in the best interest of the team to extol the virtues of those players, even if it misleads the fans as well.
Derek Carty, writing for The Hardball Times, references Paul DePodesta’s blog as a possible source of front office propaganda. In outlining the Padres who might have been traded at the deadline, DePodesta cherry picks stats that, in the absence of other information, make players like Randy Wolf look like they have all-star potential. Carty writes: “Perhaps my favorite quote comes in his discussion of Randy Wolf.
His collective line of 109 innings, 109 hits, 42 walks, and 100 k's is one of the better lines you'll find during this deadline, but his line of 101 innings, 95 hits, 33 walks, and 94 k's (3.48 ERA) without those two starts is even more indicative of the pitcher he has been. In fact, his 12 quality starts ranks 7th in the NL behind Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez (DePodesta).
Carty recognizes that smart GMs such as Theo Epstein or Billy Bean are unlikely to be swayed by the writings of DePodesta; however, a few GMs such as Ed Wade may actually believe some of what DePodesta writes. To favorably compare Wolf with Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez, is a useful sales tool to peddle Wolf, but at the same time is misleading.
In this situation, I doubt many Padre fans have a problem with DePodesta attempting to convince others that Wolf is actually a good pitcher. The club was already out of contention at the time of the post, and if a team overvalues Wolf, the Padres, and by extension the fans, can only benefit.
A messier version of a team misleading the public occurs when the team knows they will not be very good, but tries to convince the fans that the team will contend. In this situation, the team stands to benefit from the higher ticket sales that result from positive expectations. Some point to the Padres preseason prediction of 90 wins as unethical manipulation of their customers. Personally, I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins for this team. Perhaps a few simulations out of thousands resulted in a 90 win season, but there is no way that was the average result. At the same time, I don’t really have a problem with teams raising the level of expectations. Ticket buyers were never guaranteed a 90 win season. Additionally, the ballpark experience, while better when the team is winning, can still be fun when the team is losing.
Teams, including the Padres, clearly need to protect their player valuation secrets from other teams. To do this, the team is unable to let the fans in on much of the behind the scenes work that goes into constructing the ball club. It is when teams reveal only selective information in order to entice the fans to buy more tickets that an ethical debate can be had. To me, things like trying to convince the fans that the team is going to be good, or to accept higher beer prices for phony reasons, may be justified from a business perspective, and I have a hard time getting too worked up, but others may be more offended.
I know I've been rambling, and don't really have an answer as to when it is okay for a team to mislead its fans, but I am curious what others have to say on the topic...
Gains teams exhibit by possessing more precise knowledge tend to be short term. Recognizing the importance of OBP may have provided the Oakland Athletics with opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for a few years, but for a number of reasons including: other teams copying their successful tactics, the release of Moneyball (I am not sure how big of an effect this really had. If OBP was actually still undervalued, the As probably would not have allowed Michael Lewis to chronicle their secrets), and their top assistants leaving for other jobs around baseball, the competitive advantage the As received by more accurately valuing OBP quickly evaporated.
Because asymmetric information does not stay asymmetric forever, it is crucial for teams to actively protect their valuation models. This suggests the front office must keep some information from the fans, and at some level even mislead the public. It is likely that at any given time, the front office knows certain players are not very good. However, it may be in the best interest of the team to extol the virtues of those players, even if it misleads the fans as well.
Derek Carty, writing for The Hardball Times, references Paul DePodesta’s blog as a possible source of front office propaganda. In outlining the Padres who might have been traded at the deadline, DePodesta cherry picks stats that, in the absence of other information, make players like Randy Wolf look like they have all-star potential. Carty writes: “Perhaps my favorite quote comes in his discussion of Randy Wolf.
His collective line of 109 innings, 109 hits, 42 walks, and 100 k's is one of the better lines you'll find during this deadline, but his line of 101 innings, 95 hits, 33 walks, and 94 k's (3.48 ERA) without those two starts is even more indicative of the pitcher he has been. In fact, his 12 quality starts ranks 7th in the NL behind Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez (DePodesta).
Carty recognizes that smart GMs such as Theo Epstein or Billy Bean are unlikely to be swayed by the writings of DePodesta; however, a few GMs such as Ed Wade may actually believe some of what DePodesta writes. To favorably compare Wolf with Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez, is a useful sales tool to peddle Wolf, but at the same time is misleading.
In this situation, I doubt many Padre fans have a problem with DePodesta attempting to convince others that Wolf is actually a good pitcher. The club was already out of contention at the time of the post, and if a team overvalues Wolf, the Padres, and by extension the fans, can only benefit.
