Sunday, December 21, 2008
Moving Over to Friar Forecast
I am very happy to announce that I will now be a part of Friar Forecast, and would like to thank Myron for the opportunity to join him, Mike, and Ben in contributing to the site. Because many of you already frequent Friar Forecast on a regular basis, this move should be an added convenience, allowing you to get more of your Padres content with less hassle. For those who are unfamiliar with Myron's site, I heartily recommend you check it out, as a lot of interesting insight is published there on a frequent basis. Thank you to those who have been reading this blog, and I hope to hear from you over at Friar Forecast.
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Trade will be Judged on Greene's Ability to Bounce Back
Initial reports state the Padres will receive relief pitcher Mark Worrell, as well as a "player to be named later" from the Cardinals in return for Khalil Greene.
Supposedly Worrell is a submariner who can get his fastball up into the low-90s and has an average slider. He followed up a nice 2007 season with an even better 2008 minor league season, striking out 80 batters, compared to 30 walks in 58.2 innings. His ERA of 2.15 reflected his ability to miss bats, and prevent the long-ball (only 2 HR allowed). These numbers are even more impressive in the context of his league (the PCL).
Baseball Prospectus's translated minor league statistics suggest Worrell would have put up a 3.65 DERA in the major leagues. Worrell should earn a spot in the Padre's 2009 bullpen, and based on his minor league profile, looks to be a decent bet to have a pretty good season. At 25 years old, and with minimal big league experience Worrell will be under team control through his prime years.
While I am pleased about adding Worrell, and am optimistic he will be another K.T. "bullpen gem," the fact Worrell is a reliever puts a damper on his value. Not only do relievers not pitch many innings, but their performance is notoriously volatile across seasons. Likewise, there is some risk that Worrell's odd delivery will not fool big league hitters like it did minor leaguers.
We can analyze the Padre's return all we want, but the bottom line is this trade will not be evaluated in the context of who the Padres received, but rather whether Khalil Greene is able to bounce back from a disastrous 2008 season, and put up reasonable numbers while playing a decent shortstop. Greeney has never been good at getting on base, but if he can somehow replicate, or even approach his 2005-2007 line (once park effects are adjusted for), the Cardinals are likely to come out on top in this deal.
Personally, and this is pure speculation, I see Greene rebounding and having solid seasons going forward. He will probably never be an allstar, but capable every day shortstops are not easy to find cheaply (they are certainly more difficult than finding cheap, capable relievers). It might have been in the Padres best long-term interests to try and sign Khalil to a steeply discounted multi-year deal now rather than trading him away. Of course, the Padres know more about Greene than I do, and we should probably give them the benefit of the doubt on this one. If they planned on letting Greene walk after the season, because the Padres are unlikely to contend in 2009, it makes sense to get as much as possible for him now. Likewise, Greene might have had no interest in signing a dirt cheap contract extension following his worst season as a pro.
Assuming the Padres made this trade for baseball reasons, rather than as a reaction to a short-term cash flow problem, I have no problem with it since I trust the team's ability to evaluate players. But my feelings are reversed if management had reason to believe Greene's 2008 performance was bit of an outlier, and would have otherwise liked to hold onto him, possibly signing him to a contract extension. Since there is no way to know what the Padres true motives for dealing Greene were, I guess we'll just have to wait and see. Hopefully things work out in the Friar's favor.
Supposedly Worrell is a submariner who can get his fastball up into the low-90s and has an average slider. He followed up a nice 2007 season with an even better 2008 minor league season, striking out 80 batters, compared to 30 walks in 58.2 innings. His ERA of 2.15 reflected his ability to miss bats, and prevent the long-ball (only 2 HR allowed). These numbers are even more impressive in the context of his league (the PCL).
Baseball Prospectus's translated minor league statistics suggest Worrell would have put up a 3.65 DERA in the major leagues. Worrell should earn a spot in the Padre's 2009 bullpen, and based on his minor league profile, looks to be a decent bet to have a pretty good season. At 25 years old, and with minimal big league experience Worrell will be under team control through his prime years.
While I am pleased about adding Worrell, and am optimistic he will be another K.T. "bullpen gem," the fact Worrell is a reliever puts a damper on his value. Not only do relievers not pitch many innings, but their performance is notoriously volatile across seasons. Likewise, there is some risk that Worrell's odd delivery will not fool big league hitters like it did minor leaguers.
We can analyze the Padre's return all we want, but the bottom line is this trade will not be evaluated in the context of who the Padres received, but rather whether Khalil Greene is able to bounce back from a disastrous 2008 season, and put up reasonable numbers while playing a decent shortstop. Greeney has never been good at getting on base, but if he can somehow replicate, or even approach his 2005-2007 line (once park effects are adjusted for), the Cardinals are likely to come out on top in this deal.
Personally, and this is pure speculation, I see Greene rebounding and having solid seasons going forward. He will probably never be an allstar, but capable every day shortstops are not easy to find cheaply (they are certainly more difficult than finding cheap, capable relievers). It might have been in the Padres best long-term interests to try and sign Khalil to a steeply discounted multi-year deal now rather than trading him away. Of course, the Padres know more about Greene than I do, and we should probably give them the benefit of the doubt on this one. If they planned on letting Greene walk after the season, because the Padres are unlikely to contend in 2009, it makes sense to get as much as possible for him now. Likewise, Greene might have had no interest in signing a dirt cheap contract extension following his worst season as a pro.
Assuming the Padres made this trade for baseball reasons, rather than as a reaction to a short-term cash flow problem, I have no problem with it since I trust the team's ability to evaluate players. But my feelings are reversed if management had reason to believe Greene's 2008 performance was bit of an outlier, and would have otherwise liked to hold onto him, possibly signing him to a contract extension. Since there is no way to know what the Padres true motives for dealing Greene were, I guess we'll just have to wait and see. Hopefully things work out in the Friar's favor.
Greene Traded to Cardinals
ESPN is reporting Khalil Greene has been traded to the Saint Louis Cardinals. I plan on commenting once we know who the Padres will receive in return. Honestly, I am not holding out much hope that the Padres received significantly more than salary relief. If that is the case, you can rest assured I will not be a fan of the deal.
Update: It appears Tom Krasovic of the U.T. had the story first.
Update 2: Here is a more detailed analysis (though certainly not complete analysis) of the trade.
Update: It appears Tom Krasovic of the U.T. had the story first.
Update 2: Here is a more detailed analysis (though certainly not complete analysis) of the trade.
Monday, November 10, 2008
The Final Out
I attend a handful of Padres games per season. Most of these games, taken by themselves, have little impact on the overall success of the team that season. Whether the Padres win or lose is somewhat irrelevant.
What keeps me in my seat for the entire game is not the uncertainty of the outcome, the thrill of watching a big league ball game, or even my passion for the sport. Rather, it is the possibility that Trevor Hoffman might get called upon to close out a game, and jog in from center field to "Hells Bells." I love the anticipation of Hoffman's departure from the bullpen, the blaring music, the blackened scoreboard, and most of all the energy of the crowd.
If Buster Olney is correct, I may have witnessed my last "Hells Bells" in Petco Park. While I realize Hoffman's skills have diminished, he is not only still an effective closer, but a fixture in the San Diego community, and the reason I never leave my seat until the final out has been recorded. From a pure baseball/profit-making perspective Trevor Hoffman might not be worth keeping around for more than $4-5 million, but from my perspective (as a guy who merely watches the games rather than signs the paychecks), Hoffman is worth, assuming he is willing to agree to a 1-year deal, whatever it takes to sign him.
What keeps me in my seat for the entire game is not the uncertainty of the outcome, the thrill of watching a big league ball game, or even my passion for the sport. Rather, it is the possibility that Trevor Hoffman might get called upon to close out a game, and jog in from center field to "Hells Bells." I love the anticipation of Hoffman's departure from the bullpen, the blaring music, the blackened scoreboard, and most of all the energy of the crowd.
If Buster Olney is correct, I may have witnessed my last "Hells Bells" in Petco Park. While I realize Hoffman's skills have diminished, he is not only still an effective closer, but a fixture in the San Diego community, and the reason I never leave my seat until the final out has been recorded. From a pure baseball/profit-making perspective Trevor Hoffman might not be worth keeping around for more than $4-5 million, but from my perspective (as a guy who merely watches the games rather than signs the paychecks), Hoffman is worth, assuming he is willing to agree to a 1-year deal, whatever it takes to sign him.
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
No More Matt and Mud
http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2008/nov/03/padres-s4padtv/?padres
Oddly, I am more dissapointed about this news than the fact Peavy might be traded. Previously, I shared my feelings about the quality of Matty V's. work, so it isn't really neccesary for me to elaborate. While I will certainly miss hearing Matt call Padres games, he had long ago outgrown the market, and this day was going to come sooner than later. I wish Matt the best in his new job, and hope the Padres bring in someone with the same combination of personality and baseball knowledge as Matty V.
By the way, did anybody hear Vasgersian's football two weeks ago. He invented a truly brilliant phrase for icing the kicker: "clock blocking."
Oddly, I am more dissapointed about this news than the fact Peavy might be traded. Previously, I shared my feelings about the quality of Matty V's. work, so it isn't really neccesary for me to elaborate. While I will certainly miss hearing Matt call Padres games, he had long ago outgrown the market, and this day was going to come sooner than later. I wish Matt the best in his new job, and hope the Padres bring in someone with the same combination of personality and baseball knowledge as Matty V.
By the way, did anybody hear Vasgersian's football two weeks ago. He invented a truly brilliant phrase for icing the kicker: "clock blocking."
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Thursday, October 23, 2008
No-Trade Clauses
In the comments of my previous post, one reader asked me to explain why a team would ever give a player a no-trade clause. While a player with a no-trade clause is certainly more difficult to trade than a player without a no-trade clause, there are plenty of valid reasons to "give" them to some players...
1) A no-trade clause does not mean that player cannot be traded. Often, players will consent to be traded even if they have a no-trade clause. In 2008 alone, Scott Rolen, Johan Santana, Manny Ramirez, Ken Griffey Jr., and Greg Maddux were all traded in spite of their no-trade powers. Some of these players threatened to veto deals to particular clubs, or specified a few "acceptable" teams, but the fact remains they were traded. The definition of a trade means the acquiring team values a certain player more than the team currently with a player. It seems that players like to be where they are most wanted, and will often change their mind and agree to a trade they previously said they would veto. Additionally, teams are often able to provide incentives to a player to waive his no-trade clause. An extra option year may be picked up, or an extension to the player's contract offered. No-trade clauses make it marginally more difficult to move players, but does not make it impossible.
2) The no-trade clause may be important to a player, and he will insist on having one included in his contract. Many baseball players have families. They have friends. They have a life outside of baseball. No-trade clauses protect players against disruptions in their lives outside of baseball. They ensure that they cannot be arbitrarily assigned to some club on the other side of the country without their consent. In the specific case of the Padres, some players may (I am not sure if this actually exists) have taken a "San Diego discount." The insertion of a no-trade clause, or other contract mechanism such as an escalation in salary in the case of a trade, guarantees their "discount" is only applicable to San Diego.
Obviously players value no-trade clauses, but they are also costly (albeit in a non-monetary fashion) for teams. Theoretically, the full cost of the no-trade clause is recognized by teams, and some sort of acceptable concession is made on the part of the player. Say a player is worth $10 million per year, and values a no-trade clause at $1 million per year. The team believes their true cost of a no-trade clause is only $0.5 million per year because there is a high probability they will be able to trade the player anyway. Because the no-trade clause is valued asymetrically, the player can be paid anywhere between $9 million and $9.5 million and both parties will be better off because of it. The club will pay, including the cost of the no-trade clause, less than the $10 million the player is worth, and the player will get more than the $10 million he is worth.
3) The "10 and 5 rule" lessens the impact of contractually guaranteed no-trade clauses. The collective bargaining agreement gives any player who has been in MLB for 10 years, including 5 years on his current team full no-trade powers. In many cases, players who ink a contract with a no-trade clause are really only getting 1 or 2 additional years of no-trade protection above what they would already have received.
I am sure I am omitting some of the reasons teams may give no-trade clauses, but the overiding reason they exist is "reason number 2." No-trade clauses can be a win-win, making both the team and the player better off due to the asymetry of their valuations of the no-trade clause. Sometimes no-trade clauses come back to bite a team in the rear-end, but so do many contracts without no-trade clauses. The no-trade clause is not what "kills" the team, but rather a mistake in the initial player evaluation.
1) A no-trade clause does not mean that player cannot be traded. Often, players will consent to be traded even if they have a no-trade clause. In 2008 alone, Scott Rolen, Johan Santana, Manny Ramirez, Ken Griffey Jr., and Greg Maddux were all traded in spite of their no-trade powers. Some of these players threatened to veto deals to particular clubs, or specified a few "acceptable" teams, but the fact remains they were traded. The definition of a trade means the acquiring team values a certain player more than the team currently with a player. It seems that players like to be where they are most wanted, and will often change their mind and agree to a trade they previously said they would veto. Additionally, teams are often able to provide incentives to a player to waive his no-trade clause. An extra option year may be picked up, or an extension to the player's contract offered. No-trade clauses make it marginally more difficult to move players, but does not make it impossible.
2) The no-trade clause may be important to a player, and he will insist on having one included in his contract. Many baseball players have families. They have friends. They have a life outside of baseball. No-trade clauses protect players against disruptions in their lives outside of baseball. They ensure that they cannot be arbitrarily assigned to some club on the other side of the country without their consent. In the specific case of the Padres, some players may (I am not sure if this actually exists) have taken a "San Diego discount." The insertion of a no-trade clause, or other contract mechanism such as an escalation in salary in the case of a trade, guarantees their "discount" is only applicable to San Diego.
Obviously players value no-trade clauses, but they are also costly (albeit in a non-monetary fashion) for teams. Theoretically, the full cost of the no-trade clause is recognized by teams, and some sort of acceptable concession is made on the part of the player. Say a player is worth $10 million per year, and values a no-trade clause at $1 million per year. The team believes their true cost of a no-trade clause is only $0.5 million per year because there is a high probability they will be able to trade the player anyway. Because the no-trade clause is valued asymetrically, the player can be paid anywhere between $9 million and $9.5 million and both parties will be better off because of it. The club will pay, including the cost of the no-trade clause, less than the $10 million the player is worth, and the player will get more than the $10 million he is worth.
3) The "10 and 5 rule" lessens the impact of contractually guaranteed no-trade clauses. The collective bargaining agreement gives any player who has been in MLB for 10 years, including 5 years on his current team full no-trade powers. In many cases, players who ink a contract with a no-trade clause are really only getting 1 or 2 additional years of no-trade protection above what they would already have received.
I am sure I am omitting some of the reasons teams may give no-trade clauses, but the overiding reason they exist is "reason number 2." No-trade clauses can be a win-win, making both the team and the player better off due to the asymetry of their valuations of the no-trade clause. Sometimes no-trade clauses come back to bite a team in the rear-end, but so do many contracts without no-trade clauses. The no-trade clause is not what "kills" the team, but rather a mistake in the initial player evaluation.
Friday, October 17, 2008
Trading Peavy: It's all About Excess Value
Today I received an email from a Padre fan upset about the possibility Jake Peavy may be traded. The letter began:
As you may have heard the Padres are actively, yes actively, shopping Jake Peavy and hope to find a suitor before free agency begins. I want to start off by saying that moving him would be stupid...period. There is no excuse, no way to justify it. Not "potential" injuries, not cost, not anything. A pitcher of his caliber is going for 20 mil/a year now (Santana and what Sabathia will get)...