A messier version of a team misleading the public occurs when the team knows they will not be very good, but tries to convince the fans that the team will contend. In this situation, the team stands to benefit from the higher ticket sales that result from positive expectations. Some point to the Padres preseason prediction of 90 wins as unethical manipulation of their customers. Personally, I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins for this team. Perhaps a few simulations out of thousands resulted in a 90 win season, but there is no way that was the average result. At the same time, I don’t really have a problem with teams raising the level of expectations. Ticket buyers were never guaranteed a 90 win season. Additionally, the ballpark experience, while better when the team is winning, can still be fun when the team is losing.
Teams, including the Padres, clearly need to protect their player valuation secrets from other teams. To do this, the team is unable to let the fans in on much of the behind the scenes work that goes into constructing the ball club. It is when teams reveal only selective information in order to entice the fans to buy more tickets that an ethical debate can be had. To me, things like trying to convince the fans that the team is going to be good, or to accept higher beer prices for phony reasons, may be justified from a business perspective, and I have a hard time getting too worked up, but others may be more offended.
I know I've been rambling, and don't really have an answer as to when it is okay for a team to mislead its fans, but I am curious what others have to say on the topic...
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Bobby Jones
In 2002, Bobby Jones pitched 9.2 innings for the Padres and gave up 7 runs. Bobby Jones used his right arm to catch.
In 2002, Bobby Jones pitched 108 innings for the Padres. He had an ERA of 5.50. He struck out 60 batters, while walking 21. Bobby Jones used his right arm to throw.
In 2002, the Padres were terrible, losing 96 games and finishing in last place. However, fans of pitchers named Bobby Jones could not have been happier. That season, the Padres employed two pitchers, both named Bobby Jones. Both were terrible pitchers (at least that season), but due to the remarkable coincidence of being on the same team as someone who shared their name, gave fans some interesting water-cooler material to discuss in an otherwise dreadful season of Padres baseball. Thanks for the Memories Bobby's.
Monday, August 18, 2008
The Joy of the Seat Upgrade/Downgrade & Why Teams Ruin the Fun
One year for my birthday (I was probably 13 or 14), I convinced my parents to let me take a small group of friends to a ballgame at Qualcomm stadium. Pitching in his big league debut was Ben Howard, a young flamethrower who, along with Dennis Tankersley, looked poised to anchor the Padres rotation for years to come. Johnson had trouble finding the strike zone that day, and the game quickly turned sour. My friends and I lost interest in the game by the fourth inning, but soon turned our interest to summiting the mountainous concrete bowl that is Qualcomm Stadium. We wished to sit in the oxygen-deprived seats at the very top of upper-view level.
We made our way up the Q’s infamous spiral ramps with the same swiftness of a Nepalian Sherpa summiting Everest. Upon reaching view level; we turned left, walking to the furthest possible section where we were poised to finally experience the thrill of being closer to the overhead blimp than home plate. We never reached our intended destination. Before we were able to enter our desired section of seats, an usher (is there some unwritten rule that ushers must be eligible to collect social security), asked to see our tickets. I calmly showed the gentleman my ticket, and began walking toward the seats. That’s when I was sternly told to not proceed any further. I informed the usher that our seats were field level, which were much better seats than view level, and that since nobody was sitting in view level, “downgrading” should not be a problem. This must have gotten the man worked up, because he proceeded to lecture me and my friends on the history of “open seating” at Qualcomm Stadium. Supposedly, at one time, fans could sit pretty much wherever they wanted, but those days had long passed, and fans were now constrained to the seat marked on their ticket. Dejected, yet thinking we were pretty cool for attempting to challenge an authority figure, my friends and I returned to our seats where we watched the end of the game. None of us could understand why downgrading seats was not allowed.
To this day, when I take in a big league ballgame, I often hear fans complain that they cannot upgrade to the empty seats closer to the field. I am not sympathetic to these complaints. If upgrades were permitted, many people otherwise willing to buy the more expensive tickets, would instead purchase cheap seats, but sit in the empty seats below. Not only would the Padres lose out on a good amount of revenue, but the viewing experience would surely be decreased, as a flood of people would be wondering around the lower levels looking for empty seats, and being forced to move when the rightful ticket holder shows up.
The case against allowing ticket downgrades is not so obvious. The Padres are selling an expensive ticket, but the downgrading fan is sitting in a cheaper seat. Likewise, there are often a lot of empty sections in the upper corners of the stadium, so there are not many fans with tickets to those seats who will have their view obstructed by others searching for empty seats. The real problem with allowing downgrades is the Padres would be forced to hire additional personnel such as extra security and more custodial staff. Additionally, while the team would not necessarily be required to add food vendors, fans without convenient access to ballpark snacks are much less likely to purchase these high margin concessions since there is are added transaction costs to the fans (expending extra energy to walk to further concession stands, and spending more time away from the game). Once again, the result is decreased revenue to the team.
Both seat upgrades and seat downgrades are costly to teams. Before you complain about not being allowed to move to an empty seat, please consider that the Padres are not being insensitive to customer service, but actually have solid business reasons to limiting fans to sitting in their marked seat.
We made our way up the Q’s infamous spiral ramps with the same swiftness of a Nepalian Sherpa summiting Everest. Upon reaching view level; we turned left, walking to the furthest possible section where we were poised to finally experience the thrill of being closer to the overhead blimp than home plate. We never reached our intended destination. Before we were able to enter our desired section of seats, an usher (is there some unwritten rule that ushers must be eligible to collect social security), asked to see our tickets. I calmly showed the gentleman my ticket, and began walking toward the seats. That’s when I was sternly told to not proceed any further. I informed the usher that our seats were field level, which were much better seats than view level, and that since nobody was sitting in view level, “downgrading” should not be a problem. This must have gotten the man worked up, because he proceeded to lecture me and my friends on the history of “open seating” at Qualcomm Stadium. Supposedly, at one time, fans could sit pretty much wherever they wanted, but those days had long passed, and fans were now constrained to the seat marked on their ticket. Dejected, yet thinking we were pretty cool for attempting to challenge an authority figure, my friends and I returned to our seats where we watched the end of the game. None of us could understand why downgrading seats was not allowed.
To this day, when I take in a big league ballgame, I often hear fans complain that they cannot upgrade to the empty seats closer to the field. I am not sympathetic to these complaints. If upgrades were permitted, many people otherwise willing to buy the more expensive tickets, would instead purchase cheap seats, but sit in the empty seats below. Not only would the Padres lose out on a good amount of revenue, but the viewing experience would surely be decreased, as a flood of people would be wondering around the lower levels looking for empty seats, and being forced to move when the rightful ticket holder shows up.
The case against allowing ticket downgrades is not so obvious. The Padres are selling an expensive ticket, but the downgrading fan is sitting in a cheaper seat. Likewise, there are often a lot of empty sections in the upper corners of the stadium, so there are not many fans with tickets to those seats who will have their view obstructed by others searching for empty seats. The real problem with allowing downgrades is the Padres would be forced to hire additional personnel such as extra security and more custodial staff. Additionally, while the team would not necessarily be required to add food vendors, fans without convenient access to ballpark snacks are much less likely to purchase these high margin concessions since there is are added transaction costs to the fans (expending extra energy to walk to further concession stands, and spending more time away from the game). Once again, the result is decreased revenue to the team.
Both seat upgrades and seat downgrades are costly to teams. Before you complain about not being allowed to move to an empty seat, please consider that the Padres are not being insensitive to customer service, but actually have solid business reasons to limiting fans to sitting in their marked seat.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
How to Run onto the Field and Get Away with it.
I have previously written about how to properly guess the attendance at a ballgame. Today, I focus on the lost art of running onto the field of play:
The Padres lost yesterday in pretty boring fashion. They did not get many people on base, and did not score many runs. The players did not give the fans much reason to cheer, but an external distraction more than made up for the boring on-field product.
Immediately prior to the seventh inning stretch, three youngsters (My guess is they were 17 or 18 years old), shed their shirts and jumped out for a joy-run on the field.
Typically, fans who run onto the field avoid one or two out of shape Elite security guards prior to being tackled by an overly zealous rent-a-cop in a red jacket. These fans are usually totally plastered, and their 15 seconds is, if you consider running onto the field a source of fame, just that-15 seconds.
Not yesterday. The three gentlemen raced onto the outfield and immediately spread the security force out. This creative strategy worked to their advantage as rather than 7 or 8 guards being able to focus on one miscreant, they had to split up into smaller teams.
Also unique was that it was clear alcohol was not consumed prior to their run. These kids were agile, had good acceleration, great vision, speed, and endurance. I could not help but think that L.T. had better watch out, because any of the three would look great in a powder blue jersey on Sundays.
The first runner to be caught was merely unlucky. One of his cohorts made the mistake of getting too close to his friend, and the first runner was tackled-almost accidentally-by one of the security guards who was actually chasing his friend, and just happened to run right into this unlucky guy.
The second runner-who had evaded security for literally at least 3 minutes-decided to go for the gold and slide head first into home plate. His dive exhibited perfect form, and he was safe by a wide margin. Unfortunately, his slide into home gave the men of Elite Security time to catch up, and he was roughly cuffed shortly thereafter.