This letter epitomizes a widespread misunderstanding about player value. Jake Peavy may very well be worth $20 million on the free agent market, but that does not mean he has more value than a player (or set of players) who would be worth $10 million as a free agent.
Peavy's true value to the team is the difference between his marginal revenue product and his salary. If we assume Jake Peavy is a $20 million pitcher, then (all else equal) he will generate an average of $5.25 million in surplus value for the Padres over the next 4 years. Just because this (highly limited) model predicts Peavy generates positive value for the Padres over a 4 year period does not mean the Padres should not explore a trade. Another team could offer a package of young players expected to generate $10 million dollars per season with a collective cost of $2 million per season. If the Padres were to accept this trade they would be better off. Instead of earning $5.25 million per year of profit, the Padres would be making profits of $8 million.
Of course, as fans, we are not interested in how much profit the team makes, but rather how well the team does. My example seems to suggest the Padres would neccesarily get worse, as they are losing $10 million per year in production. What I failed to mention was assuming the team maintains an even payroll, making this trade could be the first step toward improving the team.
Over the next 4 seasons, the Padres will pay Jake Peavy a non-discounted average of approximately $15 million. In my theoretical trade, the Padres take back $2 million per year in salary obligations. This leaves $13 million per season to spend on additional players. Assuming the Padres maintain an even payroll, the team will have replaced $20 million of production with $23 million of production (Note: there are enough replacement level players on the current roster such that their contributions can essentially be ignored). In addition to getting $3 million dollars better, the Padres will have also reduced their risk. This includes both the risk of injury, and the risk of poor performance.
Now, what if the Padres do reduce payroll. Should we as fans still support a trade of Jake Peavy? In short, yes. Lets assume the Padres are planning to reduce their current projected 2009 payroll by $15 million and do not want to trade Jake Peavy. Instead, the team decides to forego resigning Brian Giles ($6 million in savings), and Trevor Hoffman (estimated $5.5 million in savings), and trades Khalil Greene ($6.5 million). These players are replaced by cheap talent that costs (and is expected to produce) $3 million. It is likely Giles, Hoffman, and Greene will collectively be worth in 2009 at least the $21 million I project they will be paid. If so, by reducing costs in this manner, the Padres will have gotten at least $18 million worse.
By trading Peavy, the Padres will be able to reduce costs while also aquiring valuable assets. In my example, the Padres only get $10 million worse by trading Peavy, which is certainly better than $18 million worse. (Disclosure: I am going to go ahead and use the $15 million per year average, rather than the actual 2009 salary number. But, if you want, you can trade Greene as well, and the team still does better than in the previous example). I recognize there are other ways to reduce payroll than getting rid of Giles, Hoffman, and Greene, but the concept is the same: the Padres will be unlikely to get much back in return. Instead, the full effects of payroll reduction are likely to be felt on the field. If the Padres are able to acquire surplus value for Peavy, not only is ownership better off, but the fans are better off as well. This is the case regardless of whether the team cuts payroll.
In this post I have used somewhat arbitrary examples. The reason for this was not to somehow prove the Padres should trade Jake Peavy. That type of analysis must include concepts such as the variability of Peavy's value depending on the projected success of the team. Rather, I merely wanted to demonstrate (and I know I am in some cases preaching to the choir) that if the Padres are able to deal Peavy to a team that more highly values his services, they should do it. The team, and the fans will be better off because of it.
As you may have heard the Padres are actively, yes actively, shopping Jake Peavy and hope to find a suitor before free agency begins. I want to start off by saying that moving him would be stupid...period. There is no excuse, no way to justify it. Not "potential" injuries, not cost, not anything. A pitcher of his caliber is going for 20 mil/a year now (Santana and what Sabathia will get)...
This letter epitomizes a widespread misunderstanding about player value. Jake Peavy may very well be worth $20 million on the free agent market, but that does not mean he has more value than a player (or set of players) who would be worth $10 million as a free agent.
Peavy's true value to the team is the difference between his marginal revenue product and his salary. If we assume Jake Peavy is a $20 million pitcher, then (all else equal) he will generate an average of $5.25 million in surplus value for the Padres over the next 4 years. Just because this (highly limited) model predicts Peavy generates positive value for the Padres over a 4 year period does not mean the Padres should not explore a trade. Another team could offer a package of young players expected to generate $10 million dollars per season with a collective cost of $2 million per season. If the Padres were to accept this trade they would be better off. Instead of earning $5.25 million per year of profit, the Padres would be making profits of $8 million.
Of course, as fans, we are not interested in how much profit the team makes, but rather how well the team does. My example seems to suggest the Padres would neccesarily get worse, as they are losing $10 million per year in production. What I failed to mention was assuming the team maintains an even payroll, making this trade could be the first step toward improving the team.
Over the next 4 seasons, the Padres will pay Jake Peavy a non-discounted average of approximately $15 million. In my theoretical trade, the Padres take back $2 million per year in salary obligations. This leaves $13 million per season to spend on additional players. Assuming the Padres maintain an even payroll, the team will have replaced $20 million of production with $23 million of production (Note: there are enough replacement level players on the current roster such that their contributions can essentially be ignored). In addition to getting $3 million dollars better, the Padres will have also reduced their risk. This includes both the risk of injury, and the risk of poor performance.
Now, what if the Padres do reduce payroll. Should we as fans still support a trade of Jake Peavy? In short, yes. Lets assume the Padres are planning to reduce their current projected 2009 payroll by $15 million and do not want to trade Jake Peavy. Instead, the team decides to forego resigning Brian Giles ($6 million in savings), and Trevor Hoffman (estimated $5.5 million in savings), and trades Khalil Greene ($6.5 million). These players are replaced by cheap talent that costs (and is expected to produce) $3 million. It is likely Giles, Hoffman, and Greene will collectively be worth in 2009 at least the $21 million I project they will be paid. If so, by reducing costs in this manner, the Padres will have gotten at least $18 million worse.
By trading Peavy, the Padres will be able to reduce costs while also aquiring valuable assets. In my example, the Padres only get $10 million worse by trading Peavy, which is certainly better than $18 million worse. (Disclosure: I am going to go ahead and use the $15 million per year average, rather than the actual 2009 salary number. But, if you want, you can trade Greene as well, and the team still does better than in the previous example). I recognize there are other ways to reduce payroll than getting rid of Giles, Hoffman, and Greene, but the concept is the same: the Padres will be unlikely to get much back in return. Instead, the full effects of payroll reduction are likely to be felt on the field. If the Padres are able to acquire surplus value for Peavy, not only is ownership better off, but the fans are better off as well. This is the case regardless of whether the team cuts payroll.
In this post I have used somewhat arbitrary examples. The reason for this was not to somehow prove the Padres should trade Jake Peavy. That type of analysis must include concepts such as the variability of Peavy's value depending on the projected success of the team. Rather, I merely wanted to demonstrate (and I know I am in some cases preaching to the choir) that if the Padres are able to deal Peavy to a team that more highly values his services, they should do it. The team, and the fans will be better off because of it.
Friday, September 26, 2008
There's Always Next Year
I leave for London tomorrow, where I will be for the next 9 or so months. So, while the season has yet to completely wind down, it is doubtful I will be able to crank out any more posts this season. I expect to be able to offer some sporadic thoughts throughout the off-season (particularly in response to notable events), but recognize these posts will probably be few in number.
In response to the disappointing season all Padres fans experienced in 2008:
There's Always Next Year.
In response to the disappointing season all Padres fans experienced in 2008:
There's Always Next Year.
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Math Demonstrates Just How Unlikely it is that the Padres Will Pick #1
In my previous post, I concluded: "theoretically it is possible the Padres will end up with the worst record, but the odds are not that great." Well, my curiosity got the best of me, and I decided to calculate just how small those odds actually are...
Using Bill James log5 method of estimating one-game winning percentages, I calculated the odds of both Washington and San Diego beating their opponents in any given game. I included an adjustment for home-field advantage, but did not account for pitching match ups. Although there is an extremely good chance Seattle actually winds up with the worst record in MLB, for the sake of simplicity, I am excluding them in this analysis.
Using Bill James log5 method of estimating one-game winning percentages, I calculated the odds of both Washington and San Diego beating their opponents in any given game. I included an adjustment for home-field advantage, but did not account for pitching match ups. Although there is an extremely good chance Seattle actually winds up with the worst record in MLB, for the sake of simplicity, I am excluding them in this analysis.
The Padres are expected to beat the Dodgers 37% of the time, and Pittsburgh 51% of the time. Washington is expected to beat Florida 39% of the time, and Philly in 31% of their games. In short, over their next 6 games, ignoring pitching matchups, the Padres are expected to win 2.664 games, and Washington is expected to win 2.121 games.
In order to end up with a worse record than Washington, the Padres must lose 4 games more than Washington. Three situations exist which satisfy this requirement. The Nats can lose 0, and the Padres lose 4 or more games, the Nats can lose 1 game, and the Pads lose 5 or more games, or the Nats can lose 2 games, and the Padres lose 6 games.
The first situation has a probability of 0.00112214. The probability of the Padres losing 4 or more games is nearly 60%, but the probability of the Nationals losing 0 games is under 1%. Situation 2 has a probability of 0.0054376. Situation 3 has a likelihood of 0.002737. Taken as a whole, the probability of San Diego finishing with a worse record than Washington is under 1%. Combined with the fact that the Padres must also overtake Seattle for the worst record, it is extremely unlikely the Padres will select first in the 2009 draft.
The Padres Are Not Even Good at Losing
An absolutely heartbreaking weekend. I admit it, I am rooting for the Padres to lose games. I don't care if this team finishes with 100 losses or 99 losses. The season has long been over, and it almost certainly behooves the team to have the first pick in the draft. This is not to say the Padres themselves are purposely tanking games, but only that I am now actively rooting for the opposing teams.
By sweeping the Nationals this weekend, the Padres put themselves in a terrible position in the "Strasburg Sweepstakes." Not only did they win 3 games, but by definition, the Nats also lost 3 games. With 6 games to play, the Padres are 3 games "ahead" of Washington in the standings. Realistically, the Pads need Washington to win at least 5 of their final 6 games against Florida and Philly-both quality teams. Theoretically it is possible the Padres will end up with the worst record, but the odds are not that great.
By sweeping the Nationals this weekend, the Padres put themselves in a terrible position in the "Strasburg Sweepstakes." Not only did they win 3 games, but by definition, the Nats also lost 3 games. With 6 games to play, the Padres are 3 games "ahead" of Washington in the standings. Realistically, the Pads need Washington to win at least 5 of their final 6 games against Florida and Philly-both quality teams. Theoretically it is possible the Padres will end up with the worst record, but the odds are not that great.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Chris Gwynn
My original plan was to just post the video of his 1996 11th inning pinch hit double against the Dodgers that catapulted the Padres into the playoffs, and say nothing more. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the video online. Instead, I offer you the post-game celebration made possible by the other Gwynn's memorable hit...
Monday, September 15, 2008
Preserving Hoffman's Legacy
Not exactly new news, but Trevor Hoffman wants to return to the Padres in 2009. Contrary to popular belief, Hoffman has not been that bad this season. His 4.04 ERA is a little high for a closer, but he has 45 strike outs to only 8 walks in 42 innings. The only problem has been a propensity to give up the long-ball, as his HR/9 is at 1.70, well above his career average of 1.38.
Hoffman is still a quality reliever, and with the dearth of good bullpen arms on the team, will almost certainly be welcomed back assuming his contract demands are not ridiculous.
What I find interesting about the situation is many fans seem to wish Hoffman would just retire after the season. They believe that he is ruining is legacy by continuing to pitch well past his prime, that he will somehow be remembered not as one of the best relievers in major league history, but as a middle of the road closer who made every save appearance an adventure toward the end of his career.
Personally, I have no problem with players continuing to play until no team will offer them a job, even if they are not still at their peak. An athlete has a limited time frame in which to earn a living. The money earned playing baseball basically has to last them a lifetime (yes, I realize they could transition to a different job, but most baseball players best, and most lucrative skill is playing baseball-not doing something else).
I have heard the argument that star players are better off protecting their legacy, that they have accumulated enough money in their careers already, and don't need another contract. I find this line of reasoning silly.
First, there is no reason to think that continuing to play past one's prime results in a reduced legacy. Jordan came back and played for the Wizards, he is still considered the best basketball player of all time. Willie Mays played one forgettable season for the Mets at age 42, but most remember his fantastic years with the Giants. It seems to me that once removed from the short-term, people tend not to remember the last years of most athlete's careers (unless you are talking about Barry Bonds of course). Hoffman is really at no risk of wrecking his legacy by continuing to play. In fact, he may be enhancing it. Hoffman will continue to accumulate saves, innings, and strikeouts, all of which will be positively referenced in hall of fame debates. Note: His career ERA is not really at risk of a significant increase if he continues to play.
Second, even if you assume that a player's legacy is reduced by playing past his prime, I am not sure the magnitude of that reduction is enough to bypass the millions of dollars a contract will pay. It seems ridiculous that a player would be so worried about what others think, that he would turn down such a large amount of money.
Hoffman is not a bad pitcher, and his presence on the Padres makes the team better than they would otherwise be. So long as the team agrees with my assessment of his value, and Hoffman does in fact wish to continue playing, there is no reason he should not be welcomed back. Whether the fans think Hoffman should retire is irrelevant. Whether Hoffman should continue to close out games is an entirely different debate.
Sunday, September 7, 2008
Gone for a Week
Not that many of you care, but I will probably be unable to post this upcoming week, as I will be out of town. I do however have a few taco shop bracket posts already lined up, so if you are following along at sdtacoshops.wordpress.com , you will continue to see updates throughout the week.
Saturday, September 6, 2008
SD Taco Shops
Besides, a love for baseball, I also enjoy frequenting the local taco shops. This month, I have a lot of extra time on my hands, so taking inspiration from Nate Silver's burrito bracket , I have decided to hold a similar contest to establish the best taco shop in San Diego County. If you are into this type of thing, feel free to follow along at: sdtacoshops.blogspot.com . There you can find the rules, the bracket, a map detailing the location of all the eateries, and the results of the first two match ups.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Are the Padres Tanking Games?
Stephen Strasburg, is, at this time, widely recognized as the most promising talent eligible for the 2009 MLB draft. He is a SP who combines a fastball that reaches the mid to upper 90s with quality secondary pitches. He is seen as being close to major league ready, perhaps ready to assume a rotation spot within 2 years of being drafted. While there are certainly other intriguing prospects, the number one prize in the '09 draft is clearly Strasburg.
With the Padres well out of contention, it would seemingly behoove them to finish with the worst overall record, allowing the team to draft Strasburg. Recent moves such as starting Will Venable in CF, Matt Antonelli at 2B, and employing a 6 man rotation do not seem to have been made with the goal of winning ballgames.
With that said, many of those moves may have other explanations. Jody Gerut is probably not the long-term answer in CF. Venable may be. Giving him a chance to experience life in the big leagues, and face major league pitching could help him progress as a player. Same with Antonelli, who although he had a miserable overall batting line in AAA, has been hitting better of late, and could very well be the Padres opening day second baseman in '09.
The six-man rotation is a little trickier to explain. The Padres have had trouble fielding 5 good starters, let alone 6. Adding Wade LeBlanc and Josh Geer to the rotation makes some sense, with the logic being similar to that of playing Venable and Antonelli every day. On the other hand, adding Sean Estes to the rotation makes little sense. Estes had his last reasonably solid year in 2001 with the Giants. Since then, his performance, when healthy has been miserable. Of course, he has rarely been healthy. Estes has pitched 30 innings since 2005-not exactly a guy a team can count on to be healthy in the future. It is unlikely Estes will provide much value to the Padres in '09, so the only reason I can think of for him to be pitching every 6 days is to give Peavy extra rest.