The final runner to be apprehended must not have felt comfortable leaving his friends behind. Once he saw his friends in custody, he used his hands to signal the safe sign, and then gave himself up peacefully. He placed his hands behind his back and waited 10 seconds for the guards to close in (that’s right-his closest pursuer was a full 10 seconds behind).
These three rascals provided some needed energy to the stadium, but after a fun four minutes, were led off the field in handcuffs. Their effort got me thinking-what if they had wanted to escape unpunished? Would it be possible to actually get away with running onto the field of play?
Although difficult, I think it might actually be possible. These bright scoundrels got the first two necessary components correct. They ran in as a group-which spread the defense too thin, they possessed the speed and athletic prowess necessary to evade security, and were not under the influence of alcohol. What they did not have was a proper exit plan. My guess is they have been watching too much Fox News and are convinced exit plans are just unnecessary. I, on the other hand, have it all thought out…
The obvious escape route is into the stands on the third or first base side. In these locations, the wall is short and provides easy access away from the field of play. The problem with this route is security can use the layout of the stadium to its advantage and basically box in the runners. The runners could surely run horizontally, trampling over a bunch of fans to avoid running straight up an aisle, but, to escape for good, vertical movement toward the exits is eventually required. I am certain security guards would have no problem blocking off the escape routes.
Instead of escaping by going over the short walls, I propose an escape by scaling the center field wall. Typically, only one security guard is stationed in the centerfield sand. So long as the group of runners has a big enough lead over their on-field pursuers (hence the need for speed/athleticism), and are able to coordinate their dash to the wall, it is likely that at least 2 will be able to escape (I am assuming the “lifeguard” out in CF will be able to apprehend one person as he/she is descending the fence. Note: There is always the risk that the person caught will squeal-giving up the rest of his crew. I propose setting up some sort of fund beforehand. Prior to the attempt, each person must put down a deposit commensurate to a relatively high proportion of their wealth. The money will be returned following the attempt to everyone who does not squeal. Anybody who squeals loses their deposit which is then distributed equally amongst the others).
Once the wall is scaled, there are numerous exits to choose from, and plenty of open space to dodge the reinforcements that have surely been called into active duty.
It is also necessary to don a proper uniform. Be sure to wear a mask of some sort to hide your face. Also, wear two shirts, and a pair of generic colored shorts. Upon evading the authorities-ditch the mask and top shirt. Then, casually duck into an eatery or bar in the gaslamp. You will now be adequately disguised, and ready to continue your night on the town worry free.
It may be a long-shot, but if you really get that urge to run onto the field and attempt an escape, heed my advice:
1) Don’t consume alcoholic beverages prior to your attempt.
2) Recruit a group of friends to join you.
3) Make sure both you and your friends are fast runners.
4) Set up a system that commits people to not squealing.
5) Prepare proper uniforms
6) Escape into centerfield-not the seats in foul territory.
7) Be sure to have the number of a local cab company handy-not to call as an escape vehicle-but for a ride home after downing a few pitchers in the wake of your glory.
Note: Don't try this at home kids...This article is for entertainment purposes only. Daniel Gettinger does not encourage any behavior that breaks the law-not even Kissing on the lips in Riverside, CA which violates a public health ordinance unless both parties wipe their lips with carbonized rose water.
The Padres lost yesterday in pretty boring fashion. They did not get many people on base, and did not score many runs. The players did not give the fans much reason to cheer, but an external distraction more than made up for the boring on-field product.
Immediately prior to the seventh inning stretch, three youngsters (My guess is they were 17 or 18 years old), shed their shirts and jumped out for a joy-run on the field.
Typically, fans who run onto the field avoid one or two out of shape Elite security guards prior to being tackled by an overly zealous rent-a-cop in a red jacket. These fans are usually totally plastered, and their 15 seconds is, if you consider running onto the field a source of fame, just that-15 seconds.
Not yesterday. The three gentlemen raced onto the outfield and immediately spread the security force out. This creative strategy worked to their advantage as rather than 7 or 8 guards being able to focus on one miscreant, they had to split up into smaller teams.
Also unique was that it was clear alcohol was not consumed prior to their run. These kids were agile, had good acceleration, great vision, speed, and endurance. I could not help but think that L.T. had better watch out, because any of the three would look great in a powder blue jersey on Sundays.
The first runner to be caught was merely unlucky. One of his cohorts made the mistake of getting too close to his friend, and the first runner was tackled-almost accidentally-by one of the security guards who was actually chasing his friend, and just happened to run right into this unlucky guy.