Jake Peavy pitching every 6 days, rather than every 5 days does two things: it helps avoid unnecesarily overtaxing Peavy, and it also transfers some innings Peavy would have otherwise pitched to a (probably worse than) replacement level pitcher. One explanation implies the Padres are tanking games, the other merely suggests the Padres are being cautious with one of their most valuable assets.
Personally, I don't think the Padres would risk the hit to their reputation that would result from overtly tanking games. Rather, I believe the Padres primary motive is introducing some of their prospects to the majors in a relatively stress-free atmosphere, and protecting Peavy's arm. The fact that losing more games may actually benefit the team is just an added bonus which has allowed the Padres to be more aggressive in making September lineup and rotation adjustments at little cost.
I liken the situation to playing poker without money on the line. Going all-in on every hand, or otherwise disrespecting the game, is no fun for anybody involved. This type of behavior will draw the ire of others at the table. At the same time, with little to lose, it is likely everybody will play more aggressively, and even try out a new strategy or two (or in the Padres case-3 or 4).
With the Padres well out of contention, it would seemingly behoove them to finish with the worst overall record, allowing the team to draft Strasburg. Recent moves such as starting Will Venable in CF, Matt Antonelli at 2B, and employing a 6 man rotation do not seem to have been made with the goal of winning ballgames.
With that said, many of those moves may have other explanations. Jody Gerut is probably not the long-term answer in CF. Venable may be. Giving him a chance to experience life in the big leagues, and face major league pitching could help him progress as a player. Same with Antonelli, who although he had a miserable overall batting line in AAA, has been hitting better of late, and could very well be the Padres opening day second baseman in '09.
The six-man rotation is a little trickier to explain. The Padres have had trouble fielding 5 good starters, let alone 6. Adding Wade LeBlanc and Josh Geer to the rotation makes some sense, with the logic being similar to that of playing Venable and Antonelli every day. On the other hand, adding Sean Estes to the rotation makes little sense. Estes had his last reasonably solid year in 2001 with the Giants. Since then, his performance, when healthy has been miserable. Of course, he has rarely been healthy. Estes has pitched 30 innings since 2005-not exactly a guy a team can count on to be healthy in the future. It is unlikely Estes will provide much value to the Padres in '09, so the only reason I can think of for him to be pitching every 6 days is to give Peavy extra rest.
Jake Peavy pitching every 6 days, rather than every 5 days does two things: it helps avoid unnecesarily overtaxing Peavy, and it also transfers some innings Peavy would have otherwise pitched to a (probably worse than) replacement level pitcher. One explanation implies the Padres are tanking games, the other merely suggests the Padres are being cautious with one of their most valuable assets.
Personally, I don't think the Padres would risk the hit to their reputation that would result from overtly tanking games. Rather, I believe the Padres primary motive is introducing some of their prospects to the majors in a relatively stress-free atmosphere, and protecting Peavy's arm. The fact that losing more games may actually benefit the team is just an added bonus which has allowed the Padres to be more aggressive in making September lineup and rotation adjustments at little cost.
I liken the situation to playing poker without money on the line. Going all-in on every hand, or otherwise disrespecting the game, is no fun for anybody involved. This type of behavior will draw the ire of others at the table. At the same time, with little to lose, it is likely everybody will play more aggressively, and even try out a new strategy or two (or in the Padres case-3 or 4).
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Bret Boone
In 2000, Bret Boone replaced the traded Quilvio Veras as the team’s second baseman. In Boone’s only season with the Friars, he provided almost exactly league average production-both offensively and defensively. If it were not for what happened next, Boone would not have been all that memorable.
The next season, Boone played for the Seattle Mariners. There, he was anything but average. He hit 37 homeruns, and had an OPS+ of 153. Perhaps Boone’s most remarkable feat in 2001 was his ability to match Barry Bonds in the race to see whose cranium could grow at the fastest rate.
During that 2001 season, Boone became the first player I suspected of using illegal performance enhancers. While my suspicions have never been confirmed (he was not named in the Mitchell Report), I still chuckle when I think about his remarkable mid-30s surge in both power and cap size. Thanks for the memories Bret!
The next season, Boone played for the Seattle Mariners. There, he was anything but average. He hit 37 homeruns, and had an OPS+ of 153. Perhaps Boone’s most remarkable feat in 2001 was his ability to match Barry Bonds in the race to see whose cranium could grow at the fastest rate.
During that 2001 season, Boone became the first player I suspected of using illegal performance enhancers. While my suspicions have never been confirmed (he was not named in the Mitchell Report), I still chuckle when I think about his remarkable mid-30s surge in both power and cap size. Thanks for the memories Bret!
Monday, August 25, 2008
Clarifying my Comments on Preseason Predictions
Geoff, at Ducksnorts seems to take issue with my statement that "I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins." He suggests that the answer to whether the Padres explicitly mislead the fans regarding the season outlook lies in how one "perceive[s] the front office." Geoff writes:
If you are inclined to mistrust them, then you will conclude that they were lying because this is consistent with your beliefs. It’s easy to find (or concoct) justifications for a particular point of view. What’s difficult is taking an honest look at a situation, with all its incumbent variables, and trying to figure out what’s actually happening.
I disagree. The answer is not necessarily a function of perception. In previous posts, I have vehemently defended the front office, going so far as to write: "The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward." I have supported the controversial goal of being "consistently competitive," have urged others to resist placing the blame on management, and have written glowingly of the decisions made in keeping or trading personnel and protecting our prospects.
With that said, it is not inconceivable that the Padres, who clearly have an interest in maintaining high expectations, would release the most optimistic results of their preseason projections. Prior to the season, PECOTA predicted 79 wins. An average of the opinions of 17 Baseball Prospectus writers felt the Padres would finish 4th in the NL West, ahead of only the Giants. Other quantitative systems predicted the Padres were a low to mid 80 win team. In fact, the only 2 projections I saw that forecasted close to a 90 win season belonged to The Hardball Times and the San Diego Padres (who obviously did not disclose their methodology).
Clearly there is no definitive proof that the Padres had internal models that were not as optimistic as their public prediction of 90 wins. I am choosing to believe that in the excitement of the off-season, the Padres released their most optimistic projections, and in the process may have mislead the fans. My belief is not biased from a lack of faith in the Padres. Rather, bias may exist because I have too much faith in the Padres and their ability to get things right.
Regardless of whether you believe that in this specific situation the Padres purposely mislead the fans, the underlying question remains: when is okay for the front office to lie?
If you are inclined to mistrust them, then you will conclude that they were lying because this is consistent with your beliefs. It’s easy to find (or concoct) justifications for a particular point of view. What’s difficult is taking an honest look at a situation, with all its incumbent variables, and trying to figure out what’s actually happening.
I disagree. The answer is not necessarily a function of perception. In previous posts, I have vehemently defended the front office, going so far as to write: "The Padres may be terrible this year, but there is no other group of people I would rather have trying to fix the problem going forward." I have supported the controversial goal of being "consistently competitive," have urged others to resist placing the blame on management, and have written glowingly of the decisions made in keeping or trading personnel and protecting our prospects.
With that said, it is not inconceivable that the Padres, who clearly have an interest in maintaining high expectations, would release the most optimistic results of their preseason projections. Prior to the season, PECOTA predicted 79 wins. An average of the opinions of 17 Baseball Prospectus writers felt the Padres would finish 4th in the NL West, ahead of only the Giants. Other quantitative systems predicted the Padres were a low to mid 80 win team. In fact, the only 2 projections I saw that forecasted close to a 90 win season belonged to The Hardball Times and the San Diego Padres (who obviously did not disclose their methodology).
Clearly there is no definitive proof that the Padres had internal models that were not as optimistic as their public prediction of 90 wins. I am choosing to believe that in the excitement of the off-season, the Padres released their most optimistic projections, and in the process may have mislead the fans. My belief is not biased from a lack of faith in the Padres. Rather, bias may exist because I have too much faith in the Padres and their ability to get things right.
Regardless of whether you believe that in this specific situation the Padres purposely mislead the fans, the underlying question remains: when is okay for the front office to lie?
An Unabashed Advertisement
Many of you are reading this site for the first time, having been directed from Ducksnorts. There, Geoff further developed the discussion I began in my previous post. Because comments have been temporarily disabled at Ducksnorts, I encourage all who wish to engage in the discussion to post their comments here. Even if you care not to comment, please feel free to check out some of my previous posts. Welcome.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Is it Okay for the Front Office to Lie?
Asymmetric information makes baseball interesting. If all teams valued players the same way, then baseball would be little more than a game of luck (reasonable variation from expectations). Instead, teams with innovative management are able to gain an edge over their competitors by developing better models of player valuation.
Gains teams exhibit by possessing more precise knowledge tend to be short term. Recognizing the importance of OBP may have provided the Oakland Athletics with opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for a few years, but for a number of reasons including: other teams copying their successful tactics, the release of Moneyball (I am not sure how big of an effect this really had. If OBP was actually still undervalued, the As probably would not have allowed Michael Lewis to chronicle their secrets), and their top assistants leaving for other jobs around baseball, the competitive advantage the As received by more accurately valuing OBP quickly evaporated.
Because asymmetric information does not stay asymmetric forever, it is crucial for teams to actively protect their valuation models. This suggests the front office must keep some information from the fans, and at some level even mislead the public. It is likely that at any given time, the front office knows certain players are not very good. However, it may be in the best interest of the team to extol the virtues of those players, even if it misleads the fans as well.
Derek Carty, writing for The Hardball Times, references Paul DePodesta’s blog as a possible source of front office propaganda. In outlining the Padres who might have been traded at the deadline, DePodesta cherry picks stats that, in the absence of other information, make players like Randy Wolf look like they have all-star potential. Carty writes: “Perhaps my favorite quote comes in his discussion of Randy Wolf.
His collective line of 109 innings, 109 hits, 42 walks, and 100 k's is one of the better lines you'll find during this deadline, but his line of 101 innings, 95 hits, 33 walks, and 94 k's (3.48 ERA) without those two starts is even more indicative of the pitcher he has been. In fact, his 12 quality starts ranks 7th in the NL behind Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez (DePodesta).
Carty recognizes that smart GMs such as Theo Epstein or Billy Bean are unlikely to be swayed by the writings of DePodesta; however, a few GMs such as Ed Wade may actually believe some of what DePodesta writes. To favorably compare Wolf with Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez, is a useful sales tool to peddle Wolf, but at the same time is misleading.
In this situation, I doubt many Padre fans have a problem with DePodesta attempting to convince others that Wolf is actually a good pitcher. The club was already out of contention at the time of the post, and if a team overvalues Wolf, the Padres, and by extension the fans, can only benefit.
A messier version of a team misleading the public occurs when the team knows they will not be very good, but tries to convince the fans that the team will contend. In this situation, the team stands to benefit from the higher ticket sales that result from positive expectations. Some point to the Padres preseason prediction of 90 wins as unethical manipulation of their customers. Personally, I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins for this team. Perhaps a few simulations out of thousands resulted in a 90 win season, but there is no way that was the average result. At the same time, I don’t really have a problem with teams raising the level of expectations. Ticket buyers were never guaranteed a 90 win season. Additionally, the ballpark experience, while better when the team is winning, can still be fun when the team is losing.
Teams, including the Padres, clearly need to protect their player valuation secrets from other teams. To do this, the team is unable to let the fans in on much of the behind the scenes work that goes into constructing the ball club. It is when teams reveal only selective information in order to entice the fans to buy more tickets that an ethical debate can be had. To me, things like trying to convince the fans that the team is going to be good, or to accept higher beer prices for phony reasons, may be justified from a business perspective, and I have a hard time getting too worked up, but others may be more offended.
I know I've been rambling, and don't really have an answer as to when it is okay for a team to mislead its fans, but I am curious what others have to say on the topic...
Gains teams exhibit by possessing more precise knowledge tend to be short term. Recognizing the importance of OBP may have provided the Oakland Athletics with opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for a few years, but for a number of reasons including: other teams copying their successful tactics, the release of Moneyball (I am not sure how big of an effect this really had. If OBP was actually still undervalued, the As probably would not have allowed Michael Lewis to chronicle their secrets), and their top assistants leaving for other jobs around baseball, the competitive advantage the As received by more accurately valuing OBP quickly evaporated.
Because asymmetric information does not stay asymmetric forever, it is crucial for teams to actively protect their valuation models. This suggests the front office must keep some information from the fans, and at some level even mislead the public. It is likely that at any given time, the front office knows certain players are not very good. However, it may be in the best interest of the team to extol the virtues of those players, even if it misleads the fans as well.
Derek Carty, writing for The Hardball Times, references Paul DePodesta’s blog as a possible source of front office propaganda. In outlining the Padres who might have been traded at the deadline, DePodesta cherry picks stats that, in the absence of other information, make players like Randy Wolf look like they have all-star potential. Carty writes: “Perhaps my favorite quote comes in his discussion of Randy Wolf.
His collective line of 109 innings, 109 hits, 42 walks, and 100 k's is one of the better lines you'll find during this deadline, but his line of 101 innings, 95 hits, 33 walks, and 94 k's (3.48 ERA) without those two starts is even more indicative of the pitcher he has been. In fact, his 12 quality starts ranks 7th in the NL behind Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez (DePodesta).
Carty recognizes that smart GMs such as Theo Epstein or Billy Bean are unlikely to be swayed by the writings of DePodesta; however, a few GMs such as Ed Wade may actually believe some of what DePodesta writes. To favorably compare Wolf with Haren, Lincecum, Hudson, Santana, Webb, and Volquez, is a useful sales tool to peddle Wolf, but at the same time is misleading.
In this situation, I doubt many Padre fans have a problem with DePodesta attempting to convince others that Wolf is actually a good pitcher. The club was already out of contention at the time of the post, and if a team overvalues Wolf, the Padres, and by extension the fans, can only benefit.
A messier version of a team misleading the public occurs when the team knows they will not be very good, but tries to convince the fans that the team will contend. In this situation, the team stands to benefit from the higher ticket sales that result from positive expectations. Some point to the Padres preseason prediction of 90 wins as unethical manipulation of their customers. Personally, I doubt that the Padres consistently predicted 90 wins for this team. Perhaps a few simulations out of thousands resulted in a 90 win season, but there is no way that was the average result. At the same time, I don’t really have a problem with teams raising the level of expectations. Ticket buyers were never guaranteed a 90 win season. Additionally, the ballpark experience, while better when the team is winning, can still be fun when the team is losing.
Teams, including the Padres, clearly need to protect their player valuation secrets from other teams. To do this, the team is unable to let the fans in on much of the behind the scenes work that goes into constructing the ball club. It is when teams reveal only selective information in order to entice the fans to buy more tickets that an ethical debate can be had. To me, things like trying to convince the fans that the team is going to be good, or to accept higher beer prices for phony reasons, may be justified from a business perspective, and I have a hard time getting too worked up, but others may be more offended.
I know I've been rambling, and don't really have an answer as to when it is okay for a team to mislead its fans, but I am curious what others have to say on the topic...
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Bobby Jones
In 2002, Bobby Jones pitched 9.2 innings for the Padres and gave up 7 runs. Bobby Jones used his right arm to catch.
In 2002, Bobby Jones pitched 108 innings for the Padres. He had an ERA of 5.50. He struck out 60 batters, while walking 21. Bobby Jones used his right arm to throw.
In 2002, the Padres were terrible, losing 96 games and finishing in last place. However, fans of pitchers named Bobby Jones could not have been happier. That season, the Padres employed two pitchers, both named Bobby Jones. Both were terrible pitchers (at least that season), but due to the remarkable coincidence of being on the same team as someone who shared their name, gave fans some interesting water-cooler material to discuss in an otherwise dreadful season of Padres baseball. Thanks for the Memories Bobby's.
Monday, August 18, 2008
The Joy of the Seat Upgrade/Downgrade & Why Teams Ruin the Fun
One year for my birthday (I was probably 13 or 14), I convinced my parents to let me take a small group of friends to a ballgame at Qualcomm stadium. Pitching in his big league debut was Ben Howard, a young flamethrower who, along with Dennis Tankersley, looked poised to anchor the Padres rotation for years to come. Johnson had trouble finding the strike zone that day, and the game quickly turned sour. My friends and I lost interest in the game by the fourth inning, but soon turned our interest to summiting the mountainous concrete bowl that is Qualcomm Stadium. We wished to sit in the oxygen-deprived seats at the very top of upper-view level.
We made our way up the Q’s infamous spiral ramps with the same swiftness of a Nepalian Sherpa summiting Everest. Upon reaching view level; we turned left, walking to the furthest possible section where we were poised to finally experience the thrill of being closer to the overhead blimp than home plate. We never reached our intended destination. Before we were able to enter our desired section of seats, an usher (is there some unwritten rule that ushers must be eligible to collect social security), asked to see our tickets. I calmly showed the gentleman my ticket, and began walking toward the seats. That’s when I was sternly told to not proceed any further. I informed the usher that our seats were field level, which were much better seats than view level, and that since nobody was sitting in view level, “downgrading” should not be a problem. This must have gotten the man worked up, because he proceeded to lecture me and my friends on the history of “open seating” at Qualcomm Stadium. Supposedly, at one time, fans could sit pretty much wherever they wanted, but those days had long passed, and fans were now constrained to the seat marked on their ticket. Dejected, yet thinking we were pretty cool for attempting to challenge an authority figure, my friends and I returned to our seats where we watched the end of the game. None of us could understand why downgrading seats was not allowed.
To this day, when I take in a big league ballgame, I often hear fans complain that they cannot upgrade to the empty seats closer to the field. I am not sympathetic to these complaints. If upgrades were permitted, many people otherwise willing to buy the more expensive tickets, would instead purchase cheap seats, but sit in the empty seats below. Not only would the Padres lose out on a good amount of revenue, but the viewing experience would surely be decreased, as a flood of people would be wondering around the lower levels looking for empty seats, and being forced to move when the rightful ticket holder shows up.
The case against allowing ticket downgrades is not so obvious. The Padres are selling an expensive ticket, but the downgrading fan is sitting in a cheaper seat. Likewise, there are often a lot of empty sections in the upper corners of the stadium, so there are not many fans with tickets to those seats who will have their view obstructed by others searching for empty seats. The real problem with allowing downgrades is the Padres would be forced to hire additional personnel such as extra security and more custodial staff. Additionally, while the team would not necessarily be required to add food vendors, fans without convenient access to ballpark snacks are much less likely to purchase these high margin concessions since there is are added transaction costs to the fans (expending extra energy to walk to further concession stands, and spending more time away from the game). Once again, the result is decreased revenue to the team.
Both seat upgrades and seat downgrades are costly to teams. Before you complain about not being allowed to move to an empty seat, please consider that the Padres are not being insensitive to customer service, but actually have solid business reasons to limiting fans to sitting in their marked seat.
We made our way up the Q’s infamous spiral ramps with the same swiftness of a Nepalian Sherpa summiting Everest. Upon reaching view level; we turned left, walking to the furthest possible section where we were poised to finally experience the thrill of being closer to the overhead blimp than home plate. We never reached our intended destination. Before we were able to enter our desired section of seats, an usher (is there some unwritten rule that ushers must be eligible to collect social security), asked to see our tickets. I calmly showed the gentleman my ticket, and began walking toward the seats. That’s when I was sternly told to not proceed any further. I informed the usher that our seats were field level, which were much better seats than view level, and that since nobody was sitting in view level, “downgrading” should not be a problem. This must have gotten the man worked up, because he proceeded to lecture me and my friends on the history of “open seating” at Qualcomm Stadium. Supposedly, at one time, fans could sit pretty much wherever they wanted, but those days had long passed, and fans were now constrained to the seat marked on their ticket. Dejected, yet thinking we were pretty cool for attempting to challenge an authority figure, my friends and I returned to our seats where we watched the end of the game. None of us could understand why downgrading seats was not allowed.
To this day, when I take in a big league ballgame, I often hear fans complain that they cannot upgrade to the empty seats closer to the field. I am not sympathetic to these complaints. If upgrades were permitted, many people otherwise willing to buy the more expensive tickets, would instead purchase cheap seats, but sit in the empty seats below. Not only would the Padres lose out on a good amount of revenue, but the viewing experience would surely be decreased, as a flood of people would be wondering around the lower levels looking for empty seats, and being forced to move when the rightful ticket holder shows up.
The case against allowing ticket downgrades is not so obvious. The Padres are selling an expensive ticket, but the downgrading fan is sitting in a cheaper seat. Likewise, there are often a lot of empty sections in the upper corners of the stadium, so there are not many fans with tickets to those seats who will have their view obstructed by others searching for empty seats. The real problem with allowing downgrades is the Padres would be forced to hire additional personnel such as extra security and more custodial staff. Additionally, while the team would not necessarily be required to add food vendors, fans without convenient access to ballpark snacks are much less likely to purchase these high margin concessions since there is are added transaction costs to the fans (expending extra energy to walk to further concession stands, and spending more time away from the game). Once again, the result is decreased revenue to the team.
Both seat upgrades and seat downgrades are costly to teams. Before you complain about not being allowed to move to an empty seat, please consider that the Padres are not being insensitive to customer service, but actually have solid business reasons to limiting fans to sitting in their marked seat.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
How to Run onto the Field and Get Away with it.
I have previously written about how to properly guess the attendance at a ballgame. Today, I focus on the lost art of running onto the field of play:
The Padres lost yesterday in pretty boring fashion. They did not get many people on base, and did not score many runs. The players did not give the fans much reason to cheer, but an external distraction more than made up for the boring on-field product.
Immediately prior to the seventh inning stretch, three youngsters (My guess is they were 17 or 18 years old), shed their shirts and jumped out for a joy-run on the field.
Typically, fans who run onto the field avoid one or two out of shape Elite security guards prior to being tackled by an overly zealous rent-a-cop in a red jacket. These fans are usually totally plastered, and their 15 seconds is, if you consider running onto the field a source of fame, just that-15 seconds.
Not yesterday. The three gentlemen raced onto the outfield and immediately spread the security force out. This creative strategy worked to their advantage as rather than 7 or 8 guards being able to focus on one miscreant, they had to split up into smaller teams.
Also unique was that it was clear alcohol was not consumed prior to their run. These kids were agile, had good acceleration, great vision, speed, and endurance. I could not help but think that L.T. had better watch out, because any of the three would look great in a powder blue jersey on Sundays.
The first runner to be caught was merely unlucky. One of his cohorts made the mistake of getting too close to his friend, and the first runner was tackled-almost accidentally-by one of the security guards who was actually chasing his friend, and just happened to run right into this unlucky guy.
The second runner-who had evaded security for literally at least 3 minutes-decided to go for the gold and slide head first into home plate. His dive exhibited perfect form, and he was safe by a wide margin. Unfortunately, his slide into home gave the men of Elite Security time to catch up, and he was roughly cuffed shortly thereafter.
The final runner to be apprehended must not have felt comfortable leaving his friends behind. Once he saw his friends in custody, he used his hands to signal the safe sign, and then gave himself up peacefully. He placed his hands behind his back and waited 10 seconds for the guards to close in (that’s right-his closest pursuer was a full 10 seconds behind).
These three rascals provided some needed energy to the stadium, but after a fun four minutes, were led off the field in handcuffs. Their effort got me thinking-what if they had wanted to escape unpunished? Would it be possible to actually get away with running onto the field of play?
Although difficult, I think it might actually be possible. These bright scoundrels got the first two necessary components correct. They ran in as a group-which spread the defense too thin, they possessed the speed and athletic prowess necessary to evade security, and were not under the influence of alcohol. What they did not have was a proper exit plan. My guess is they have been watching too much Fox News and are convinced exit plans are just unnecessary. I, on the other hand, have it all thought out…
The obvious escape route is into the stands on the third or first base side. In these locations, the wall is short and provides easy access away from the field of play. The problem with this route is security can use the layout of the stadium to its advantage and basically box in the runners. The runners could surely run horizontally, trampling over a bunch of fans to avoid running straight up an aisle, but, to escape for good, vertical movement toward the exits is eventually required. I am certain security guards would have no problem blocking off the escape routes.
Instead of escaping by going over the short walls, I propose an escape by scaling the center field wall. Typically, only one security guard is stationed in the centerfield sand. So long as the group of runners has a big enough lead over their on-field pursuers (hence the need for speed/athleticism), and are able to coordinate their dash to the wall, it is likely that at least 2 will be able to escape (I am assuming the “lifeguard” out in CF will be able to apprehend one person as he/she is descending the fence. Note: There is always the risk that the person caught will squeal-giving up the rest of his crew. I propose setting up some sort of fund beforehand. Prior to the attempt, each person must put down a deposit commensurate to a relatively high proportion of their wealth. The money will be returned following the attempt to everyone who does not squeal. Anybody who squeals loses their deposit which is then distributed equally amongst the others).
Once the wall is scaled, there are numerous exits to choose from, and plenty of open space to dodge the reinforcements that have surely been called into active duty.
It is also necessary to don a proper uniform. Be sure to wear a mask of some sort to hide your face. Also, wear two shirts, and a pair of generic colored shorts. Upon evading the authorities-ditch the mask and top shirt. Then, casually duck into an eatery or bar in the gaslamp. You will now be adequately disguised, and ready to continue your night on the town worry free.
It may be a long-shot, but if you really get that urge to run onto the field and attempt an escape, heed my advice:
1) Don’t consume alcoholic beverages prior to your attempt.
2) Recruit a group of friends to join you.
3) Make sure both you and your friends are fast runners.
4) Set up a system that commits people to not squealing.
5) Prepare proper uniforms
6) Escape into centerfield-not the seats in foul territory.
7) Be sure to have the number of a local cab company handy-not to call as an escape vehicle-but for a ride home after downing a few pitchers in the wake of your glory.
Note: Don't try this at home kids...This article is for entertainment purposes only. Daniel Gettinger does not encourage any behavior that breaks the law-not even Kissing on the lips in Riverside, CA which violates a public health ordinance unless both parties wipe their lips with carbonized rose water.
The Padres lost yesterday in pretty boring fashion. They did not get many people on base, and did not score many runs. The players did not give the fans much reason to cheer, but an external distraction more than made up for the boring on-field product.
Immediately prior to the seventh inning stretch, three youngsters (My guess is they were 17 or 18 years old), shed their shirts and jumped out for a joy-run on the field.
Typically, fans who run onto the field avoid one or two out of shape Elite security guards prior to being tackled by an overly zealous rent-a-cop in a red jacket. These fans are usually totally plastered, and their 15 seconds is, if you consider running onto the field a source of fame, just that-15 seconds.
Not yesterday. The three gentlemen raced onto the outfield and immediately spread the security force out. This creative strategy worked to their advantage as rather than 7 or 8 guards being able to focus on one miscreant, they had to split up into smaller teams.
Also unique was that it was clear alcohol was not consumed prior to their run. These kids were agile, had good acceleration, great vision, speed, and endurance. I could not help but think that L.T. had better watch out, because any of the three would look great in a powder blue jersey on Sundays.
The first runner to be caught was merely unlucky. One of his cohorts made the mistake of getting too close to his friend, and the first runner was tackled-almost accidentally-by one of the security guards who was actually chasing his friend, and just happened to run right into this unlucky guy.
The second runner-who had evaded security for literally at least 3 minutes-decided to go for the gold and slide head first into home plate. His dive exhibited perfect form, and he was safe by a wide margin. Unfortunately, his slide into home gave the men of Elite Security time to catch up, and he was roughly cuffed shortly thereafter.
The final runner to be apprehended must not have felt comfortable leaving his friends behind. Once he saw his friends in custody, he used his hands to signal the safe sign, and then gave himself up peacefully. He placed his hands behind his back and waited 10 seconds for the guards to close in (that’s right-his closest pursuer was a full 10 seconds behind).
These three rascals provided some needed energy to the stadium, but after a fun four minutes, were led off the field in handcuffs. Their effort got me thinking-what if they had wanted to escape unpunished? Would it be possible to actually get away with running onto the field of play?
Although difficult, I think it might actually be possible. These bright scoundrels got the first two necessary components correct. They ran in as a group-which spread the defense too thin, they possessed the speed and athletic prowess necessary to evade security, and were not under the influence of alcohol. What they did not have was a proper exit plan. My guess is they have been watching too much Fox News and are convinced exit plans are just unnecessary. I, on the other hand, have it all thought out…
The obvious escape route is into the stands on the third or first base side. In these locations, the wall is short and provides easy access away from the field of play. The problem with this route is security can use the layout of the stadium to its advantage and basically box in the runners. The runners could surely run horizontally, trampling over a bunch of fans to avoid running straight up an aisle, but, to escape for good, vertical movement toward the exits is eventually required. I am certain security guards would have no problem blocking off the escape routes.
Instead of escaping by going over the short walls, I propose an escape by scaling the center field wall. Typically, only one security guard is stationed in the centerfield sand. So long as the group of runners has a big enough lead over their on-field pursuers (hence the need for speed/athleticism), and are able to coordinate their dash to the wall, it is likely that at least 2 will be able to escape (I am assuming the “lifeguard” out in CF will be able to apprehend one person as he/she is descending the fence. Note: There is always the risk that the person caught will squeal-giving up the rest of his crew. I propose setting up some sort of fund beforehand. Prior to the attempt, each person must put down a deposit commensurate to a relatively high proportion of their wealth. The money will be returned following the attempt to everyone who does not squeal. Anybody who squeals loses their deposit which is then distributed equally amongst the others).
Once the wall is scaled, there are numerous exits to choose from, and plenty of open space to dodge the reinforcements that have surely been called into active duty.
It is also necessary to don a proper uniform. Be sure to wear a mask of some sort to hide your face. Also, wear two shirts, and a pair of generic colored shorts. Upon evading the authorities-ditch the mask and top shirt. Then, casually duck into an eatery or bar in the gaslamp. You will now be adequately disguised, and ready to continue your night on the town worry free.
It may be a long-shot, but if you really get that urge to run onto the field and attempt an escape, heed my advice:
1) Don’t consume alcoholic beverages prior to your attempt.
2) Recruit a group of friends to join you.
3) Make sure both you and your friends are fast runners.
4) Set up a system that commits people to not squealing.
5) Prepare proper uniforms
6) Escape into centerfield-not the seats in foul territory.
7) Be sure to have the number of a local cab company handy-not to call as an escape vehicle-but for a ride home after downing a few pitchers in the wake of your glory.
Note: Don't try this at home kids...This article is for entertainment purposes only. Daniel Gettinger does not encourage any behavior that breaks the law-not even Kissing on the lips in Riverside, CA which violates a public health ordinance unless both parties wipe their lips with carbonized rose water.
Friday, August 8, 2008
Giles Update
According to ESPN, Giles will invoke his contractual right to block a trade to Boston. I am not surprised. Like Maddux, Giles enjoys playing in San Diego, and seemingly has no interest in leaving. However, I would not be totally shocked if Giles changes his mind-especially if his option is dropped.