The second runner-who had evaded security for literally at least 3 minutes-decided to go for the gold and slide head first into home plate. His dive exhibited perfect form, and he was safe by a wide margin. Unfortunately, his slide into home gave the men of Elite Security time to catch up, and he was roughly cuffed shortly thereafter.
The final runner to be apprehended must not have felt comfortable leaving his friends behind. Once he saw his friends in custody, he used his hands to signal the safe sign, and then gave himself up peacefully. He placed his hands behind his back and waited 10 seconds for the guards to close in (that’s right-his closest pursuer was a full 10 seconds behind).
These three rascals provided some needed energy to the stadium, but after a fun four minutes, were led off the field in handcuffs. Their effort got me thinking-what if they had wanted to escape unpunished? Would it be possible to actually get away with running onto the field of play?
Although difficult, I think it might actually be possible. These bright scoundrels got the first two necessary components correct. They ran in as a group-which spread the defense too thin, they possessed the speed and athletic prowess necessary to evade security, and were not under the influence of alcohol. What they did not have was a proper exit plan. My guess is they have been watching too much Fox News and are convinced exit plans are just unnecessary. I, on the other hand, have it all thought out…
The obvious escape route is into the stands on the third or first base side. In these locations, the wall is short and provides easy access away from the field of play. The problem with this route is security can use the layout of the stadium to its advantage and basically box in the runners. The runners could surely run horizontally, trampling over a bunch of fans to avoid running straight up an aisle, but, to escape for good, vertical movement toward the exits is eventually required. I am certain security guards would have no problem blocking off the escape routes.
Instead of escaping by going over the short walls, I propose an escape by scaling the center field wall. Typically, only one security guard is stationed in the centerfield sand. So long as the group of runners has a big enough lead over their on-field pursuers (hence the need for speed/athleticism), and are able to coordinate their dash to the wall, it is likely that at least 2 will be able to escape (I am assuming the “lifeguard” out in CF will be able to apprehend one person as he/she is descending the fence. Note: There is always the risk that the person caught will squeal-giving up the rest of his crew. I propose setting up some sort of fund beforehand. Prior to the attempt, each person must put down a deposit commensurate to a relatively high proportion of their wealth. The money will be returned following the attempt to everyone who does not squeal. Anybody who squeals loses their deposit which is then distributed equally amongst the others).
Once the wall is scaled, there are numerous exits to choose from, and plenty of open space to dodge the reinforcements that have surely been called into active duty.
It is also necessary to don a proper uniform. Be sure to wear a mask of some sort to hide your face. Also, wear two shirts, and a pair of generic colored shorts. Upon evading the authorities-ditch the mask and top shirt. Then, casually duck into an eatery or bar in the gaslamp. You will now be adequately disguised, and ready to continue your night on the town worry free.
It may be a long-shot, but if you really get that urge to run onto the field and attempt an escape, heed my advice:
1) Don’t consume alcoholic beverages prior to your attempt.
2) Recruit a group of friends to join you.
3) Make sure both you and your friends are fast runners.
4) Set up a system that commits people to not squealing.
5) Prepare proper uniforms
6) Escape into centerfield-not the seats in foul territory.
7) Be sure to have the number of a local cab company handy-not to call as an escape vehicle-but for a ride home after downing a few pitchers in the wake of your glory.
Note: Don't try this at home kids...This article is for entertainment purposes only. Daniel Gettinger does not encourage any behavior that breaks the law-not even Kissing on the lips in Riverside, CA which violates a public health ordinance unless both parties wipe their lips with carbonized rose water.
Friday, August 8, 2008
Giles Update
According to ESPN, Giles will invoke his contractual right to block a trade to Boston. I am not surprised. Like Maddux, Giles enjoys playing in San Diego, and seemingly has no interest in leaving. However, I would not be totally shocked if Giles changes his mind-especially if his option is dropped.
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Giles to Boston?
Today’s big news in Padresland is the Red Sox are “working on a deal to acquire Brian Giles.” Supposedly, the Red Sox claimed Giles on waivers. The Padres have 48 hours to work out a deal with the Sox. Giles, who has a limited no-trade clause, can block a deal to the Red Sox if he so desires. In the event no deal is reached, the Padres will likely pull Giles off waivers and retain him for at least the end of the season. Below, I will try to answer a few of the obvious questions surrounding this report:
Why Does Boston want to acquire Brian Giles?