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Giles to Boston?
Today’s big news in Padresland is the Red Sox are “working on a deal to acquire Brian Giles.” Supposedly, the Red Sox claimed Giles on waivers. The Padres have 48 hours to work out a deal with the Sox. Giles, who has a limited no-trade clause, can block a deal to the Red Sox if he so desires. In the event no deal is reached, the Padres will likely pull Giles off waivers and retain him for at least the end of the season. Below, I will try to answer a few of the obvious questions surrounding this report:
Why Does Boston want to acquire Brian Giles?
As the ESPN report indicated, the health of David Ortiz (and Mike Lowell) is uncertain. Ortiz has already spent a significant amount of time on the disabled list this season, and is currently battling a troubled wrist. Acquiring Giles would act as an insurance policy, protecting the Red Sox against Ortiz missing time both in the regular season, and more importantly-the playoffs. Giles is very adept at getting on base, and could be a good fit in the 2-hole, ahead of Boston’s power hitters. Giles is also affordably signed through the 2009 season. The Mark Teixera trades give us a reasonable estimate as to the value of an extra year of control. Teams are no longer willing to give up the farm for an expiring contract, but will pay a premium for a player controllable for at least an additional year.
In all honesty, I am not convinced Boston is interested in actually acquiring Giles. Boston already has Jason Bay and J.D. Drew at the corners of the OF, and assuming David Ortiz is healthy for the playoffs, there is no spot for Giles to play in Boston. My feeling is Boston submitted a claim to prevent Tampa Bay or Anaheim from getting a shot at Giles. It would seem that Giles would provide more marginal benefit to either Tampa or Anaheim. Boston has no interest in seeing either of those teams upgrade heading toward/into the playoffs.
What can the Padres get in Return for Giles?
While I would not expect the Padres to receive anything close to what the Pirates got for Jason Bay, if a deal is consummated, the Padres should get one (or more) reasonably solid prospects. Boston has a very deep farm system, and could probably tempt the Padres without giving up one of their top five farm-hands. As I wrote last week, Giles is a very valuable asset for the Padres through 2009. The Padres will not deal him unless they get equally valuable assets in return.
Should the Padres have Dealt Giles Prior to the Deadline?
Not necessarily. It is true that now the deadline has passed, the Padres do not have the same amount of leverage they possessed prior to the deadline. The only team they can trade Giles to now is Boston, and under normal circumstances, this would seemingly lessen their potential return. However, because Giles is a valuable asset going forward, and the Padres are content holding on to him, Boston will still be forced to pay up if they want Giles. Even though the Padres insist they did not actively shop Giles prior to the trade-deadline, I find it difficult to believe they hung up the phone before listening to the offers of interested teams. It is likely that the Padres considered the offers, and found none of them to be enticing enough to deal Giles. Perhaps with further question marks now surrounding the health of David Ortiz, the Red Sox are valuing Giles differently than they did a few days ago. If Giles’ value to Boston has increased, then the Padres are likely to get more out of Boston now than they could have at the deadline.
Will Giles Accept a Trade to Boston?
He may. Or he may not. Giles may be interested in having a legitimate shot at winning the World Series, or he may prefer playing for his hometown Padres. It is impossible to know what his preferences are. One possibility is that Giles agrees to a trade under the condition that his option be dropped. He would then be a free agent at the end of the season and free to sign with any team-including the Padres. Of course, dropping the option would reduce his value to Boston, and thus reduce the caliber of prospect(s) the Padres are able to acquire in return.
Why Does Boston want to acquire Brian Giles?
As the ESPN report indicated, the health of David Ortiz (and Mike Lowell) is uncertain. Ortiz has already spent a significant amount of time on the disabled list this season, and is currently battling a troubled wrist. Acquiring Giles would act as an insurance policy, protecting the Red Sox against Ortiz missing time both in the regular season, and more importantly-the playoffs. Giles is very adept at getting on base, and could be a good fit in the 2-hole, ahead of Boston’s power hitters. Giles is also affordably signed through the 2009 season. The Mark Teixera trades give us a reasonable estimate as to the value of an extra year of control. Teams are no longer willing to give up the farm for an expiring contract, but will pay a premium for a player controllable for at least an additional year.
In all honesty, I am not convinced Boston is interested in actually acquiring Giles. Boston already has Jason Bay and J.D. Drew at the corners of the OF, and assuming David Ortiz is healthy for the playoffs, there is no spot for Giles to play in Boston. My feeling is Boston submitted a claim to prevent Tampa Bay or Anaheim from getting a shot at Giles. It would seem that Giles would provide more marginal benefit to either Tampa or Anaheim. Boston has no interest in seeing either of those teams upgrade heading toward/into the playoffs.
What can the Padres get in Return for Giles?
While I would not expect the Padres to receive anything close to what the Pirates got for Jason Bay, if a deal is consummated, the Padres should get one (or more) reasonably solid prospects. Boston has a very deep farm system, and could probably tempt the Padres without giving up one of their top five farm-hands. As I wrote last week, Giles is a very valuable asset for the Padres through 2009. The Padres will not deal him unless they get equally valuable assets in return.
Should the Padres have Dealt Giles Prior to the Deadline?
Not necessarily. It is true that now the deadline has passed, the Padres do not have the same amount of leverage they possessed prior to the deadline. The only team they can trade Giles to now is Boston, and under normal circumstances, this would seemingly lessen their potential return. However, because Giles is a valuable asset going forward, and the Padres are content holding on to him, Boston will still be forced to pay up if they want Giles. Even though the Padres insist they did not actively shop Giles prior to the trade-deadline, I find it difficult to believe they hung up the phone before listening to the offers of interested teams. It is likely that the Padres considered the offers, and found none of them to be enticing enough to deal Giles. Perhaps with further question marks now surrounding the health of David Ortiz, the Red Sox are valuing Giles differently than they did a few days ago. If Giles’ value to Boston has increased, then the Padres are likely to get more out of Boston now than they could have at the deadline.
Will Giles Accept a Trade to Boston?
He may. Or he may not. Giles may be interested in having a legitimate shot at winning the World Series, or he may prefer playing for his hometown Padres. It is impossible to know what his preferences are. One possibility is that Giles agrees to a trade under the condition that his option be dropped. He would then be a free agent at the end of the season and free to sign with any team-including the Padres. Of course, dropping the option would reduce his value to Boston, and thus reduce the caliber of prospect(s) the Padres are able to acquire in return.
Monday, August 4, 2008
Why Giving the Kids a Chance Makes No Cents
The Padres have a lot of mediocre players who are better suited to bench work or long relief, than a spot in the starting lineup or the five-man rotation. Many of these players, such as Jody Gerut and Cha Seung Baek are not young and do not figure to be a major part of the Padres plans in the future.
One reader of this blog has been telling me since mid-June that he, as a fan, would rather see some of the team’s young prospects get a chance to play every day for the big league club. He argues that since the team is going nowhere this season, that it would be more exciting for fans to catch a glimpse of the future than to watch “4A” talent. In addition, he believes that the young players will benefit from some time in the majors, and are likely to become better players due to the experience. He frequently cites Will Inman and Steve Garrison as candidates to be promoted and plugged into the big league rotation. Even though he is certain that Gerut and others must be replaced, I have yet to hear this loyal reader present any suggestions for position players due for a promotion
I recognize three primary problems associated with promoting Inman or Garrison at this point in the season. The first is that they are not better pitchers, at this point in their careers, than anybody in the current Padres rotation. The second problem is that rushing players who are not ready for the majors may stunt their development. Finally, a player promoted from the minors begins accumulating MLB service time.
By promoting Inman or Garrison to their big league team, the Padres are likely to become worse, rather than better. Davenport Translations can give us a rough estimate for the stats minor league players are likely to put up in the majors. Both are likely to post Defense Independent ERAs in the mid-5s. For comparison, the much maligned Cha Seung Baek has a DERA of 4.88 this season, while Josh Banks has posted a 3.97 DERA for the Padres. Other statistics can, and should be compared in a more thorough analysis, but I believe it is pretty clear that Inman and Garrison are downgrades, this season, from Banks, Baek, or just about any other pitcher the Padres may decide to plug into the 5 slot in the rotation. Although some fans may get excited about being introduced to some of the franchise’s younger talent, I believe many fans will actually be turned off by the even poorer performance of the team that is likely to ensue. These fans will question why the team is making them pay major league dollar to cheer for minor league talent.
A somewhat more compelling reason for promoting the “kids,” (not sure kid is the right word for me to use, since these guys are slightly older than myself), is to help accelerate the development process of these young players. Some may point to Chase Headley’s experience as a Padre last season as “proof” of the good a short stint in the majors can do for a player’s development. Chase was called up from AA last year to fill in for an injured Kevin Kouzmanoff. Headley struggled in a small sample of plate appearances, and was optioned back to the minors upon Kouz’s return. Following his return to AA, Headley performed exceptionally. The theory is that although Headley was not great in the big leagues, that he learned from the experience and was ready to positively contribute the next season.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Headley’s appearance in the major’s actually helped him become a better or more major league ready player. Prior to his call up, Headley was hitting 0.357 in the minors, so it’s not like he learned how to hit due to a few games in the majors. In fact, I would argue that promoting a player before he is ready has the potential to do more harm than good. It is possible that a player not yet ready for the big leagues may try so hard to impress that he could mess up his mechanics (potentially leading to injury). Also, although it is difficult to quantify the effect confidence has on production, a young player who struggles mightily in the big leagues, could have trouble regaining his previous form due to confidence issues. I am not certain rushing a player actually does him permanent harm, but I find the potential harm to be more probable, and greater in magnitude than the potential benefits.
The final, and most important reason for not rushing a top prospect to the majors, is the “service time” issue. A player becomes eligible for arbitration if he has 3 or more years of MLB service time. After 6 years of MLB service time, a player can file for free agency. This system makes a player’s 1-3 years incredibly valuable to teams, since they can pay the players a salary potentially well below their marginal revenue product. To call a player up before he is ready, and particularly in a year where the team is terrible, wastes those valuable years, and will cause the players to become arbitration and free agent eligible sooner than necessary.
I am not opposed to calling up a few minor leaguers once rosters expand in September. A few days in the majors, after a full season of development in the minors, is likely to do little harm (assuming pitchers' IP are carefully monitored). What I do not wish to see is players rushed to the majors in early August for no reason other than change itself. To waste valuable development time in the minor leagues, to risk blows to the players’ confidence, and to start the service time clock for no apparent reason just makes no sense.
One reader of this blog has been telling me since mid-June that he, as a fan, would rather see some of the team’s young prospects get a chance to play every day for the big league club. He argues that since the team is going nowhere this season, that it would be more exciting for fans to catch a glimpse of the future than to watch “4A” talent. In addition, he believes that the young players will benefit from some time in the majors, and are likely to become better players due to the experience. He frequently cites Will Inman and Steve Garrison as candidates to be promoted and plugged into the big league rotation. Even though he is certain that Gerut and others must be replaced, I have yet to hear this loyal reader present any suggestions for position players due for a promotion
I recognize three primary problems associated with promoting Inman or Garrison at this point in the season. The first is that they are not better pitchers, at this point in their careers, than anybody in the current Padres rotation. The second problem is that rushing players who are not ready for the majors may stunt their development. Finally, a player promoted from the minors begins accumulating MLB service time.
By promoting Inman or Garrison to their big league team, the Padres are likely to become worse, rather than better. Davenport Translations can give us a rough estimate for the stats minor league players are likely to put up in the majors. Both are likely to post Defense Independent ERAs in the mid-5s. For comparison, the much maligned Cha Seung Baek has a DERA of 4.88 this season, while Josh Banks has posted a 3.97 DERA for the Padres. Other statistics can, and should be compared in a more thorough analysis, but I believe it is pretty clear that Inman and Garrison are downgrades, this season, from Banks, Baek, or just about any other pitcher the Padres may decide to plug into the 5 slot in the rotation. Although some fans may get excited about being introduced to some of the franchise’s younger talent, I believe many fans will actually be turned off by the even poorer performance of the team that is likely to ensue. These fans will question why the team is making them pay major league dollar to cheer for minor league talent.
A somewhat more compelling reason for promoting the “kids,” (not sure kid is the right word for me to use, since these guys are slightly older than myself), is to help accelerate the development process of these young players. Some may point to Chase Headley’s experience as a Padre last season as “proof” of the good a short stint in the majors can do for a player’s development. Chase was called up from AA last year to fill in for an injured Kevin Kouzmanoff. Headley struggled in a small sample of plate appearances, and was optioned back to the minors upon Kouz’s return. Following his return to AA, Headley performed exceptionally. The theory is that although Headley was not great in the big leagues, that he learned from the experience and was ready to positively contribute the next season.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Headley’s appearance in the major’s actually helped him become a better or more major league ready player. Prior to his call up, Headley was hitting 0.357 in the minors, so it’s not like he learned how to hit due to a few games in the majors. In fact, I would argue that promoting a player before he is ready has the potential to do more harm than good. It is possible that a player not yet ready for the big leagues may try so hard to impress that he could mess up his mechanics (potentially leading to injury). Also, although it is difficult to quantify the effect confidence has on production, a young player who struggles mightily in the big leagues, could have trouble regaining his previous form due to confidence issues. I am not certain rushing a player actually does him permanent harm, but I find the potential harm to be more probable, and greater in magnitude than the potential benefits.
The final, and most important reason for not rushing a top prospect to the majors, is the “service time” issue. A player becomes eligible for arbitration if he has 3 or more years of MLB service time. After 6 years of MLB service time, a player can file for free agency. This system makes a player’s 1-3 years incredibly valuable to teams, since they can pay the players a salary potentially well below their marginal revenue product. To call a player up before he is ready, and particularly in a year where the team is terrible, wastes those valuable years, and will cause the players to become arbitration and free agent eligible sooner than necessary.
I am not opposed to calling up a few minor leaguers once rosters expand in September. A few days in the majors, after a full season of development in the minors, is likely to do little harm (assuming pitchers' IP are carefully monitored). What I do not wish to see is players rushed to the majors in early August for no reason other than change itself. To waste valuable development time in the minor leagues, to risk blows to the players’ confidence, and to start the service time clock for no apparent reason just makes no sense.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Post Trade Deadline Thoughts
The Padres were unable to make any deadline beating deals following the Randy Wolf trade. This should come as no real surprise to anyone. It is easy to suggest trading veterans for prospects, but getting anything back of value is an entirely different proposition.
Greg Maddux was the Padre who frequented the rumor mills the most often. Greg is, even at this point in his career, a decent pitcher who could possibly step in and be the fifth starter for a few contending teams. Maddux has been a few runs worse than the average pitcher this season, and was intriguing to teams like the Phillies who have had problems with consistency of their rotations. Had Maddux not possessed a no-trade clause, the Padres may have been able to snag a prospect similar, or even slightly better in quality to what they received in the Randy Wolf trade-nothing special, but certainly a potentially useful player.
Unfortunately (or fortunately if you really like seeing Maddux pitch in San Diego), Maddux has a no-trade clause, and he had no interest in going anywhere except for a contender on the West Coast. Maddux’s wishes basically limited the potential market to only the Dodgers. The Dodgers, recognizing the Padres had little leverage over them, probably offered the Padres nothing but the assumption of the remainder of Maddux’s contract.
If this were any other business, I would imagine the Padres would have made that trade. With no shot at the playoffs, there is really little financial logic to continuing to pay Maddux’s not so cheap salary. Better to let the Dodgers do so, and pocket the savings as profit. However, baseball is unlike most other businesses in that the customers are able to analyze the company’s every move. Had the Padres merely given Maddux away, to a division rival no less, a good majority of the fans would have been incensed. For whatever reason, fans tend to not like seeing an owner put profit into his own pocket. Trading Maddux for what would appear to be nothing, would be sure to cause such a P.R. backlash that it was just not worth doing.
Other Padres rumored to possibly be dealt included Brian Giles, Cla Meredith, and Josh Bard, Khalil Greene, and Kevin Kouzmanoff. Below is a very brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding each of them…
Giles, has a relatively affordable option for next year, and is likely to be the team’s best option for RF in 2009. Trading him now would have created another hole to be filled in the off-season.
Meredith is not great, and would not have generated much of a return. With that said, he is a serviceable bullpen arm under team control for the next few years. I would guess he actually has more value to the Padres than what they could have received in a trade.
Trading Greene now would probably have amounted to selling at a low. He has been awful so far this season, but his past performance suggests he will play better going forward. Also, much like the problem of trading Giles, getting rid of Greene would open a huge hole at SS, and because there are so few good shortstops, both internally, and externally, it may take a while to find a good replacement.
Kouzmanoff is a league average third baseman who comes cheap. Headley can play 3B, but, unless a team were to offer a quality player who could fill a position of need (i.e. CF or 2B) in 2009, there was little reason to trade Kouz.
The only guy who I thought might have been traded was Bard. He, like many players on the Padres roster is between a replacement level and average level talent. At one point, I had read that the Marlins were interested in him. My initial thought was that trading him would not hurt the team too much, as a guy like Hundley could replace him without too big of a drop in overall production. At the same time, Bard is not a good enough player to fetch much in return, so keeping him around is not the worst thing that could have happened.
Easy as it is to argue the front office was complacent, and should have traded some veterans for prospects, when each of the possible trade candidates is examined individually, it becomes clear that the Padres would not have received much in return, or were actually better off from a baseball perspective keeping the player. Had any team actually made an enticing offer for any of the players mentioned above, I am sure the Padres would have jumped all over it.
Perhaps the best news the Padres received all day, was that the Dodgers acquired Manny Ramirez. In return for 2 months of Manny, they gave up two quality prospects, including a guy (LaRoche) who should have been starting at 3B for them all year. Since the Padres are not contending this year, it really does not matter how well the Dodgers finish the season. Removing players from the Dodger’s system who could have been useful to the team in the future can only benefit the Padres.
Finally, lets not forget, although the Padres were unable to pull off a deal today, Kevin Towers once said: “There are Better Deals in August...”
Greg Maddux was the Padre who frequented the rumor mills the most often. Greg is, even at this point in his career, a decent pitcher who could possibly step in and be the fifth starter for a few contending teams. Maddux has been a few runs worse than the average pitcher this season, and was intriguing to teams like the Phillies who have had problems with consistency of their rotations. Had Maddux not possessed a no-trade clause, the Padres may have been able to snag a prospect similar, or even slightly better in quality to what they received in the Randy Wolf trade-nothing special, but certainly a potentially useful player.
Unfortunately (or fortunately if you really like seeing Maddux pitch in San Diego), Maddux has a no-trade clause, and he had no interest in going anywhere except for a contender on the West Coast. Maddux’s wishes basically limited the potential market to only the Dodgers. The Dodgers, recognizing the Padres had little leverage over them, probably offered the Padres nothing but the assumption of the remainder of Maddux’s contract.
If this were any other business, I would imagine the Padres would have made that trade. With no shot at the playoffs, there is really little financial logic to continuing to pay Maddux’s not so cheap salary. Better to let the Dodgers do so, and pocket the savings as profit. However, baseball is unlike most other businesses in that the customers are able to analyze the company’s every move. Had the Padres merely given Maddux away, to a division rival no less, a good majority of the fans would have been incensed. For whatever reason, fans tend to not like seeing an owner put profit into his own pocket. Trading Maddux for what would appear to be nothing, would be sure to cause such a P.R. backlash that it was just not worth doing.
Other Padres rumored to possibly be dealt included Brian Giles, Cla Meredith, and Josh Bard, Khalil Greene, and Kevin Kouzmanoff. Below is a very brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding each of them…
Giles, has a relatively affordable option for next year, and is likely to be the team’s best option for RF in 2009. Trading him now would have created another hole to be filled in the off-season.
Meredith is not great, and would not have generated much of a return. With that said, he is a serviceable bullpen arm under team control for the next few years. I would guess he actually has more value to the Padres than what they could have received in a trade.
Trading Greene now would probably have amounted to selling at a low. He has been awful so far this season, but his past performance suggests he will play better going forward. Also, much like the problem of trading Giles, getting rid of Greene would open a huge hole at SS, and because there are so few good shortstops, both internally, and externally, it may take a while to find a good replacement.
Kouzmanoff is a league average third baseman who comes cheap. Headley can play 3B, but, unless a team were to offer a quality player who could fill a position of need (i.e. CF or 2B) in 2009, there was little reason to trade Kouz.
The only guy who I thought might have been traded was Bard. He, like many players on the Padres roster is between a replacement level and average level talent. At one point, I had read that the Marlins were interested in him. My initial thought was that trading him would not hurt the team too much, as a guy like Hundley could replace him without too big of a drop in overall production. At the same time, Bard is not a good enough player to fetch much in return, so keeping him around is not the worst thing that could have happened.
Easy as it is to argue the front office was complacent, and should have traded some veterans for prospects, when each of the possible trade candidates is examined individually, it becomes clear that the Padres would not have received much in return, or were actually better off from a baseball perspective keeping the player. Had any team actually made an enticing offer for any of the players mentioned above, I am sure the Padres would have jumped all over it.
Perhaps the best news the Padres received all day, was that the Dodgers acquired Manny Ramirez. In return for 2 months of Manny, they gave up two quality prospects, including a guy (LaRoche) who should have been starting at 3B for them all year. Since the Padres are not contending this year, it really does not matter how well the Dodgers finish the season. Removing players from the Dodger’s system who could have been useful to the team in the future can only benefit the Padres.
Finally, lets not forget, although the Padres were unable to pull off a deal today, Kevin Towers once said: “There are Better Deals in August...”
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Words of Wisdom from Manny Ramirez
"I should go to Green Bay straight up and they should send Brett Favre to Boston. That will end two soap operas at the same time."
-Manny Ramirez
-Manny Ramirez
Sunday, July 27, 2008
The Misutilization of Bullpen Resources
It is pretty clear that Heath Bell has been the Padres best reliever over the past two seasons. Still, Trevor Hoffman continues to be the team’s designated closer. I am okay with this. Others are not.
It seems like every time Trevor blows a save, or even makes one interesting, there are murmurings about making Heath Bell the closer-if not this year, then next year. My response is always the same: the worry should be less about who the closer is, but rather who gets to pitch in the highest leverage situations.
Protecting a ninth inning lead is certainly important, but how important it is depends on the magnitude of the lead, as well as the skill of the batters scheduled to bat in the inning. As Tom Tango writes: “The record books don't make distinctions between the one-run save and the three-run save, but it's rather clear that it's much easier to save a three-run game than a one-run game.”
With this in mind, Tango set out to quantify the relative importance of various situations within a game. To do so, he established a table of win expectancies. The table shows the probability of winning the game at any point in the game. For example, a home team winning by one run with two outs in the top of the eighth inning with no runners on base will win 84.7% of the time. Using the win expectancy data, leverage index, which measures the importance of any situation relative to the start of the game, was born. Baseball Prospectus explains that: “a leverage of 1.00 is the same importance as the start of a game. Leverage values below one represent situations less important than the start of a game (such as mopup innings in a blowout). Leverage values above one represent situations with more importance (such as a closer protecting a one-run lead with bases loaded in the 9th inning).”
To demonstrate the importance of a team getting its best reliever into the game in high leverage situations, I ran a quick regression analysis, which hopefully illustrates the intuition behind the leverage theory. The theory is that if teams are better off pitching their best reliever in high leverage situations regardless of whether it is classified as a “save situation,” there should exist a positive relationship between the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by the team’s best reliever and wins (once other factors such as a team’s total runs scored and runs allowed have been controlled for).
To test this theory, I first needed to define a way to measure the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by a team’s best reliever. Leverage does not account for innings pitched. Rather, it signifies the average importance of a team/player’s relief appearances. A minor league pitcher can get called up and throw one inning of high leverage ball. His leverage score will be high, but his impact on wins over the course of a 162 game season is negligible. For this reason, I have created what may be a new statistic called effective leveraged innings (note: there is a good chance someone has done something like this before; I am just unaware of it). Effective leveraged innings is the product of innings pitched and leverage index. Effective leveraged innings accounts for both the quantity and importance of innings pitched. A pitcher with 100 innings pitched and a leverage index of 1.20 would have pitched 120 effective leveraged innings. A team whose relievers pitched 500 combined innings with a leverage index of 1.1 would have pitched 550 effective leveraged innings.
Measuring the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever requires identifying each team’s best reliever. A team’s closer is not necessarily the best reliever. The closer may have the role based on the reputation of his past performance rather than his current skills. Also, managers may already recognize save situations are not always the most important, and purposely name a pitcher who is not the team’s best reliever “the closer.”
Traditional statistics such as earned run average (ERA) do an equally poor job of identifying a team’s best reliever. ERA often overstates the skills of bad pitchers who may have had some lucky success over a small sample of innings. Another shortcoming of ERA is it is dependent on factors outside of the pitcher’s control. Differences in the skill of the surrounding defense and ballpark configurations make ERA a poor choice for evaluating the skill of pitchers. Other frequently cited statistics such as WHIP (base runners allowed per inning) offer many of the same shortcomings as ERA.
The best measure of a reliever’s skill is WXL, the “expected wins added over an average pitcher, adjusted for level of opposing hitters faced.” WXRL could be used if you prefer to use replacement level as a comparison rather than average level. WXL factors in the MLV [marginal lineup value] of the actual batters faced by the pitchers. Then, WXL uses win expectancy calculations to assess how relievers have changed the outcome of games” (baseballprospectus.com). In this study, the player on each team with the highest WXL is considered the team’s best reliever.
My data comes from the 2006 and 2007 seasons. A larger sample size would be more telling, but data collection takes time, and I did not feel like spending hours collecting data to better prove such a widely accepted concept. I have removed data from the 2006 Atlanta Braves and 2006 Cleveland Indians because the Cleveland Indians traded their best reliever, Bob Wickman to the Braves in the middle of the season. Wickman’s proportion of effective leveraged innings pitched was not representative of his use while with either team.
Regression Results:
I first ran a regression using only runs scored and runs allowed to explain wins. These two variables explained approximately 83% of the variance in wins. Next, I ran the regression with a third independent variable-the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever. Not only was this variable significant at the 0.01 level, but the new equation did an even better job than the first at explaining wins. It had a higher adjusted R^2, lower Akaike, and lower Schwartz. I played around with different functional forms of the variables, and even added a variable that measured the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s second best reliever (as measured by WXL), but these equations had trouble passing the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification, or contained combinations of variables that turned out to be insignificant. Below, I am posting two images of the results. The first captures the pertinent information of my final equation. The second image compares the final equation to the control. Click on the images to enlarge and view more clearly.
Conclusions:
The data shows that for each additional percentage of effective leveraged innings pitched by a team’s best reliever, a team can expect to add 0.33 wins to its record. The implication is a team could increase its win total by pitching its best reliever in an additional 3% of its effective leveraged innings. There are two ways to do this. A team could increase the innings pitched of its best reliever or increase its proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by its best reliever. Increasing a pitcher’s innings thrown is unlikely to be successful because it could cause extra wear on the pitcher’s arm and lead to injury. The more practical method is to increase the leverage score of its best pitcher, while maintaining the same amount of innings thrown. Increasing the leverage score would entail that teams not reserve its best reliever for save situations, but instead employ their ace reliever in the highest high leverage situations possible.
I understand the argument that closing games in the 9th inning may take a special mind-set. This may or may not be true, but I am willing to cede the point for now. Luckily, that theory is not inconsistent with using a team’s best reliever in the highest leverage situations. Many save situations are in fact high leverage. What I encourage the Padres to do with Heath Bell (once Hoffy retires), or whoever their best reliever may be in the future, is to have him close out tight games in the 9th inning, but not necessarily games with a 3 run lead. Rather than wasting innings picking up easy saves with a huge lead, the Padres should allow their best reliever to pitch in other high leverage situations.
Of course, it is easy to pinpoint the highest leverage situation in a particular game after the fact, but not so easy to do mid-game. My solution to this is for the Padres to employ its statisticians to make up a chart outlining the probability of any given situation being the highest leverage moment in that game. Armed with this information, the manager will be able to make an informed decision about when best to bring in his best reliever. Using the “save situation” as a rule-of-thumb will no longer be necessary.
It seems like every time Trevor blows a save, or even makes one interesting, there are murmurings about making Heath Bell the closer-if not this year, then next year. My response is always the same: the worry should be less about who the closer is, but rather who gets to pitch in the highest leverage situations.
Protecting a ninth inning lead is certainly important, but how important it is depends on the magnitude of the lead, as well as the skill of the batters scheduled to bat in the inning. As Tom Tango writes: “The record books don't make distinctions between the one-run save and the three-run save, but it's rather clear that it's much easier to save a three-run game than a one-run game.”
With this in mind, Tango set out to quantify the relative importance of various situations within a game. To do so, he established a table of win expectancies. The table shows the probability of winning the game at any point in the game. For example, a home team winning by one run with two outs in the top of the eighth inning with no runners on base will win 84.7% of the time. Using the win expectancy data, leverage index, which measures the importance of any situation relative to the start of the game, was born. Baseball Prospectus explains that: “a leverage of 1.00 is the same importance as the start of a game. Leverage values below one represent situations less important than the start of a game (such as mopup innings in a blowout). Leverage values above one represent situations with more importance (such as a closer protecting a one-run lead with bases loaded in the 9th inning).”
To demonstrate the importance of a team getting its best reliever into the game in high leverage situations, I ran a quick regression analysis, which hopefully illustrates the intuition behind the leverage theory. The theory is that if teams are better off pitching their best reliever in high leverage situations regardless of whether it is classified as a “save situation,” there should exist a positive relationship between the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by the team’s best reliever and wins (once other factors such as a team’s total runs scored and runs allowed have been controlled for).
To test this theory, I first needed to define a way to measure the proportion of a team’s high leverage innings pitched by a team’s best reliever. Leverage does not account for innings pitched. Rather, it signifies the average importance of a team/player’s relief appearances. A minor league pitcher can get called up and throw one inning of high leverage ball. His leverage score will be high, but his impact on wins over the course of a 162 game season is negligible. For this reason, I have created what may be a new statistic called effective leveraged innings (note: there is a good chance someone has done something like this before; I am just unaware of it). Effective leveraged innings is the product of innings pitched and leverage index. Effective leveraged innings accounts for both the quantity and importance of innings pitched. A pitcher with 100 innings pitched and a leverage index of 1.20 would have pitched 120 effective leveraged innings. A team whose relievers pitched 500 combined innings with a leverage index of 1.1 would have pitched 550 effective leveraged innings.
Measuring the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever requires identifying each team’s best reliever. A team’s closer is not necessarily the best reliever. The closer may have the role based on the reputation of his past performance rather than his current skills. Also, managers may already recognize save situations are not always the most important, and purposely name a pitcher who is not the team’s best reliever “the closer.”