As the ESPN report indicated, the health of David Ortiz (and Mike Lowell) is uncertain. Ortiz has already spent a significant amount of time on the disabled list this season, and is currently battling a troubled wrist. Acquiring Giles would act as an insurance policy, protecting the Red Sox against Ortiz missing time both in the regular season, and more importantly-the playoffs. Giles is very adept at getting on base, and could be a good fit in the 2-hole, ahead of Boston’s power hitters. Giles is also affordably signed through the 2009 season. The Mark Teixera trades give us a reasonable estimate as to the value of an extra year of control. Teams are no longer willing to give up the farm for an expiring contract, but will pay a premium for a player controllable for at least an additional year.
In all honesty, I am not convinced Boston is interested in actually acquiring Giles. Boston already has Jason Bay and J.D. Drew at the corners of the OF, and assuming David Ortiz is healthy for the playoffs, there is no spot for Giles to play in Boston. My feeling is Boston submitted a claim to prevent Tampa Bay or Anaheim from getting a shot at Giles. It would seem that Giles would provide more marginal benefit to either Tampa or Anaheim. Boston has no interest in seeing either of those teams upgrade heading toward/into the playoffs.
What can the Padres get in Return for Giles?
While I would not expect the Padres to receive anything close to what the Pirates got for Jason Bay, if a deal is consummated, the Padres should get one (or more) reasonably solid prospects. Boston has a very deep farm system, and could probably tempt the Padres without giving up one of their top five farm-hands. As I wrote last week, Giles is a very valuable asset for the Padres through 2009. The Padres will not deal him unless they get equally valuable assets in return.
Should the Padres have Dealt Giles Prior to the Deadline?
Not necessarily. It is true that now the deadline has passed, the Padres do not have the same amount of leverage they possessed prior to the deadline. The only team they can trade Giles to now is Boston, and under normal circumstances, this would seemingly lessen their potential return. However, because Giles is a valuable asset going forward, and the Padres are content holding on to him, Boston will still be forced to pay up if they want Giles. Even though the Padres insist they did not actively shop Giles prior to the trade-deadline, I find it difficult to believe they hung up the phone before listening to the offers of interested teams. It is likely that the Padres considered the offers, and found none of them to be enticing enough to deal Giles. Perhaps with further question marks now surrounding the health of David Ortiz, the Red Sox are valuing Giles differently than they did a few days ago. If Giles’ value to Boston has increased, then the Padres are likely to get more out of Boston now than they could have at the deadline.
Will Giles Accept a Trade to Boston?
He may. Or he may not. Giles may be interested in having a legitimate shot at winning the World Series, or he may prefer playing for his hometown Padres. It is impossible to know what his preferences are. One possibility is that Giles agrees to a trade under the condition that his option be dropped. He would then be a free agent at the end of the season and free to sign with any team-including the Padres. Of course, dropping the option would reduce his value to Boston, and thus reduce the caliber of prospect(s) the Padres are able to acquire in return.
Why Does Boston want to acquire Brian Giles?
As the ESPN report indicated, the health of David Ortiz (and Mike Lowell) is uncertain. Ortiz has already spent a significant amount of time on the disabled list this season, and is currently battling a troubled wrist. Acquiring Giles would act as an insurance policy, protecting the Red Sox against Ortiz missing time both in the regular season, and more importantly-the playoffs. Giles is very adept at getting on base, and could be a good fit in the 2-hole, ahead of Boston’s power hitters. Giles is also affordably signed through the 2009 season. The Mark Teixera trades give us a reasonable estimate as to the value of an extra year of control. Teams are no longer willing to give up the farm for an expiring contract, but will pay a premium for a player controllable for at least an additional year.
In all honesty, I am not convinced Boston is interested in actually acquiring Giles. Boston already has Jason Bay and J.D. Drew at the corners of the OF, and assuming David Ortiz is healthy for the playoffs, there is no spot for Giles to play in Boston. My feeling is Boston submitted a claim to prevent Tampa Bay or Anaheim from getting a shot at Giles. It would seem that Giles would provide more marginal benefit to either Tampa or Anaheim. Boston has no interest in seeing either of those teams upgrade heading toward/into the playoffs.
What can the Padres get in Return for Giles?
While I would not expect the Padres to receive anything close to what the Pirates got for Jason Bay, if a deal is consummated, the Padres should get one (or more) reasonably solid prospects. Boston has a very deep farm system, and could probably tempt the Padres without giving up one of their top five farm-hands. As I wrote last week, Giles is a very valuable asset for the Padres through 2009. The Padres will not deal him unless they get equally valuable assets in return.
Should the Padres have Dealt Giles Prior to the Deadline?