Traditional statistics such as earned run average (ERA) do an equally poor job of identifying a team’s best reliever. ERA often overstates the skills of bad pitchers who may have had some lucky success over a small sample of innings. Another shortcoming of ERA is it is dependent on factors outside of the pitcher’s control. Differences in the skill of the surrounding defense and ballpark configurations make ERA a poor choice for evaluating the skill of pitchers. Other frequently cited statistics such as WHIP (base runners allowed per inning) offer many of the same shortcomings as ERA.
The best measure of a reliever’s skill is WXL, the “expected wins added over an average pitcher, adjusted for level of opposing hitters faced.” WXRL could be used if you prefer to use replacement level as a comparison rather than average level. WXL factors in the MLV [marginal lineup value] of the actual batters faced by the pitchers. Then, WXL uses win expectancy calculations to assess how relievers have changed the outcome of games” (baseballprospectus.com). In this study, the player on each team with the highest WXL is considered the team’s best reliever.
My data comes from the 2006 and 2007 seasons. A larger sample size would be more telling, but data collection takes time, and I did not feel like spending hours collecting data to better prove such a widely accepted concept. I have removed data from the 2006 Atlanta Braves and 2006 Cleveland Indians because the Cleveland Indians traded their best reliever, Bob Wickman to the Braves in the middle of the season. Wickman’s proportion of effective leveraged innings pitched was not representative of his use while with either team.
Regression Results:
I first ran a regression using only runs scored and runs allowed to explain wins. These two variables explained approximately 83% of the variance in wins. Next, I ran the regression with a third independent variable-the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s best reliever. Not only was this variable significant at the 0.01 level, but the new equation did an even better job than the first at explaining wins. It had a higher adjusted R^2, lower Akaike, and lower Schwartz. I played around with different functional forms of the variables, and even added a variable that measured the proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by a team’s second best reliever (as measured by WXL), but these equations had trouble passing the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification, or contained combinations of variables that turned out to be insignificant. Below, I am posting two images of the results. The first captures the pertinent information of my final equation. The second image compares the final equation to the control. Click on the images to enlarge and view more clearly.
Conclusions:The data shows that for each additional percentage of effective leveraged innings pitched by a team’s best reliever, a team can expect to add 0.33 wins to its record. The implication is a team could increase its win total by pitching its best reliever in an additional 3% of its effective leveraged innings. There are two ways to do this. A team could increase the innings pitched of its best reliever or increase its proportion of effective leveraged innings thrown by its best reliever. Increasing a pitcher’s innings thrown is unlikely to be successful because it could cause extra wear on the pitcher’s arm and lead to injury. The more practical method is to increase the leverage score of its best pitcher, while maintaining the same amount of innings thrown. Increasing the leverage score would entail that teams not reserve its best reliever for save situations, but instead employ their ace reliever in the highest high leverage situations possible.
I understand the argument that closing games in the 9th inning may take a special mind-set. This may or may not be true, but I am willing to cede the point for now. Luckily, that theory is not inconsistent with using a team’s best reliever in the highest leverage situations. Many save situations are in fact high leverage. What I encourage the Padres to do with Heath Bell (once Hoffy retires), or whoever their best reliever may be in the future, is to have him close out tight games in the 9th inning, but not necessarily games with a 3 run lead. Rather than wasting innings picking up easy saves with a huge lead, the Padres should allow their best reliever to pitch in other high leverage situations.
Of course, it is easy to pinpoint the highest leverage situation in a particular game after the fact, but not so easy to do mid-game. My solution to this is for the Padres to employ its statisticians to make up a chart outlining the probability of any given situation being the highest leverage moment in that game. Armed with this information, the manager will be able to make an informed decision about when best to bring in his best reliever. Using the “save situation” as a rule-of-thumb will no longer be necessary.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Thanks for the Memories-Jason Szuminski
The Padres selected Jason Szuminski in the 2004 Rule 5 draft. He made the club out of spring training, and after appearing in his first game, he became the first MIT graduate to play in the major leagues. His story gained national attention, and resulted in an abundance of personal interest pieces that played off the novelty of having a “rocket scientist” pitching in the major leagues.
Sadly, Szuminski’s performance left much to be desired, and he was returned to his original team, the Cubs. Szuminski was never able to make it back to the big leagues, but hey, with an MIT diploma, at least he had something to fall back on. Thanks for the Memories Jason!
Sadly, Szuminski’s performance left much to be desired, and he was returned to his original team, the Cubs. Szuminski was never able to make it back to the big leagues, but hey, with an MIT diploma, at least he had something to fall back on. Thanks for the Memories Jason!
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Randy Wolf May Have More Value for the 'Stros than People Think
Yesterday, the Padres traded Randy Wolf to the Astros. The reviews are in, and while few analysts are overly excited about Chad Reineke, the 26 year old AAA pitcher the Padres received, the general consensus is that the move made no sense for the Astros. Prior to the trade being completed, Rob Neyer (subscription required) of ESPN wrote: "If the Astros trade even one promising young player for Randy Wolf, it'll rank among the worst deals of the year." Today, he replied: “Well, they've done it. And it may wind up looking like one of the worst deals of the year.”
I too was initially shocked that the Astros wanted to acquire Randy Wolf, and deemed it another bone-headed move by Astros GM Ed Wade. Like the Padres, the Astros are in last place in their division. They trail the Cubs by 12 games, and recently placed Roy Oswalt-their best pitcher-on the DL. Additionally, Randy Wolf is not very good. Besides the fact that he has historically had trouble staying healthy, he currently has a SNLVAR of 2.2, meaning he has essentially been a replacement level pitcher this season. The only reason his ERA does not look worse, is he has been fortunate enough to pitch half his games at Petco Park. For the privilege of acquiring a player who fall somewhere between replacement level and average level (probably closer to replacement level), the Astros surrendered one of their top 5 pitching prospects.
As bad as the trade is for the Astros, I can at least understand it. First, Reineke is nowhere close to a top prospect. He is neither particularly young, nor particularly good. From what I have read, most scouts project him as a long-reliever with the upside to be a serviceable middle reliever. That type of player has some value, but is nothing to get too worked up about losing. Next, Randy Wolf actually improves the Astros rotation this season. With Oswalt injured, Wolf is probably the best starter on their team. Even though they will not contend for a playoff spot, as MB over at Friar Forecast notes: “it’s not like regular season games are meaningless, if you aren’t in contention. A win (or some fraction of a win) is still worth something, in revenue, to a ball club.” I have no idea what the Astros specific win curve (the amount of revenue they receive for each marginal win) looks like, but it is conceivable that acquiring Wolf is close to a break-even proposition for Houston this season.
Finally, trading for Wolf presents the Astros with the opportunity to exclusively negotiate a contract with him for a few weeks after the season. If they are able to resign Wolf, the deal suddenly makes a lot of sense. Even if they do not resign Wolf, there is the chance that they could receive a compensatory draft pick for losing him to free agency. When all factors are considered, the Astros suddenly do not look too dumb. At the same time, they took on more payroll and further depleted their farm system in a year without much hope at contending. From the Padres perspective-the trade makes complete sense. They acquire another cheap arm they can control for the next half-decade, and no longer need to pay a mediocre pitcher a decent salary.
I too was initially shocked that the Astros wanted to acquire Randy Wolf, and deemed it another bone-headed move by Astros GM Ed Wade. Like the Padres, the Astros are in last place in their division. They trail the Cubs by 12 games, and recently placed Roy Oswalt-their best pitcher-on the DL. Additionally, Randy Wolf is not very good. Besides the fact that he has historically had trouble staying healthy, he currently has a SNLVAR of 2.2, meaning he has essentially been a replacement level pitcher this season. The only reason his ERA does not look worse, is he has been fortunate enough to pitch half his games at Petco Park. For the privilege of acquiring a player who fall somewhere between replacement level and average level (probably closer to replacement level), the Astros surrendered one of their top 5 pitching prospects.
As bad as the trade is for the Astros, I can at least understand it. First, Reineke is nowhere close to a top prospect. He is neither particularly young, nor particularly good. From what I have read, most scouts project him as a long-reliever with the upside to be a serviceable middle reliever. That type of player has some value, but is nothing to get too worked up about losing. Next, Randy Wolf actually improves the Astros rotation this season. With Oswalt injured, Wolf is probably the best starter on their team. Even though they will not contend for a playoff spot, as MB over at Friar Forecast notes: “it’s not like regular season games are meaningless, if you aren’t in contention. A win (or some fraction of a win) is still worth something, in revenue, to a ball club.” I have no idea what the Astros specific win curve (the amount of revenue they receive for each marginal win) looks like, but it is conceivable that acquiring Wolf is close to a break-even proposition for Houston this season.
Finally, trading for Wolf presents the Astros with the opportunity to exclusively negotiate a contract with him for a few weeks after the season. If they are able to resign Wolf, the deal suddenly makes a lot of sense. Even if they do not resign Wolf, there is the chance that they could receive a compensatory draft pick for losing him to free agency. When all factors are considered, the Astros suddenly do not look too dumb. At the same time, they took on more payroll and further depleted their farm system in a year without much hope at contending. From the Padres perspective-the trade makes complete sense. They acquire another cheap arm they can control for the next half-decade, and no longer need to pay a mediocre pitcher a decent salary.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Do the Brightest Stars Dim Slower?
It is well documented that baseball players tend to peak at around 26 or 27 years of age. Last year, I was talking a little baseball with a person who knows the game well. At some point in the conversation, the aging process of position players became central to the discussion. I suggested that the Padres should be wary of signing or trading for any star player already in his 30s-even early 30s, because an expected decrease in skill may leave the club paying for past performance rather than future performance. The person I was talking to suggested that star players actually experience a much longer peak than the average ball player. Therefore, acquiring a star player in his early 30s could actually be a good bet for the Padres, as the star will be likely to maintain his production, or at the very least experience an extremely gradual decline.
At the time, I did not pursue the argument any further, but continued to silently contemplate the concept that the best players may age better than the average player. I have no doubt that hall of famers continue to be extremely productive well into their 30s. There is no way that they would be able to accumulate the longevity statistics necessary to be voted into the hall without sustained excellence. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that just because they played great baseball at 33, they were not even better at 27.
The biggest problem I had with the argument was that it is very difficult to project the players that will age well, and who will completely fall off the map. Sure players with greater athleticism have been shown to age better than huge, clumsy first baseman/DH types such as Cecil Fielder, but it is very difficult to make predictions for an individual player. Most of the players fans remember as stars were able to sustain their excellence, but for every Paul Molitor who seemed to grow better with age, there is a Ruben Sierra who looked like a star early in his career, but struggled after experiencing early success.
Since the conversation began with the question of whether the Padres can safely sign or trade for “stars,” in their 30s, I decided to construct a test that examines the careers of players who at any given point may have been considered a “star.”
The first step was to define the parameters. I chose to define a “star” as a person selected to at least 2 allstar games-at least one of which occurred in the 90s. I examined stars from the 90s because these players were able to take advantage of relatively modern training and medical technologies. In addition, most of these players are now retired or at the very end of their careers, which allows for a longitudinal view. I included only players elected to at least 2 allstar games because this removes fluky players who may have only had one good half season, or were only elected because their team needed a representative (sorry guys, but Jon Jaha was removed from the data set).
Skill was defined by WARP (Wins Against Replacement Player). WARP has the advantage of measuring both offensive and defensive production. About 1/3 of the way through my data collection, I realized I probably should have used WARP 3, but I did not really feel like starting over at that point, and I am certain that the results were not affected by the subtle differences between WARP 1 and WARP 3.
I recorded the age of each player when he achieved his career high WARP, the lower and upper bounds of each player’s best three year WARP, and each player’s cumulative WARP from their age 26-28, 29-31, and 32-34 seasons. I calculated the mean, median, mode, and standard deviations for each category where applicable. I present the results in the table below. In addition, feel free to download the excel spreadsheet that contains the raw data and calculations.
Results (I can't seem to get the formatting right, so please scroll down):
It is pretty clear that even the stars experience their best play between 26 and 28. From 29-31, there is a gradual decline (12.48%), and then an even more dramatic decline from 32-34 (an additional 25.69% or 34.97% from the age 26-28 seasons). These results are extremely consistent with the numbers seen in the general baseball population.
My conclusion is that although some players maintain an extremely high level of play well into their 30s, that in general, even the stars demonstrate severe slippage from their peak level of play, and that slippage tends to begin between ages 29 and 31. This fact suggests that making a large investment in a 30 year old star is a very risky proposition. Although it is likely that the star will continue to be a serviceable regular worthy of consistent playing time, the team cannot expect the player to duplicate the production from earlier in his career, and should plan accordingly.
At the time, I did not pursue the argument any further, but continued to silently contemplate the concept that the best players may age better than the average player. I have no doubt that hall of famers continue to be extremely productive well into their 30s. There is no way that they would be able to accumulate the longevity statistics necessary to be voted into the hall without sustained excellence. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that just because they played great baseball at 33, they were not even better at 27.
The biggest problem I had with the argument was that it is very difficult to project the players that will age well, and who will completely fall off the map. Sure players with greater athleticism have been shown to age better than huge, clumsy first baseman/DH types such as Cecil Fielder, but it is very difficult to make predictions for an individual player. Most of the players fans remember as stars were able to sustain their excellence, but for every Paul Molitor who seemed to grow better with age, there is a Ruben Sierra who looked like a star early in his career, but struggled after experiencing early success.
Since the conversation began with the question of whether the Padres can safely sign or trade for “stars,” in their 30s, I decided to construct a test that examines the careers of players who at any given point may have been considered a “star.”
The first step was to define the parameters. I chose to define a “star” as a person selected to at least 2 allstar games-at least one of which occurred in the 90s. I examined stars from the 90s because these players were able to take advantage of relatively modern training and medical technologies. In addition, most of these players are now retired or at the very end of their careers, which allows for a longitudinal view. I included only players elected to at least 2 allstar games because this removes fluky players who may have only had one good half season, or were only elected because their team needed a representative (sorry guys, but Jon Jaha was removed from the data set).
Skill was defined by WARP (Wins Against Replacement Player). WARP has the advantage of measuring both offensive and defensive production. About 1/3 of the way through my data collection, I realized I probably should have used WARP 3, but I did not really feel like starting over at that point, and I am certain that the results were not affected by the subtle differences between WARP 1 and WARP 3.
I recorded the age of each player when he achieved his career high WARP, the lower and upper bounds of each player’s best three year WARP, and each player’s cumulative WARP from their age 26-28, 29-31, and 32-34 seasons. I calculated the mean, median, mode, and standard deviations for each category where applicable. I present the results in the table below. In addition, feel free to download the excel spreadsheet that contains the raw data and calculations.
Results (I can't seem to get the formatting right, so please scroll down):
| Age: Best WARP | Age: Best 3 yr. WARP Low | Age: Best 3 yr. WARP High | WARP 26-28 | WARP 29-31 | WARP 32-34 | |
| Mean | 27.867 | 26.965 | 28.965 | 18.366 | 16.073 | 11.944 |
| Median | 27 | 26 | 28 | 18.3 | 16.3 | 11.1 |
| Mode | 27 | 26 | 28 | |||
| Std. Dev. | 2.987 | 2.982 | 2.982 |
It is pretty clear that even the stars experience their best play between 26 and 28. From 29-31, there is a gradual decline (12.48%), and then an even more dramatic decline from 32-34 (an additional 25.69% or 34.97% from the age 26-28 seasons). These results are extremely consistent with the numbers seen in the general baseball population.
My conclusion is that although some players maintain an extremely high level of play well into their 30s, that in general, even the stars demonstrate severe slippage from their peak level of play, and that slippage tends to begin between ages 29 and 31. This fact suggests that making a large investment in a 30 year old star is a very risky proposition. Although it is likely that the star will continue to be a serviceable regular worthy of consistent playing time, the team cannot expect the player to duplicate the production from earlier in his career, and should plan accordingly.
Monday, July 14, 2008
How to Correctly Guess the Attendance
The Padres are big fans of the game: “guess the attendance.” They have a few variations of the game, but regardless of the exact rules, one lucky fan is asked to choose between a couple of attendance options. Prior to the fan choosing, the crowd is always asked for its input.
I find these games fascinating. There are three primary strategies the “lucky fan” is likely to follow. The three strategies are: going with one’s gut, choosing the highest number(s), and following the advice of the crowd.
I do not like strategy one-following one’s gut. Often, the difference between the various attendance options is only a couple of thousand people. I find it difficult to believe that a fan is able to recognize the difference between 35,000 people in a stadium and 33,000 people in a stadium. I can barely recognize the difference when 5 people enter a room where 15 previously stood. That is a 33% increase. Going from 33,000 to 35,000 is a mere 6% increase. Going with one’s gut is no likely to be more successful than a simple flip of the coin. Note: I always choose tails.
Strategy two-choosing the highest number(s)-is better. Although I do not keep an exact recording, it does seem that the highest number available for the fan to choose is the actual attendance more often than not. In addition, I have found that a general level of excitement fills the stadium when it is announced that the highest number available was in fact the actual attendance. I am not sure why fans care how many people are in the stadium with them. I suppose many fans feel that a larger crowd is associated with a better ballpark atmosphere. I am even more perplexed as to why fans care whether the actual attendance number was larger than a handful of other completely arbitrary numbers. Regardless of why fans get excited when the largest option turns out to be the actual attendance, the fact is that they do get excited about it. The Padres have surely recognized this phenomenon, and have decided to cater to the crowd by assigning the actual attendance to be the highest number on a very regular basis. At the same time, the Padres, for fear of making the game too predictable do not always select the highest number. While it does not guarantee victory, selecting the highest number seems to increase the odds of the fan guessing correctly compared to a random guess or “going with one’s gut.”
My favorite strategy is actually to go with the crowd. Going with the crowd takes advantage of the “wisdom of the crowds” phenomenon written about by James Surowiecki. In the opening anecdote of his book, Surowiecki discusses
“Francis Galton's surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when their individual guesses were averaged (the average was closer to the ox's true butchered weight than the estimates of most crowd members, and also closer than any of the separate estimates made by cattle experts” (Wikipedia.org).
Basically, even though the crowd had no particular expertise in raising oxen, they were able to better approximate the weight of the ox than an individual cattle expert. Likewise, the crowd at the ballgame is often correct in it’s prediction. It is likely that the crowd takes into account all relevant information including the fact that the highest number is correct quite often. To demonstrate the benefit of going with the crowd, one need look no further than Saturday night’s game against the Braves. Rather than choosing highest possible number combination, the crowd went with the second highest number combination. The reason for this deviation from the proven strategy of choosing the highest number, was that the highest number would have suggested an attendance that exceeded the capacity of Petco Park. The crowd recognized this fact, and was correct in it’s prediction. The (un)lucky contestant picked against the crowd, and lost.
In reality, if you are ever chosen to participate in the “guess the attendance” game at Petco Park, it probably does not matter what strategy you choose. Even the losers are often given the grand prize anyway. However, if you have some pride in your predictions, I recommend just going with crowd and rightfully staking claim to your ever so valuable Khalil Greene autographed baseball given away to each night's winner.
I find these games fascinating. There are three primary strategies the “lucky fan” is likely to follow. The three strategies are: going with one’s gut, choosing the highest number(s), and following the advice of the crowd.
I do not like strategy one-following one’s gut. Often, the difference between the various attendance options is only a couple of thousand people. I find it difficult to believe that a fan is able to recognize the difference between 35,000 people in a stadium and 33,000 people in a stadium. I can barely recognize the difference when 5 people enter a room where 15 previously stood. That is a 33% increase. Going from 33,000 to 35,000 is a mere 6% increase. Going with one’s gut is no likely to be more successful than a simple flip of the coin. Note: I always choose tails.
Strategy two-choosing the highest number(s)-is better. Although I do not keep an exact recording, it does seem that the highest number available for the fan to choose is the actual attendance more often than not. In addition, I have found that a general level of excitement fills the stadium when it is announced that the highest number available was in fact the actual attendance. I am not sure why fans care how many people are in the stadium with them. I suppose many fans feel that a larger crowd is associated with a better ballpark atmosphere. I am even more perplexed as to why fans care whether the actual attendance number was larger than a handful of other completely arbitrary numbers. Regardless of why fans get excited when the largest option turns out to be the actual attendance, the fact is that they do get excited about it. The Padres have surely recognized this phenomenon, and have decided to cater to the crowd by assigning the actual attendance to be the highest number on a very regular basis. At the same time, the Padres, for fear of making the game too predictable do not always select the highest number. While it does not guarantee victory, selecting the highest number seems to increase the odds of the fan guessing correctly compared to a random guess or “going with one’s gut.”
My favorite strategy is actually to go with the crowd. Going with the crowd takes advantage of the “wisdom of the crowds” phenomenon written about by James Surowiecki. In the opening anecdote of his book, Surowiecki discusses
“Francis Galton's surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when their individual guesses were averaged (the average was closer to the ox's true butchered weight than the estimates of most crowd members, and also closer than any of the separate estimates made by cattle experts” (Wikipedia.org).
Basically, even though the crowd had no particular expertise in raising oxen, they were able to better approximate the weight of the ox than an individual cattle expert. Likewise, the crowd at the ballgame is often correct in it’s prediction. It is likely that the crowd takes into account all relevant information including the fact that the highest number is correct quite often. To demonstrate the benefit of going with the crowd, one need look no further than Saturday night’s game against the Braves. Rather than choosing highest possible number combination, the crowd went with the second highest number combination. The reason for this deviation from the proven strategy of choosing the highest number, was that the highest number would have suggested an attendance that exceeded the capacity of Petco Park. The crowd recognized this fact, and was correct in it’s prediction. The (un)lucky contestant picked against the crowd, and lost.
In reality, if you are ever chosen to participate in the “guess the attendance” game at Petco Park, it probably does not matter what strategy you choose. Even the losers are often given the grand prize anyway. However, if you have some pride in your predictions, I recommend just going with crowd and rightfully staking claim to your ever so valuable Khalil Greene autographed baseball given away to each night's winner.
Thanks for the Memories-Carlos Hernandez
On Saturday night the Padres honored the 10th anniversary of the 1998 World Series team. I attended the game on Saturday. So did Carlos Hernandez.
Carlos Hernandez came to the Padres from the Dodgers in 1997. He was the starting catcher for much of 1998. For some reason, my memory deceived me as I have always remembered him as an above average backstop. In fact, he only had an OPS+ of 83 that season. Nonetheless, I will always have fond memories of Carlos, and for that reason, I proudly gave him a standing ovation when his name was announced on Saturday night. Thanks for the memories Carlos!
Carlos Hernandez came to the Padres from the Dodgers in 1997. He was the starting catcher for much of 1998. For some reason, my memory deceived me as I have always remembered him as an above average backstop. In fact, he only had an OPS+ of 83 that season. Nonetheless, I will always have fond memories of Carlos, and for that reason, I proudly gave him a standing ovation when his name was announced on Saturday night. Thanks for the memories Carlos!
Thursday, July 10, 2008
VORP SHMORP?
JC Bradbury is an economist that writes about baseball. He really likes the Braves. And really hates VORP.
VORP which stands for Value Over Replacement Player, is defined by Baseball Prospectus as “the number of [offensive] runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances.” So, a player with a VORP of 10 has contributed 10 more runs than a freely available player who could be called up from the minors would have produced. VORP is adjusted for many variables such as year, park, and league effects.
In his blog, Bradbury writes that VORP is nothing more than “insider language,” and compares using the statistic to “speaking Klingon at a Star Trek convention.” He argues that VORP does not provide any advantages over other statistics such as ERA+ and OPS+ which also include adjustments for park and league effects. Additionally, Bradbury believes that the replacement level is arbitrary and no more useful than using the average level. Bradbury also notes that VORP is misused in evaluating player salaries because “player value is determined by opportunity cost as determined by marginal revenue product (MRP),” not VORP.
In many respects, Bradbury is correct. Park, league, and year adjustments can be made to almost any statistic, the replacement level is somewhat arbitrary, and player value is more closely aligned with MRP than VORP (although VORP can be used as a quick and dirty way to get an idea of a player's marginal value). None of these points lead to the logical conclusion that VORP does not have a place in baseball discussions. Batting average does not explain run production as well as OPS, but it is still a somewhat interesting stat to examine. Likewise, RBI is partly a function of opportunity, but it is still neat to note the number of runs a batter has actually driven in, regardless of whether that batter is likely to repeat that effort. Like many other statistics, VORP is interesting to examine, and leads to some pretty funny observations like the fact that as of June 15, “if you exclude the resurgent Cristian Guzmán (VORP: 21.5), the Washington Nationals' offense has a negative VORP -- which, in essence, means if you released every last one of their position players (except Guzmán) and replaced them with cheap, waiver-wire scrubs, the team would be better off” (David Sheinin-Washington Post). Now, would it be smart to actually release every member of the National’s lineup and replace them with replacement level talent? Of course not. Many of those players true ability is above replacement level, but the stat provided a nice laugh and starting point for further discussion.
Bradbury himself seems to hedge, by stating: “My point isn’t that VORP is an awful or useless stat. To the contrary, there is clearly useful information contained in it.” If there is useful information contained in VORP, and it is not an “awful or useless stat,” why does Bradbury get so worked up over its use? My guess is that he is deliberately trying to ruffle some feathers, and potentially drive up publicity for himself, his blog, and his book. Or maybe, he just really hates VORP.
VORP which stands for Value Over Replacement Player, is defined by Baseball Prospectus as “the number of [offensive] runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances.” So, a player with a VORP of 10 has contributed 10 more runs than a freely available player who could be called up from the minors would have produced. VORP is adjusted for many variables such as year, park, and league effects.
In his blog, Bradbury writes that VORP is nothing more than “insider language,” and compares using the statistic to “speaking Klingon at a Star Trek convention.” He argues that VORP does not provide any advantages over other statistics such as ERA+ and OPS+ which also include adjustments for park and league effects. Additionally, Bradbury believes that the replacement level is arbitrary and no more useful than using the average level. Bradbury also notes that VORP is misused in evaluating player salaries because “player value is determined by opportunity cost as determined by marginal revenue product (MRP),” not VORP.
In many respects, Bradbury is correct. Park, league, and year adjustments can be made to almost any statistic, the replacement level is somewhat arbitrary, and player value is more closely aligned with MRP than VORP (although VORP can be used as a quick and dirty way to get an idea of a player's marginal value). None of these points lead to the logical conclusion that VORP does not have a place in baseball discussions. Batting average does not explain run production as well as OPS, but it is still a somewhat interesting stat to examine. Likewise, RBI is partly a function of opportunity, but it is still neat to note the number of runs a batter has actually driven in, regardless of whether that batter is likely to repeat that effort. Like many other statistics, VORP is interesting to examine, and leads to some pretty funny observations like the fact that as of June 15, “if you exclude the resurgent Cristian Guzmán (VORP: 21.5), the Washington Nationals' offense has a negative VORP -- which, in essence, means if you released every last one of their position players (except Guzmán) and replaced them with cheap, waiver-wire scrubs, the team would be better off” (David Sheinin-Washington Post). Now, would it be smart to actually release every member of the National’s lineup and replace them with replacement level talent? Of course not. Many of those players true ability is above replacement level, but the stat provided a nice laugh and starting point for further discussion.
Bradbury himself seems to hedge, by stating: “My point isn’t that VORP is an awful or useless stat. To the contrary, there is clearly useful information contained in it.” If there is useful information contained in VORP, and it is not an “awful or useless stat,” why does Bradbury get so worked up over its use? My guess is that he is deliberately trying to ruffle some feathers, and potentially drive up publicity for himself, his blog, and his book. Or maybe, he just really hates VORP.
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Matty V.
Last week I wrote about the idiocy of a particular Ted Leitner statement. Today I write to commend the quality work put out by Matt Vasgersian on each of his telecasts. Prior to joining the Padres in 2002, Matt was perhaps best known to Padres fans as the play-by-play voice of the now defunct XFL. I guess not even true talent could save the league that was famous for outlawing the fair-catch. Upon joining the Padres, he was paired with Mark “Mud” Grant, who while not quite up to the caliber of Matty V., is one of the few announcers able to pull off the “silly shtick” persona.
What’s great about Vasgersian is he keeps the game fun, while still calling a fundamentally good game. When away from San Diego, mlb.tv forces me to watch Padres road games called by the home-team’s announcers. Nationally renowned play-by-play men do not even approach Vasgersian’s ability to combine entertainment with detailed description. Vin Scully, the longtime voice of the Dodgers is famous for his “great voice” and never-ending stock of adjectives. But, he’s boring. By the sixth inning of a low scoring affair between the Duds and Pads, I was able to take no more, and had to shut off my computer. The Giants famed play-by-play man, Jon Miller is nearly as horrendous. I had always given him the benefit of the doubt when I watched his work on ESPN’s nationally televised broadcasts; after all, to be able to work with Joe Morgan for so many years is a testament to Miller’s professionalism. Professionalism aside, Miller is dull. Sure he calls a good game, but he comes nowhere near matching Vasgersian’s quick wit and abundance of clever Seinfeld references. Lesser known announcers from other teams provide for an equally abysmal viewing experience.
As a Padres fan, I recognize that I may be biased in proclaiming Vasgersian’s supremacy over all other announcers. When watching telecasts called by others, I try to reduce this bias, and derive an impartial opinion. In fact, prior to watching Scully for the first time, I really wanted to enjoy his work. It just didn’t happen. I guess I have become so accustomed to the quality produced by Matty V., that when watching games called by lesser-skilled announcers, I quickly pick up on their reduced ability.
I leave you with one of Matt’s all-time best calls from the 2008 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl (That’s right, he does more than just baseball):
What’s great about Vasgersian is he keeps the game fun, while still calling a fundamentally good game. When away from San Diego, mlb.tv forces me to watch Padres road games called by the home-team’s announcers. Nationally renowned play-by-play men do not even approach Vasgersian’s ability to combine entertainment with detailed description. Vin Scully, the longtime voice of the Dodgers is famous for his “great voice” and never-ending stock of adjectives. But, he’s boring. By the sixth inning of a low scoring affair between the Duds and Pads, I was able to take no more, and had to shut off my computer. The Giants famed play-by-play man, Jon Miller is nearly as horrendous. I had always given him the benefit of the doubt when I watched his work on ESPN’s nationally televised broadcasts; after all, to be able to work with Joe Morgan for so many years is a testament to Miller’s professionalism. Professionalism aside, Miller is dull. Sure he calls a good game, but he comes nowhere near matching Vasgersian’s quick wit and abundance of clever Seinfeld references. Lesser known announcers from other teams provide for an equally abysmal viewing experience.
As a Padres fan, I recognize that I may be biased in proclaiming Vasgersian’s supremacy over all other announcers. When watching telecasts called by others, I try to reduce this bias, and derive an impartial opinion. In fact, prior to watching Scully for the first time, I really wanted to enjoy his work. It just didn’t happen. I guess I have become so accustomed to the quality produced by Matty V., that when watching games called by lesser-skilled announcers, I quickly pick up on their reduced ability.
I leave you with one of Matt’s all-time best calls from the 2008 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl (That’s right, he does more than just baseball):
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