Not necessarily. It is true that now the deadline has passed, the Padres do not have the same amount of leverage they possessed prior to the deadline. The only team they can trade Giles to now is Boston, and under normal circumstances, this would seemingly lessen their potential return. However, because Giles is a valuable asset going forward, and the Padres are content holding on to him, Boston will still be forced to pay up if they want Giles. Even though the Padres insist they did not actively shop Giles prior to the trade-deadline, I find it difficult to believe they hung up the phone before listening to the offers of interested teams. It is likely that the Padres considered the offers, and found none of them to be enticing enough to deal Giles. Perhaps with further question marks now surrounding the health of David Ortiz, the Red Sox are valuing Giles differently than they did a few days ago. If Giles’ value to Boston has increased, then the Padres are likely to get more out of Boston now than they could have at the deadline.
Will Giles Accept a Trade to Boston?
He may. Or he may not. Giles may be interested in having a legitimate shot at winning the World Series, or he may prefer playing for his hometown Padres. It is impossible to know what his preferences are. One possibility is that Giles agrees to a trade under the condition that his option be dropped. He would then be a free agent at the end of the season and free to sign with any team-including the Padres. Of course, dropping the option would reduce his value to Boston, and thus reduce the caliber of prospect(s) the Padres are able to acquire in return.
Monday, August 4, 2008
Why Giving the Kids a Chance Makes No Cents
The Padres have a lot of mediocre players who are better suited to bench work or long relief, than a spot in the starting lineup or the five-man rotation. Many of these players, such as Jody Gerut and Cha Seung Baek are not young and do not figure to be a major part of the Padres plans in the future.
One reader of this blog has been telling me since mid-June that he, as a fan, would rather see some of the team’s young prospects get a chance to play every day for the big league club. He argues that since the team is going nowhere this season, that it would be more exciting for fans to catch a glimpse of the future than to watch “4A” talent. In addition, he believes that the young players will benefit from some time in the majors, and are likely to become better players due to the experience. He frequently cites Will Inman and Steve Garrison as candidates to be promoted and plugged into the big league rotation. Even though he is certain that Gerut and others must be replaced, I have yet to hear this loyal reader present any suggestions for position players due for a promotion
I recognize three primary problems associated with promoting Inman or Garrison at this point in the season. The first is that they are not better pitchers, at this point in their careers, than anybody in the current Padres rotation. The second problem is that rushing players who are not ready for the majors may stunt their development. Finally, a player promoted from the minors begins accumulating MLB service time.
By promoting Inman or Garrison to their big league team, the Padres are likely to become worse, rather than better. Davenport Translations can give us a rough estimate for the stats minor league players are likely to put up in the majors. Both are likely to post Defense Independent ERAs in the mid-5s. For comparison, the much maligned Cha Seung Baek has a DERA of 4.88 this season, while Josh Banks has posted a 3.97 DERA for the Padres. Other statistics can, and should be compared in a more thorough analysis, but I believe it is pretty clear that Inman and Garrison are downgrades, this season, from Banks, Baek, or just about any other pitcher the Padres may decide to plug into the 5 slot in the rotation. Although some fans may get excited about being introduced to some of the franchise’s younger talent, I believe many fans will actually be turned off by the even poorer performance of the team that is likely to ensue. These fans will question why the team is making them pay major league dollar to cheer for minor league talent.
A somewhat more compelling reason for promoting the “kids,” (not sure kid is the right word for me to use, since these guys are slightly older than myself), is to help accelerate the development process of these young players. Some may point to Chase Headley’s experience as a Padre last season as “proof” of the good a short stint in the majors can do for a player’s development. Chase was called up from AA last year to fill in for an injured Kevin Kouzmanoff. Headley struggled in a small sample of plate appearances, and was optioned back to the minors upon Kouz’s return. Following his return to AA, Headley performed exceptionally. The theory is that although Headley was not great in the big leagues, that he learned from the experience and was ready to positively contribute the next season.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Headley’s appearance in the major’s actually helped him become a better or more major league ready player. Prior to his call up, Headley was hitting 0.357 in the minors, so it’s not like he learned how to hit due to a few games in the majors. In fact, I would argue that promoting a player before he is ready has the potential to do more harm than good. It is possible that a player not yet ready for the big leagues may try so hard to impress that he could mess up his mechanics (potentially leading to injury). Also, although it is difficult to quantify the effect confidence has on production, a young player who struggles mightily in the big leagues, could have trouble regaining his previous form due to confidence issues. I am not certain rushing a player actually does him permanent harm, but I find the potential harm to be more probable, and greater in magnitude than the potential benefits.
The final, and most important reason for not rushing a top prospect to the majors, is the “service time” issue. A player becomes eligible for arbitration if he has 3 or more years of MLB service time. After 6 years of MLB service time, a player can file for free agency. This system makes a player’s 1-3 years incredibly valuable to teams, since they can pay the players a salary potentially well below their marginal revenue product. To call a player up before he is ready, and particularly in a year where the team is terrible, wastes those valuable years, and will cause the players to become arbitration and free agent eligible sooner than necessary.
I am not opposed to calling up a few minor leaguers once rosters expand in September. A few days in the majors, after a full season of development in the minors, is likely to do little harm (assuming pitchers' IP are carefully monitored). What I do not wish to see is players rushed to the majors in early August for no reason other than change itself. To waste valuable development time in the minor leagues, to risk blows to the players’ confidence, and to start the service time clock for no apparent reason just makes no sense.
One reader of this blog has been telling me since mid-June that he, as a fan, would rather see some of the team’s young prospects get a chance to play every day for the big league club. He argues that since the team is going nowhere this season, that it would be more exciting for fans to catch a glimpse of the future than to watch “4A” talent. In addition, he believes that the young players will benefit from some time in the majors, and are likely to become better players due to the experience. He frequently cites Will Inman and Steve Garrison as candidates to be promoted and plugged into the big league rotation. Even though he is certain that Gerut and others must be replaced, I have yet to hear this loyal reader present any suggestions for position players due for a promotion
I recognize three primary problems associated with promoting Inman or Garrison at this point in the season. The first is that they are not better pitchers, at this point in their careers, than anybody in the current Padres rotation. The second problem is that rushing players who are not ready for the majors may stunt their development. Finally, a player promoted from the minors begins accumulating MLB service time.
By promoting Inman or Garrison to their big league team, the Padres are likely to become worse, rather than better. Davenport Translations can give us a rough estimate for the stats minor league players are likely to put up in the majors. Both are likely to post Defense Independent ERAs in the mid-5s. For comparison, the much maligned Cha Seung Baek has a DERA of 4.88 this season, while Josh Banks has posted a 3.97 DERA for the Padres. Other statistics can, and should be compared in a more thorough analysis, but I believe it is pretty clear that Inman and Garrison are downgrades, this season, from Banks, Baek, or just about any other pitcher the Padres may decide to plug into the 5 slot in the rotation. Although some fans may get excited about being introduced to some of the franchise’s younger talent, I believe many fans will actually be turned off by the even poorer performance of the team that is likely to ensue. These fans will question why the team is making them pay major league dollar to cheer for minor league talent.
A somewhat more compelling reason for promoting the “kids,” (not sure kid is the right word for me to use, since these guys are slightly older than myself), is to help accelerate the development process of these young players. Some may point to Chase Headley’s experience as a Padre last season as “proof” of the good a short stint in the majors can do for a player’s development. Chase was called up from AA last year to fill in for an injured Kevin Kouzmanoff. Headley struggled in a small sample of plate appearances, and was optioned back to the minors upon Kouz’s return. Following his return to AA, Headley performed exceptionally. The theory is that although Headley was not great in the big leagues, that he learned from the experience and was ready to positively contribute the next season.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Headley’s appearance in the major’s actually helped him become a better or more major league ready player. Prior to his call up, Headley was hitting 0.357 in the minors, so it’s not like he learned how to hit due to a few games in the majors. In fact, I would argue that promoting a player before he is ready has the potential to do more harm than good. It is possible that a player not yet ready for the big leagues may try so hard to impress that he could mess up his mechanics (potentially leading to injury). Also, although it is difficult to quantify the effect confidence has on production, a young player who struggles mightily in the big leagues, could have trouble regaining his previous form due to confidence issues. I am not certain rushing a player actually does him permanent harm, but I find the potential harm to be more probable, and greater in magnitude than the potential benefits.
The final, and most important reason for not rushing a top prospect to the majors, is the “service time” issue. A player becomes eligible for arbitration if he has 3 or more years of MLB service time. After 6 years of MLB service time, a player can file for free agency. This system makes a player’s 1-3 years incredibly valuable to teams, since they can pay the players a salary potentially well below their marginal revenue product. To call a player up before he is ready, and particularly in a year where the team is terrible, wastes those valuable years, and will cause the players to become arbitration and free agent eligible sooner than necessary.
I am not opposed to calling up a few minor leaguers once rosters expand in September. A few days in the majors, after a full season of development in the minors, is likely to do little harm (assuming pitchers' IP are carefully monitored). What I do not wish to see is players rushed to the majors in early August for no reason other than change itself. To waste valuable development time in the minor leagues, to risk blows to the players’ confidence, and to start the service time clock for no apparent reason just makes no sense.
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